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ABSTRACT 
THOMAS J. MUSTILLO: Entrants in the Political Arena: New Party Trajectories  
During the Third Wave of Democracy in Latin America 
(Under the direction of Jonathan Hartlyn) 
 The frequency and impact of new parties in Latin America’s new democracies has 
been profound, especially in comparison to their role in established democracies. From the 
relatively stable Chile and Uruguay to the highly volatile Ecuador and Bolivia, new entrants 
have altered national party systems.  
The electoral fortunes of new parties have been diverse. Most studies of new parties 
dichotomously classify them into successes and failures. In the more stable party systems of 
the world, this approach may be sufficient. However, in unstable systems of the developing 
world where volatility is high, the quality of representation is low, and parties are weakly 
institutionalized, we are likely to find more than two distinctive categories of party 
performance. This project begins with an analysis of the legislative electoral performance of 
all new parties from Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador and Venezuela using latent trajectory models 
and finds that there are five distinctive performance profiles among the population. I call 
these groups the explosive, contender, flash, flat and flop trajectories and classify each party 
into one group. In the relative stability of Chile there are parties of two types while the other 
systems have more diversity. 
 Theories of new party success have largely focused on advanced party systems where 
party competition and linkages with voters are centered around issues and programs. Party 
 iv 
systems in Latin America don’t often follow this logic. When they don’t, these theories can’t 
explain new party performance. In the second part of this project I use a nested research 
design—a small-N qualitative analysis of new parties in Ecuador nested in a large-N 
quantitative analysis of new parties in Ecuador, Venezuela and Bolivia—to build and test an 
alternative explanation of new party performance centered on organizational features of the 
parties, and specifically on their programmatic, machine, personalistic, or vote-buying 
strategic orientation. 
 I find that in unstable party systems, to be a contender a new party must build a 
national network of machine-based linkages with constituents that are geographically rather 
than economically or socially defined; have access to considerable discretionary resources; 
and be weakly constrained by organizationally articulated programmatic demands. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
New Entrants in Latin America 
The frequency of new party entry and the impact of new parties on the party systems 
and on representation in Latin America’s third wave democracies has been profound, 
especially in comparison to the role of new parties in established democracies. New political 
parties have emerged to successfully challenge and sometimes win national legislative and 
executive elections: Chile’s right-wing confessional Independent Democratic Union (UDI) 
was born in the 1989 transition to democracy and finished second in the 1999 presidential 
elections and won the highest vote share of any party in both the 2001 and 2005 lower house 
elections; Uruguay’s leftist Broad Front (FA) emerged from within an institutionalized two-
party system to capture the presidency and an absolute majority in congress in 2004; 
Venezuela’s neo-populist Fifth Republic Movement (MVR) emerged in the mid 1990s and 
won the presidency by 1998; Bolivia’s Movement Towards Socialism (MAS) organized as 
an indigenous and cocoa growers party in 1990’s and won an unprecedented absolute 
majority in the 2006 presidential election. Not surprisingly, these success stories have drawn 
the attention of political scientists who study Latin America, but often in a particularistic 
manner—why the right in Chile, the left in Uruguay, the populist in Venezuela, and the 
indigenous in Bolivia?  
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Also striking, but less studied, are the number of new parties which have emerged 
with other performance profiles. In Venezuela in 2005, roughly 251 electoral groups 
competing under a new name emerged in the national legislative elections, with 171 of them 
competing in only one state. Between the striking successes and the hundreds of nearly 
invisible competitors are other distinctive performance trajectories. For example, in Ecuador, 
veteran politician Sixto Duran-Ballen formed the United Republican Party (PUR) to contest 
and win the 1992 presidential elections, but despite its ambitions for growth, by the 1994 
mid-term elections the party was on the wane and in 1996 it disappeared entirely. 
In the region as a whole, since the most recent transition to democracy, most 
countries have experienced a proliferation of new parties. Table 1.1 below lists the 
approximate number of new parties that have gained representation in the lower house of 
congress.1 The number of parties contesting national legislative elections is frequently much 
larger, though comprehensive data on the subject is not available. In the four countries 
analyzed in this project, the frequencies are as follows: Bolivia from 1985 to 2005 had 37 
new party entrants; Chile from 1989 to 2005 had 20 new entrants; Ecuador from 1979-2002 
had 96 new entrants; and Venezuela from 1958-2005 had 797 new entrants. 
                                                          
1
 The number is an approximation because not all parties were rigorously coded according to the definition of 
new party used in this analysis. Sources include Nohlen and Pachano (2005), Coppedge (1997), and various 
country specific sources. Independent congressional members are not counted if they are reported as running as 
“independents” with no party or movement name. 
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Table 1.1:  
New Parties in Latin American Lower Houses During the Third Wave 
Country Parties Years 
Argentina 34 1983-2001 
Bolivia 13 1985-2002 
Brazil 14 1986-2002 
Chile 8 1989-2001 
Colombia 65 1958-2002 
Costa Rica 16 1953-2002 
Dominican Republic 5 1978-2002 
Ecuador 15 1979-2002 
El Salvador 11 1985-2002 
Guatemala 12 1985-1999 
Honduras 3 1981-2001 
Nicaragua 18 1984-2001 
Panama 9 1989-1999 
Peru 22 1980-2001 
Uruguay 2 1989-1999 
Venezuela 40 1958-2000 
 
In spite of anecdotal accounts of the impressive impact new parties have on the party 
systems of the region, they have received little attention as a group. We lack theories which 
describe, measure, and account for their activity and their impact. New party activity is a 
window into the performance of the young democracies of the Americas. First, it reveals how 
third wave democracies are consolidating, in the narrowly construed sense of the concept 
(Munck 2001, Schedler 1998). Party systems, under stress from economic and social 
changes, are generating newly mobilized demands and shifting political divisions. Most of 
the political systems have been in deep flux. The ways in which new parties assert 
themselves and the ways in which new voices are channeled by the existing powers tell us 
something about the means actors are willing to use to gain or maintain political power.  
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Second, new party activity is an indicator of how the larger party system and the 
parties which occupy it are performing their representative function. In systems where voters 
have strong and enduring linkages with parties, we would expect the impact of new parties to 
have a marginal effect on party systems and there is some indirect evidence in support of this 
suspicion. Of the four dimensions of party system institutionalization—regularity of inter-
party competition, party roots in society, party legitimacy, and party organization—new party 
activity figures directly into the first three and indirectly into the last (Mainwaring and Scully 
1995, Mainwaring and Torcal 2005). Furthermore, by finding a strong association between 
party system institutionalization and representation—measured as congruence between 
legislator issue opinions and voter issue opinions—Luna and Zechmeister (2005) suggest that 
new party challenges will be less intense and less frequent when the quality of party 
representation is strong. 
On the contrary, where party institutionalization is weak, we would expect higher 
volatility in voting patterns and a more profound influence of new challengers to the system. 
Of course, party institutionalization need not be formalized (Levitsky 2003, Levitsky and 
Feidenberg 2006) and where it is informally institutionalized, the relevant question with 
respect to representation shifts from the strength of the presumed substantive content of 
representation—what Kitschelt calls programmatic party-voter exchange—to the possibility 
that parties and voters may be linked by clientelism or some other mode of exchange. In 
informally institutionalized party systems, if the basis of exchange is different such that 
parties do not compete on the basis of platforms and appeals to broad social constituencies, 
then we might ask what role new parties play in these systems, and in particular whether new 
principled parties are able to succeed. In sum, a general and comparative study of new parties 
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will tell us something about the variation in strategies and modes of linkage that are 
electorally viable in the countries of the region. 
Third, new party activity reveals how social and economic structural conditions 
interact with national party systems. Transitions to democracy have been accompanied by the 
rise of multiple new political divisions. Political regime, economic liberalization, state form, 
and ethnic identity have all been the basis of recent political mobilizations. Though not all of 
them meet the rigorous conditions set out by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) to qualify as 
“political cleavages,” all have been features of political contestation in multiple countries of 
the region. For example, economic liberalization has had differing consequences in the party 
systems of the region, with some systems incorporating the new divide and remaining stable 
while others have decomposed and reemerged under fundamentally different logics (Roberts 
forthcoming) and with important new political actors in the electoral arena. Yashar (2005) 
argues that neo-liberalizing reforms were the impetus for the emergence of indigenous social 
movements in the Andes. A study of new parties contributes to our understanding of when 
and how underlying social and economic divisions are transferred into the political arena. 
Finally, new party activity is an indicator of the degree to which institutional design 
has achieved its intended outcomes. Practitioners have tried to engineer party system 
outcomes by crafting electoral and party laws designed to institutionalize and nationalize 
party competition, reduce fragmentation, and cull small parties in the most volatile of 
countries. A large scholarly literature exists on these efforts in the region (Mejia 2002, 
Hurtado 1990, Sievelis 2000, Van Cott 2005, Birnir 2004). A general study of new parties 
with a more fully developed concept of the early electoral life of the party can reveal the 
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strengths and limits of institutional explanations of certain features of a party system’s 
dynamics. 
This project is a comparative study of new political parties which brings all aspirants 
into the analysis—winners and losers—to investigate first whether those parties can be 
grouped into distinctive performance profiles and second whether extant theoretical 
predictive or a new model of electoral performance will account for the variation in a general 
analysis of Latin American parties.  
Party Competition in Latin American Party Systems 
Party systems in Latin America are extremely diverse, as I describe in Chapter 3. In 
this project I am particularly interested in party systems that have been sometimes described 
as fluid, inchoate, informally institutionalized, and non-programmatically structured. While 
there have been some attempts to import extant models of party competition—in particular 
cleavage, spatial and institutional approaches—into Latin America, these approaches do not 
always travel well. In particular, when party-voter linkages are formed over personalism or 
clientelism rather than party programs, then the party system is operating by a logic which is 
at odds to the assumptions of those approaches.  
Instead, I argue that an organization-centered explanation will be necessary to 
understand electoral competition in general, and the performance of new parties in particular. 
Such an approach has been neglected until recently, and is a departure from the norm. For 
example, Gibson (1996) urges caution: “If our concern is to distinguish between parties in 
ways that are relevant to the broader conflicts of society, an organization-centered approach 
provides little to work with” (p 19). Yet, there is growing evidence of the fact that many 
party systems—though by no means all—in Latin America lack partisan divides that 
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articulate broad conflicts of society (Rosas 2005, Luna and Zechmeister 2005, Coppedge 
1998, Dix 1989). Furthermore, case evidence is accumulating which emphasizes how parties 
typically thought of as programmatic are increasingly opting to invest in alternative linkage 
strategies. 
In this project, then, I focus attention of party systems which are not 
programmatically structured. With this domain restriction, I ask first: What is the observed 
variation in new party performance? What would be a suitable way to model that variation? 
Second, I ask: Do extant theories of new party performance, developed primarily in 
programmatically structured party systems, explain the observed variation in the non-
programmatically structured context? Third, I ask: What theoretically framework can I 
deploy, and if necessary alter, in order to adequately explain new party performance in this 
context? Lastly, I ask: How well does my model of new party performance explain party 
performance trajectories in Ecuador since the transition to democracy? 
Research Design and Case Selection 
This project takes place in three phases. First, in Chapter 2 I develop a conceptual and 
empirical approach for studying the electoral fortunes of new political parties. I borrow a 
quantitative technique from the fields of developmental psychology and criminology called 
“Latent Trajectory Modeling” which is specifically designed to analyze repeated measures 
over time of some behavior or trait—in this case party vote percentage—when there is 
theoretical reason to believe that the many observed trajectories can be grouped into 
qualitatively distinct categories. I use this analysis to classify the hundreds of parties I study 
into one of five groups. These classifications, in turn, form the dependent variable for the 
remainder of the project.  
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Whenever one attempts to explain variation in a categorical variable, in which each 
value differs nominally rather than ordinally, discretely or continuously from all the other 
values, the scope of the task can be large because it may include explaining each possible 
pairing of the values. In my case, the dependent variable has five categories and the scope 
could include explaining differences between categories 1 and 2, 1 and 3, 1 and 4, 1 and 5, 2 
and 3, 2 and 4, etc. Of the five categories in my dependent variable, one conforms most 
closely to conventional notions of electoral success: the “contender” parties. Three of the 
others are different variants of failure, and the fifth, what I call the “explosive” group, is 
rather rare and newly observed trajectory. Therefore, I will confine my explanation to 
distinguishing between the “contender” trajectory and the other four groups. 
Beginning in Chapter 3, I adopt a “nested” research design to explain why new 
parties are contenders rather than one of the other four types (Lieberman 2005). Because I 
adopt a domain restriction which takes the analysis of new party performance into unfamiliar 
territory—that is, the territory of non-programmatic party competition—I will begin with a 
large-N analysis which tests the robustness of explanatory models from outside that domain 
and compares the results with a preliminary formulation of a theoretical model—an 
organization-based approach—which I expect will perform better under my restriction. I use 
a multinomial logit model to compare the models. I expect that the findings for the imported 
theories will in general not be robust. Furthermore, I hope to find sufficient preliminary 
support for the organization-based approach to justify a model-building small-N analysis, 
which by the end of Chapter 3 I do.  
In Chapter 4 I develop a theoretical framework derived from insights taken from 
Adrich (1995), Kitschelt (2000) and others concerning party-voter linkages and parties as 
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solutions to voter collective action problems. I turn to the model-building small-N analysis in 
chapter 5, where I look closely at eight new parties, two from each of four types on my 
dependent variable, and test the theoretical model of chapter 5. I use data gathered during 
field research over six months between July 2005 and May 2006. My research in Ecuador 
was primarily interviews with party founders and early party leaders and national candidates 
about concerning strategic decisions from the founding years. Additionally, I gathered 
detailed electoral data, and primary and secondary sources on the early years of the new 
parties.  
Ideally, from there one could take the findings of the small-N analysis to formulate 
concepts and measures which can be reapplied in the large-N setting to test for the robustness 
of the theory. That stage, however, is beyond the scope of this project, and in any case would 
rely upon data about parties in the Americas that has not been assembled. 
Overview of the Argument and Dissertation Outline 
In chapter 2 I analyze new parties in four countries since the most recent democratic 
transition: Bolivia since 1985, Chile since 1989, Ecuador since 1979 and Venezuela since 
1958. These countries represent diversity in the degree to which party competition is 
programmatically oriented, with Chile being programmatic and the other three being non-
programmatic. I argue that when the analysis of new parties moves beyond highly 
institutionalized and programmatic arenas, that the dichotomy of success and failure to 
describe new party performance is no longer adequate. Instead, I expect there to be a larger 
number of distinctive performance profiles. I use statistical and theoretically grounded 
criteria to compare models and select a model in which there are five qualitatively distinctive 
performance profiles in the sample: “flop” parties which enter with less than 1% of the vote 
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and always disappear quickly; “flat” parties which enter with about 6% of the vote and 
persist though without growing; “flash” parties which enter prominently with about 12% of 
the vote but soon disappear; “contender” parties which also enter prominently at about the 
same level, but go on to become dominant players in the party system through slow and 
steady growth; and finally “explosive” parties which enter powerfully with 33% of the vote 
and quickly become the dominant player. The main distinction between cases from the 
programmatic system and cases from the non-programmatic systems is that the former parties 
from a more limited menu of the full range: only of the “contender” and “flop” types. Chile, 
however, also has the most majoritarian electoral system, with a district magnitude of two. 
This approach contrasts sharply with the traditional approach in the study of new party 
performance where grouping criteria and case classifications are assumed but never tested. 
In Chapter 3, I find no support for social-structural and programmatic theories of new 
party performance, but suggestive support for a linkage and organization based approach. I 
find that higher levels of district magnitude increase that probability that new parties will be 
flop rather than flat, flash or contender parties. This result is rather trivial, but consistent with 
the expectation in a sample where district magnitude is never very low. None of the 
predictors explain the distinction between contender parties and explosive parties. Given that 
the case for my small-N analysis doesn’t contain any explosive parties, I set aside this null 
result as outside the scope of this analysis. Though the phenomena of explosive parties is 
clearly very important, it requires separate theoretical treatment which will likely involve the 
dynamics of party system collapse. 
In Chapter 4 I use the “calculus of voting” model as a heuristic to derive expectations 
about the types of linkage strategies a party will build to solve the voter’s collective action 
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problem. I relate the various terms of the model to four strategies—the machine strategy, the 
vote-buying strategy, the personalist strategy, and the programmatic strategy. I then link 
these strategies to the organizational features a party will incorporate to deploy them.  
Finally, in Chapter 5 I look closely at eight parties in Ecuador—two contenders, two 
flash parties, two flat parties, and two flop parties—to examine the types of linkages the 
parties built with their voters and the degree to which these linkages contribute to the party’s 
performance profile.  
In sum, this paper introduces four innovations to the study of new party performance. 
First, it proposes looking at parties across party families and across national contexts to 
investigate whether there are general trends of new party performance. Second, it proposes 
adopting a quantitative technique to model these trends and classify the cases into groups. 
Third, taken together, this approach to modeling party performance has important theoretical 
implications for the study of new parties and party system change, and especially for the 
types of causal accounts we develop and test in the discipline. In particular, this approach 
raises the question of whether or not findings which privilege particularities of a given party 
family or a given party system—for example, that the strength and unity of the indigenous 
movement predicts indigenous party success or that permissive multi-party systems lead to 
easier success for new entrants—are truly explanatory, or instead should be incorporated into 
a broader explanatory framework, or weighted more or less when other predictors (which 
may vary outside but not within the comparison set) are incorporated. Lastly, because this 
project looks squarely at the party as the unit of analysis, it suggests that causal accounts 
should shift the focus to party-level attributes to explain electoral performance. I incorporate 
and measure of party-level predictors of trajectory groupings. This represents an important 
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evolution in the study of new parties, which generally privileges system-level variables, such 
as electoral rules and social structures. 
  
 
CHAPTER II 
A CONCEPTUAL AND METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH TO  
NEW PARTY ENTRANTS 
Introduction 
“Just as all men bear all their lives the mark of their childhood, so parties are 
profoundly influenced by their origins” (Duverger, 1959, p. xxiii) 
“Every organization bears the mark of its formation, of the crucial political-
administrative decisions made by its founders, the decisions which ‘molded’ the 
organization” (Panebianco, 1988, p. 50). 
If Duverger is correct—that the life-course of a political party is constrained by the 
circumstances surrounding its origins; and if Panebianco is correct—that at its origins, a 
party is encoded with a genetic imprint, then the early years of the life of a political party are 
distinctive and deserve careful study and nuanced theorizing. These and other scholars have 
constructed a valuable theoretical foundation upon which students of political parties can 
form and test new hypotheses about party formation and success. In this chapter I extend 
their human development metaphor by borrowing from the fields of developmental 
psychology to propose a conceptual and methodological approach for the study of new 
parties. I propose conceptualizing the early life of a party as a developmental trajectory and 
measuring development by using the vote percentage won by a party over its first five 
elections to the lower or only chamber of congress. 
 14 
I begin this chapter by reviewing the dominant approach—dichotomizing new party 
performance into success and failure—found in the literature and by pointing out the 
problems in concept and measurement with this approach. Also, I outline an argument which 
finds this approach theoretically ill-suited for application in volatile party systems. In the 
second section I lay the groundwork for treating the early electoral life of a party as a 
qualitatively distinct phase of life. In the third and fourth sections, I first outline an 
alternative approach—called latent trajectory modeling (or semi parametric mixture 
modeling)—to  measuring party performance and then test the propositions of the theoretical 
framework of section two on new political parties in four countries of Latin America in their 
most recent democratic episode. I find that in this geographical and temporal context, new 
political parties follow a small number of qualitatively distinctive developmental trajectories. 
Specifically, I have identified and named five trajectory groups: “explosive parties,” 
“contender parties”, “flash parties,” “flat parties,” and “flop parties.” Rather than coarsely 
and by fiat dividing new parties into the categories of successes and failures, as is the 
convention of most treatments of new parties, we can test for the existence of distinctive 
groups and test for the classification of parties into one group or another. 
Beyond the Dichotomy of Success and Failure 
This section reviews the extant approaches to the study of new party performance and 
argues that in poorly institutionalized party systems the standard approach of using subjective 
and dichotomous measures of performance are insufficient because they fail to test 
assumptions implicit in the criteria and they fail to capture the theoretically relevant variation 
of the dependent variable. 
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In the larger context of studying party system change—whether it be realignment, 
dealignment, fragmentation, collapse or consolidation—it is extremely important to 
understand the role of new parties and their developmental patterns. The preliminary step to 
comprehensive and generally applicable theories, and hypotheses about party system change 
and the role of new parties in particular, requires an empirically and theoretically defensible 
scheme for measuring their performance. This project seeks to improve upon the methods 
generally used for identifying and grouping new political parties by adopting a testable 
modeling technique which is also theoretically sensible. In particular, it seeks to move 
beyond the overly simplistic dichotomy of “success” and “failure.” 
Approaches to concept and measurement of the initial performance of new parties has 
evolved over time. In the earliest published quantitative analysis of the subject, Harmel and 
Robertson (1985) measure new party success by sorting their cases into countries where any 
new party has gained at least one seat in the lower chamber and the cases where no new party 
had gained a seat in the lower chamber. This division allows them to code countries as cases 
of successful new party formation and cases of unsuccessful new party formation. With this 
setup, the party is not the unit of the analysis, and they therefore cannot explain party 
performance using predictors which are attributes of the party. Many studies since then have 
shifted from the country as the unit of analysis to the party as the unit of analysis.  
Among the body of work where the party is the unit of analysis, the principle 
weakness is that the studies adopt relatively arbitrary cut points to groups their cases, usually 
into the categories of successful and failed new parties. For example, Kitschelt’s (1989) 
study of ecological parties in Europe parses out cases of “significant” and “insignificant” 
entry by setting a cut point of 4% of the national legislative vote during at least one election 
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between the range of years he studies. Many studies of new parties have proceeded in this 
general manner to identify their subjects and classify their cases. There are sometimes 
defensible reasons for these approaches, especially in systems where electoral competition is 
stable. Under those circumstances, the subjective nature of the decision-making process does 
not necessarily affect the veracity of the findings. But in general, authors who adopt a 
dichotomous successful/failed classification of new political parties ignore the fact that 
subtypes may exist. The country case approach will sometimes yield conceptualizations that 
are more subtle, as, for example in Converse and Dupeux’s discussion of “flash parties,” a 
term coined with reference to a peculiar (in a European context) unstable phenomena found 
during the French 4th Republic, which lasted through 1958 (1962). They remark:  
“The turbulence of French politics has long fascinated observers, particularly 
when comparisons have been drawn with the stability or...the dull 
complacency of American political life. Profound ideological cleavages in 
France, the instability of governments and republics, and the rise and fall of 
“flash” parties...have all contributed to the impression of peculiar intensity in 
the tenor of French political life” [emphasis added] (page 1) 
 
Flash parties start strong but soon die. In a dichotomous scheme, it is unclear whether 
these parties should be considered cases of success or failure. In the long run, they may 
properly be considered “failed” cases, but in the short run, they may properly be considered 
“success” cases. In sum, whether the particular research design and country context can 
theoretically justify a dichotomy or not, there are new modeling techniques available which 
allow us to make this determination with more precision and support. 
Approaches that use cut points adopt an unnecessarily restrictive application of data 
theory. This occurs whenever analysts adopt a nominal level of measurement when they 
could instead adopt a higher level of measurement. The dependent variable—new party 
performance—is most commonly measured using vote share, but vote share is almost never 
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used directly. In the course of dichotomizing according to ad hoc rules, one discards 
important information concerning the variation of the dependent variable. While doing so is 
not technically problematic—and depending on the research question may be perfectly 
appropriate (Steenbergen, stats notes)—the literature on new party performance suggests that 
it is ill-advised because there is a theoretical foundation for expecting distinctive intermediate 
categories, as described with the case of “flash” parties.  
Even when vote share has been used directly (Hug 2001), it is often only measured at 
one point in time—at the first election—and therefore performs poorly as a measure of new 
party performance. Party performance is a dynamic process which should instead be 
measured over several elections.  
These flaws in concept and measurement call into question some of the important 
conclusions of the literature because the form of the dependent variable has explanatory 
implications. If there are theoretically relevant and qualitatively distinctive groups of 
performance profiles among new parties which are not identified, our explanations can be 
incomplete or flawed. The research design I adopt here and describe in section three below 
allows me to more rigorously specify the dependent variable. 
Electoral Performance in Volatile Country Contexts 
The prominence of the dichotomizing approach is not surprising given the fact that 
the literature on new party performance was developed in the advanced industrial context. 
Cleavage theory, for example, traditionally posited a freezing of the systems with new party 
entrants arising at critical junctures (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, Scully 1992). Even with the 
updating of these frameworks by studies of party system realignment and dealignment 
(Dalton, Kitschelt, etc), it remains conceptually plausible if blunt to think of new parties as 
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making it or not because the systems remain relatively stable and institutionalized. But how 
shall we proceed when the “intensity” observed by Converse and Dupeux, rather than being 
“peculiar,” is not so peculiar? 
In Latin America, many parties and party systems are highly volatile and poorly 
institutionalized. In some cases, the implementation of liberalizing economic reforms has 
weakened the organizational basis of labor-based parties leading them to replace or 
complement programmatic and socially encapsulated organizational linkages with 
clientelisitic ones in order to remain competitive (Roberts forthcoming, Levitsty 2003 on 
Peronism, Luna forthcoming on FA in Uruguay and Luna manuscript on UDI in Chile, 
Samuels 2004 and Hunter APSA 2006 on PT, Freidenberg and Alcántara 2001 on ID). In 
other countries, some or all parties have always been at best weakly programmatically linked 
with voters. In countries of the region with historically “elitist” party systems, the logic of 
linkage is typically non-programmatic (Roberts forthcoming). Gibson argues that 
conservative parties, whose core constituency is the upper classes, must develop a non-
programmatic mechanism of linkage with non-elite voters to compete successfully (Gibson 
1996). 
Under these circumstances, where we can expect wide diversity in the performance 
profiles of new parties, dichotomizing their performance into success and failure according to 
an arbitrary cut point is insufficient. The case-based literature underscores the degree of 
variation that exists in new party trajectories. To name just a few, Gamarra speaks of new 
parties during Bolivia’s transition as having been dubbed “taxi” parties because their entire 
membership can fit in a taxi (Gamarra 1995) while Keck (1992), Buhn (1997) and Ellner 
(1988) trace the origins and early life three of leftist parties—Brazil’s PT, Mexico’s PRD and 
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Venezuela’s MAS, respectively—which were electorally weak but enduring over their early 
years. Also, there is ample discussion in journalistic and academic press about performance 
profiles that resemble “flash” parties. The wider range of variation in performance profiles is 
theoretically relevant to our understanding of party systems in volatile contexts. 
Scholars have developed many concepts and measures to capture the weak and 
unstable footing of many party systems in Latin America. Kitschelt and Zechmeister (2003) 
use the 1998 University of Salamanca surveys of legislators to develop a measure of 
“programmatic orientation” of politicians, which ranges from 0 to 100. They define 
programmatic orientation as a policy-based linkage of accountability and responsiveness 
between voters and politicians. Figure 2.1 below reveals the great variation in the region. In 
particular it reveals that politicians in Ecuador and Colombia are not at all programmatically 
oriented, and that politicians in Brazil, Bolivia, Venezuela, Uruguay and Peru are only 
weakly programmatically oriented.  
Figure 2.1:  
Programmatic Orientation of Politicians  
(Kitschelt and Zechmeister 2003) 
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Similarly, Rosas (2005) uses the same data to construct an index of ideological 
orientation of the party systems of the region. See Figure 2.2 below. The party systems of 
Ecuador, Venezuela, Brazil, Peru and Bolivia stand out as having very low scores, even as 
Chile, Mexico and Uruguay score well. In contexts, where programmatic or ideological 
orientation is low, a dichotomous treatment of party performance may not be adequate 
because many politicians cohere into parties for alternative, non policy-based, reasons. 
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Figure 2.2:  
Ideological Orientation (Rosas 2005) 
 
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
Ch
ile
Me
xic
o
Ur
ug
ua
y
Co
sta
 
Ric
a
Ar
ge
nti
na
Co
lom
bia
Ec
ua
do
r
Ve
ne
zu
ela
Br
az
il
Pe
ru
Bo
lvia
 
 
 
Luna and Zechmeister (2005) use the University of Salamanca surveys of 
parliamentarians and Latinobarometer surveys of voters to develop a measure of congruence 
between elite and voter policy preferences. Their measure, which ranges theoretically from –
10 to 10, captures the degree of representation success (positive values) or failure (negative 
values). Scores of zero correspond to cases where there is no relationship between elite and 
voter preferences over bundles of issues. Figure 2.3 shows that while Chile and Uruguay are 
cases of representation success, the other cases are noticeably less representative, and 
Mexico, Bolivia, and Ecuador score near zero. In such contexts, a dichotomous treatment of 
new party performance might not be adequate because linkages between parties and voters 
are not policy-based. 
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Figure 2.3:  
Elite-Mass Congruence (Luna and Zechmeister 2005) 
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Building upon Mainwaring’s work on party and party system institutionalization, a 
large literature has evolved to measure this concept and its component parts, which are: 1) 
stability in patterns of inter-party competition; 2) party roots in society; 3) the legitimacy of 
parties and elections; and 4) party organization (Mainwaring and Scully 1995, Mainwaring 
1999, Mainwaring and Torcal 2005, Jones 2005). Figure 2.4 below reports Jones’ 2005 party 
system institutionalization calculations with the dark bar and Mainwaring and Scully’s 
original 1995 calculations using the light bar.2 The time points are not precisely comparable, 
mostly because the more recent attempt incorporates more precision and survey data not 
available in 1995. Nevertheless, they are conceptually equivalent. The variation between 
countries is more dramatic with the early measure. The compression that is evident between 
the high and low in the 2005 values over the 1995 values is likely to be a result of both 
improved precision in the measurements and substantial erosion of institutionalization in 
                                                          
2
 Mainwaring and Scully’s index has been rescaled from 0-12 to 0-100. 
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several national contexts, especially Colombia and Venezuela, but also in Chile and Costa 
Rica. 
Figure 2.4:  
Party System Institutionalization (Jones 2005, Mainwaring and Scully 1995) 
Party System Institutionalization
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Taken together, these indicators of diversity in party systems of the region justify 
skepticism of the sufficiency of using dichotomous measures of new party performance. 
Returning to Converse and Dupeux’s reflection on politics during the French 4th Republic, 
they note: “…It seems likely that [the rise and fall of “flash” parties] represent spasms of 
political excitement in unusually hard times on the part of citizens whose year-in, year-out 
involvement in political affairs is abnormally weak” (1962, p 2). Hard times which in France 
may have been unusual, for Latin American third wave democracies has been usual; and a 
weakly involved citizenry which in France may have been abnormal in Latin America has 
been much closer to the norm. Below, I propose a method for measuring electoral 
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performance which is well-suited to the task of discerning patterns in the routine appearance 
of “spasms of political excitement.” 
New Parties as a Developmental Trajectory 
In this section I will develop a theoretical basis for conceptualizing new party 
performance as a developmental trajectory. Much like childhood is a distinct developmental 
phase from adulthood and treated as such in medicine and psychology, I will argue that the 
first several electoral contests for a political party are fundamentally different than electoral 
competition by a mature party. This conceptualization rationalizes my choice to measure new 
party performance with a time-series of five observations for each party. 
A central premise of this project is that new political parties are distinctive from 
mature parties. Whether one emerges seemingly from nowhere or arises out of long-standing 
social or economic groups transferred to the political arena, in so far as it is a new collective 
actor, it enters the electoral arena as a novice. Its electoral linkages with a base will be 
embryonic and its organizational infrastructure will be nascent and unconsolidated.  
I assume that new parties are vote maximizers. Vote maximizing behavior fits 
intuitively with the extremely pragmatic vote seeking actions of the personalistic and 
ideologically diffuse parties of many party systems in the region, but a vote maximizing 
assumption is not necessarily inconsistent with a principled ideological strategy. In fact, a 
diversity of party strategies could be deployed which all satisfy the quest to win votes. In 
Laver (2005), the author models the behavior of four party strategies: stickers, aggregators, 
hunters and predators. The “hunter” behaves in a way consistent with what we think of as 
pure vote seekers, taking positions over time in a hunt for more votes without commitment to 
any particular position. The “sticker,” on the contrary, is an ideological fixed party whose 
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position never changes. If we consider that a party’s attractiveness to voters will be based 
upon their reputation and not just on their current policy position, an ideological strategy may 
in the medium and long term be vote maximizing. In sum, under conditions of uncertainty 
about voter preferences and in a fluid party system where other parties are coming and going 
and shifting changing position, it is not always clear for to a party what the best vote 
maximizing strategy might be. On this basis, I will assume they are all vote maximizers. For 
a discussion of other potential motivations for parties, see Muller and Strom (1999). 
One way to justify treatment of the early years of a party as a distinct developmental 
phase is outlined by Panebianco (1988). Over the course of a party’s life, it shifts from being 
an organization oriented towards some particular program (be it a broad or narrow one) to 
becoming one oriented towards its own survival. He builds upon Michels’ theory of 
“substitution of ends” (1911; tr. 1959), which “illustrates precisely this passage of the 
organization from being an instrument for the realization of certain aims…, to a natural 
system in which the survival imperative and the actors’ particular objectives predominate” (p 
8). His approach is an organizationally-oriented treatment of the party, and he outlines 
features that one would expect to see during the founding years versus those of the mature 
years when the party is focused on survival. 
Alternatively, one can distinguish an early phase because during this time ties to 
voters are weak and being formed. Of course, not all parties consolidate ties with voters, but 
for those that do and evolve into long-standing actors in the political arena, the initial phase 
takes place under conditions of vulnerability which are not as life-threatening after linkages 
are established and ties are strong. A party in its early years will not have accumulated 
reputational capital that mature parties can rely upon. To the extent that strong relationships 
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between parties and voters rely upon many repeated iterations of exchange of some public or 
club good for a vote, I expect to see vote winning patterns over time for new parties to be 
more volatile than for established parties, and the causes of their performance gains or losses 
to be at least in part distinct from those of established parties. 
Also, new parties will not have a strongly established relationship with the state. In a 
professionalized state, it means that they may not have secured the credibility and formally 
institutionalized connections that an established party has. In a politicized state, it means that 
it will not have carved out points of access to resources and policy making that a mature 
party has secured.  
In sum, the first electoral contests of a party as a distinct from those of an established 
party in so far as it forms and consolidates its organization, contests and then gains access to 
the state and other resources, forms and consolidates linkages with voters and organized 
interests, and effectively governs or opposes. 
Parties Defined 
One thorny problem in a study of new parties is to identify them. Careful observation 
of a wide range of new political organizations reveals that they arise from a bewildering 
range of circumstances. We must offer a succinct and theoretically-informed operational rule 
for identifying and classifying the objects of this study into new and pre-existing parties.  
A preliminary task of most studies of new parties is to first define political parties. I 
use the definition adopted by Hug (2001), who in turn borrowed from Sjoblom (1968), which 
focuses upon a single criterion: a party “appoints candidates at general elections to the 
system’s representative assembly” (Sjoblom 1968, p 21).  
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Implied, but not explicit, in this definition is that the system’s representative assembly 
refers to the national representative system; therefore, parties that form and compete 
exclusively at sub-national levels are excluded. This constraint is sensible because the 
purpose of this study is to analyze how new national political parties are projected into the 
national arena. Some parties which eventually do so begin at the local level, so in a future 
extension of this project I will consider this circumstance as a predictor of performance at the 
national level.3  
Also following from the definition is that I exclude parties which compete in 
presidential or senate races, but not lower house elections. Furthermore, the definition 
presumes that lower house elections are a more perfect measure of a party’s performance in 
the national political arena than elections to the upper house or the presidency. Observation 
of political competition for the executive office is clouded by dynamics which include the 
personal attributes of candidates, sometimes to such an extreme that they overshadow the 
importance of attributes of the parties. Still, the personal attributes of a party’s leadership 
may often have an important role in determining a party’s trajectory in national political life; 
therefore, rather than considering these elected offices in the measurement of the trajectory of 
a party, I will incorporate them as predictors of that trajectory. Finally, I exclude from my 
analysis candidates who run as independents in a single district. 
Party Birth and Death Defined 
Having identified parties, I now turn to identifying new parties. If party formation 
conformed to Laver and Schilperoord’s theoretical model of the citizen-candidate (2007), 
                                                          
3
 Note that this exclusion means that the parties which Van Cott (2005) classifies as having “electoral 
viability”—the second level in her three category scheme of party success—will by design not be detected in 
this analysis. Her “electorally viable” parties include those which “may win local or regional elections, but 
rarely can compete at the national level” (p 18). 
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where parties form when citizens are dissatisfied with the system-wide programmatic 
offerings, then the identification of a new party would be a simple task: new parties would be 
of the type that Hug (2001) labels “genuinely new parties.” While Laver and Schilperood’s 
work represents a great advancement to the formal modeling of party birth and death, for this 
empirical project, new parties are almost never formed by a citizen-turned-candidate. Instead, 
party formation in Latin America is almost always the result of political entrepreneurship by 
veteran politicians.4  
For this analysis, in general, new parties are marked by discontinuities in the 
organizational structure of a party and/or lack of experience in competitive elections at the 
national level. Specifically, they are defined according to any one of the following criteria: 
After an extended non-democratic interruption, parties are new if they did not 
compete in the election immediately before the democratic breakdown or the founding 
election after the transition (ex: DP in Ecuador is new in 1984); or if the interruption caused a 
rupture in the organizational life of the party (ex: PSCH in Chile).5 Non-democratic 
interruptions often introduce pressures into the party system which can disrupt party 
organizations. If an interruption is sufficiently long, it may be fair to consider all parties 
which participate in the founding election of the transition back to democracy as new parties. 
                                                          
4
 With respect to the predictors of party formation and success, this fact implies that new party formation and 
success is not determined exclusively or mostly by features of the issue space (that is, by programmatic 
politics), but also by organizational features of the parties themselves, such as how they resolve conflict, recruit 
new leaders, and co-opt an organizational network, etc. 
5
 The Socialist Party of Chile (PSCH) broke up into various pieces during the Pinochet dictatorship. In 1989, 
during the founding election of the transition back to democracy, two instrumental parties, the PPD and PAIS, 
competed (Scully and Valenzuela 1993). Furthermore, many former members completed in 1989 without party 
affiliation, as independent candidates within the center-left Concertacion alliance. It was not until 1993 that the 
PSCH solved its organizations dilemmas and reemerged as an organizational unit, though deeply changed. In 
fact, 8 of the 10 candidates that competed as members of PAIS in 1989 later joined the Communist Party rather 
than the Socialist Party and the PPD turned out not to be so instrumental—it continues to play a prominent role 
today. In this project, I treat the PSCH as new since 1993. 
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Regime type effects party organization by introducing alternative organizational forms and 
survival strategies which do not rely on electoral incentives, and so the founding election is 
truly a new challenge. Also, a regime transition can form a critical juncture which 
fundamentally alters the dimensions of political competition by introducing a new dimension 
of competition. For this reason, it is advisable to use a slightly lower standard of 
organizational disruption for identifying a new political party than one would use under 
regime continuity. 
When a party splits, one piece will never be considered new and the other(s) will 
always be considered new (following Mainwaring, 1999, p 29). In the clear and common 
situation where a small group of dissidents leave the main party and complete under a new 
name, the coding decision is simple. In more complex situations I take into consideration 
continuities in name, the relative size of the two groups, the organizations inheritance of the 
two groups, and the source of the split.  
A political party that has existed but never competed for a seat in the lower or only 
chamber of congress will be considered new. Such a party is effectively entering a new 
political arena subject to electoral pressures it has never encountered (Schlesinger 1984). 
Formerly banned leftist parties are an example of this type of party. 
A party that arises from a fusion of two or more parties will not be counted as a new 
party. However, because I conceptualize a party’s life as a trajectory, I must code party 
death. I will use the following decision-rule: at the time of a fusion, I will always consider 
one (or more) of the party’s as having died and one and only one of the party’s as having 
survived. As with the case of fissures, the decision regarding which party dies and which 
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survives will take into consideration the size of the merging parties, the continuities in 
leadership, and the continuities in name.  
Parties that are hijacked by new leadership and essentially emerge as a new party will 
be counted as new. This often happens when there is a nearly defunct party which 
nevertheless has the benefit of having legal recognition by electoral authorities. This 
subjective decision will be guided by: a) the entry of a large cadre of new leadership; b) the 
simultaneous disaffiliation of large numbers of the previous leadership; c) the abruptness of 
the change; d) large changes in party platforms, organizational operations, party statues; and 
e) name changes (ex: MAS in Bolivia and PLN in Ecuador).6  
The coding rules used here differ to some extent with other efforts. Mair (1990), for 
example, includes as new parties any resulting from a fusion or from a fission. Hug (2001) 
distinguishes “genuinely new parties” from fusions, fissions and alliances, as parties which 
“emerge without the help from members of existing parties” (p 13.) He concludes that in his 
analysis, the category of new parties will be reserved for “genuinely new parties” and 
fissions. This definition will not suffice in this project because it fails to provide guidance 
under a number of difficult circumstances, many of which are not often found in the sample 
of advanced industrial countries he studies.  
                                                          
6
 Beginning in 1999, Evo Morales’ IPSP party adopted the party registration of MAS. In Ecuador, the party that 
was born in 1989 as the Partido Liberacion Nacional (PLN) changed hands three times. It was founded as a 
progressive splinter from the communist FADI party during the identity and strategic crisis which followed the 
fall of the Berlin Wall. In 1995 it was occupied by Rosalía Arteaga and changed its name to Alianza Nacional 
(PAN) to serve as a platform for her 1996 VP bid with Abdala Bucaram. After Bucaram was removed from the 
presidency, it was abandoned by Arteaga and cooped by César Alarcón, changing its name to the Partido 
Libertad (PL).  In spite of the continuity in party registration, the coincidence of name changes, rotation in party 
leadership, and shifting ideologies has led me to code this party as three cases of the emergence and death of a 
new party. Personal interviews PLN-1 (2006), PLN-2 (2006), PL-1 (2006). 
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Latent Trajectory Modeling as an Approach to Modeling Early Party Performance 
This section develops the argument for applying Latent Trajectory Modeling to the 
study of new party performance by citing prior applications and explaining the technical 
elements of the approach. 
Model Estimation 
Vote share trajectories were determined by fitting a semiparametric mixture model 
(SPMM) to the data, using SAS’s Proc Traj routine. SPMMs identify qualitatively distinct 
groups of trajectories within a population. This approach to modeling growth curves is 
different from traditional growth curve modeling in that the latter assumes the random 
parameters to be bivariate normal distributed. In other words, all individuals are assumed to 
belong to a single class of individuals who vary continuously on a latent trait. In contrast, the 
group-based method employed here assumes a number of discrete classes of parties, each 
having a specific intercept and slope (and sometimes a higher order polynomial in order to 
model curvilinear trajectory paths) and an estimated population prevalence.  
SPMMs were first developed for application in the fields of criminology and 
psychology to analyze distinctive trajectories of human behavior, such as criminal recidivism 
and childhood delinquency. It has potential applications in political science, but has thus far 
has not penetrated deeply into the discipline.7 The premise of the technique is that “patterns 
in the repeated measures reflect a finite number of trajectory types, each of which 
corresponds to an unobserved or latent class in the population” (Bauer and Curren 2003).  
A latent trajectory model is particularly appropriate when the developmental 
trajectories found within the population are expected to have either different functional 
                                                          
7
 See Plutzer 2002 for an exception. 
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forms—some zero-order constant trajectories, some first-order linear trajectories, some 
second-order quadratic trajectories, etc.—or the various individual trajectories do not vary 
regularly within the population—some are monotonically increasing while others are 
monotonically decreasing while still others are not monotonic (Nagin 1999). In the study of 
new political parties, theoretical expectations suggest that both circumstances apply. 
As an illustration of the varying functional forms, consider the fact that the most 
successful new parties will not continuously grow, but will flatten out, usually near or before 
becoming a majoritarian party. In this situation, a second-order specification may be 
appropriate for that trajectory to capture the curvilinear shape. Similarly, a second-order 
specification may be necessary to model performance of a “flash” trajectory. See Figure 2.5 
below. On the other hand, there may be a distinctive set of parties strongly rooted in an 
identity group—ethnic parties, extreme left parties—that enter with relatively few votes but 
are able to sustain that support over the long-run. This profile may best be modeled with a 
zero-order functional form: they enter with very a small percentage of the vote and continue 
on with no gain or loss. A single term—the intercept—may be sufficient to summarize their 
trajectory. Finally, there will likely be parties which enter and grow steadily or enter and 
decline steadily, best modeled with a first order polynomial. 
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Figure 2.5:  
Variation in Functional Form of Trajectories 
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As an illustration of the expectation that party performance may not vary regularly, 
contrast the concept of “flash parties” with what one might expect from a conventionally 
successful party. The former are distinctive in that they enter with relatively high support and 
drop quickly. In the language of latent trajectory models, flash parties are defined by their 
relatively high intercept and their relatively high negative slope. The former enter and have 
positive slopes. See Figure 2.6 below. 
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Figure 2.6:  
Irregularly Varying Trajectories 
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Taken together, these expectations are another way of saying that SPMM make 
differing assumptions than conventional growth curve models about the distribution of the 
random parameters: that is, they will be discretely rather than continuously distributed. 
The modeling procedure takes place in four steps. First, the model estimates the 
“shape parameters” for alternative specifications on the number of groups and the order of 
the polynomials; then, it estimates the “population  prevalence” for each of the groups in 
each of the models; next, the analyst compares models using both statistical and theoretical 
criteria and selects the best model; and finally, the analyst uses the estimates of the preferred 
model to compute group membership probabilities—also called posterior probabilities—for 
each of the parties in the dataset. 
Estimating The Shape Parameters 
The shape parameters are the set of estimates which describe each individual 
trajectory. They are estimated using: 
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where vote is the vote percentage of party i at age t, age is party age measured in national 
lower house election cycles, and j is the trajectory group. Notice that β ’s are superscripted 
with j, which means that each trajectory has its own intercept, slope, and quadratic term. β 0, 
β 1, and β 2 are collectively the shape parameters for the polynomial because they define the 
shape of each groups trajectory. 
Estimating The Population Prevalence 
The population prevalence is a parameter estimate of the prevalence of a given 
trajectory in the population, given the sample. The model estimates one value for each 
trajectory group. Its notation is  jpi , and it is estimated using: 
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Model Comparison and Selection 
Multiple SPMM models are estimated and compared. This process of comparison 
helps answer questions such as: Does a 4-group model fit the data better than a 5-group 
model or a 3-group model? Does a second-order polynomial on trajectory 5 fit the data better 
than a first-order polynomial on that trajectory? Model selection is informed using a 
combination of theory, domain knowledge and formal statistical criteria, normally the 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). 
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Computing Posterior Probabilities 
 Finally, once a model is selected, we use the model estimates and a party’s 
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This value, which is calculated for each party, indicates the probability that a given party is a 
member of a given group. An indication of a good model is that it places most parties solidly 
in one group or another with a high probability.  
Sometimes a party will be difficult to classify. In one circumstance, we might 
imagine that a party’s history of electoral returns over five elections may make its 
membership status ambiguous between two trajectories. Keep in mind, however, that if it is 
truly a party “in a class by itself,” the model selection stage of the analysis would have 
yielded a superior model with a group for this one party. Furthermore, the analysis does not 
serve the research question well if it yields many very similar trajectory groups. We’re 
looking for a discrete set of qualitatively different groups. If the distributional assumptions 
about the random parameters are correct, therefore, we expect that truly ambiguous cases will 
be rare in a strong model. 
In a second circumstance, where parties have entered the electoral arena so recently 
that we have only one or a few data points on them, it may be difficult to classify a party into 
a group. Imagine, for example, a scenario where there are two groups of parties. Both enter 
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strong—say, with 10% of the vote—but one group goes on to be the set of contenders and 
another group is of the “flash” type which soon dies. If we observe a party entering at the 
most recent election with 10% of the vote and no other observations, we might say that this 
party has a 50/50 chance of being in one group or the other, until another election comes and 
we receive more data and can make a stronger determination. This will be particularly the 
case if the best model contains two or more groups with similar intercepts. 
An Empirically and Theoretically Based Typology of New Party Entrants 
This section reports the results of the analysis. The result specifies my dependent 
variable for the rest of this project. The larger goal of this project is to predict why parties fall 
into one trajectory group rather than another. In the introductory chapter I explained that the 
predictive theories developed for application in programmatically structured political arenas 
do not travel well to the volatile and non-programmatically structured arenas. In chapter 3 I 
will develop a predictive model for application in non-programmatic arenas. However, in this 
chapter, where for the time being I am concerned only with the question of whether and 
which distinctive trajectory groups exists, I will not restrict my sample to non-programmatic 
country contexts. I will argue that the approach used here has general application cross-
nationally and for party systems of all types, programmatic or not. I illustrate this point by 
including the programmatic case of Chile.  
Sample and Measurement 
The sample I use here is drawn from four countries, Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela and 
Chile. The sample is restricted to cases for which I was able to collect district-level electoral 
data over the entire period since the democratic transition. The analysis here uses only 
national-level vote returns, but I use the district-level data in the predictive model of Chapter 
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3. Theoretically, the analysis here could be conducted on a larger sample of countries, but 
these four cases contain a sufficiently large sample of new parties and they span party 
systems that are institutionalized and programmatic and those that are not.  
I analyze all new political parties which compete in national elections to the lower or 
only legislative chamber since the most recent transition to democracy. In multi-tier electoral 
systems, I analyze results from the proportional component if it generally governs the overall 
seat distribution in the legislative body. See Table 2.1 below. 
Table 2.1:  
Summary of Election Results Analyzed 
Country Years Election Results Analyzed 
Chile 1989-2005 Lower Chamber; Single Tier 
Bolivia I 1985-1994 Lower Chamber; Single Tier 
Bolivia II 1994-2005 Lower Chamber; PR Tier 
Ecuador I 1979-1998 Single Chamber; District Tier 
Ecuador II 1998-2005 Single Chamber; Single Tier 
Venezuela I 1958-pre1993 Lower Camber; District Tier 
Venezuela II 1993-1999 Lower Chamber; PR Tier 
Venezuela III 1999-2005 Single Chamber; Single Tier 
 
Overall, during 32 elections, 950 new parties entered the electoral arena. The majority 
of them, however, are one-district parties from recent elections in Venezuela (about 200 each 
year in 1998, 2000 and 2005) and Ecuador (about 25 each year in 1996, 1998, and 2002). 
With respect to their national electoral performance, the 649 one-district parties comprise a 
homogeneous group together with several hundred other small parties which compete in 
multiple districts. All the one-district parties conform to the general profile of the “flop” 
parties I describe later. That is, they all enter with a very small vote share and none have 
lived beyond 4 election cycles. On only 5 occasions did any of these parties ever earn more 
than 1% of the vote, and they never earned more than 3.5%. The mean national vote 
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percentage of these parties is less than .05%. Because they severely skew the sample 
distribution, they lead to estimation difficulties. Therefore, I have excluded them from the 
analysis. See Appendix X for more details on the excluded one-district parties. 
After excluding one-district parties, the resulting sample includes 297 parties with 
558 party-year vote share observations. However, there is an additional alteration which I 
make to the dataset. Vote percentage is not reported for parties which die because we only 
observe their death when they cease to compete. If we analyze the data in this condition, the 
general electoral profile of the parties which die would appear healthier than it actually is 
since death is not observed in the data. I prefer to analyze a dataset that includes a defensible 
value for party death. Fortunately, the vote share has a meaningful value for death. Following 
Diehr and Patrick (2003), if a party is determined to have died, I add to its panel an entry of 0 
vote percentage following the last election in which they compete in order to “account fully 
for death.” I do not do this when a party competes in the most recent election for each 
country. Once accounting for death in this way, the final dataset of 297 parties includes 759 
party-year observations. See Table 2.2 below.  
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Table 2.2:  
Frequency of New Party Entrants 
      New Parties Party -Year N 
Country Years Elections Total 
Excluded  
One-
District Analyzed 
w/o 
Accounting 
for Death 
Accounting 
for Death 
Bolivia 1985-2005 6 34 0 34 53 82
Chile 1989-2005 5 20 2 18 40 51
Ecuador 1979-2002 10 96 73 23 64 72
Venezuela 1958-2005 11 797 574 223 401 554
Total   32 950 649 297 558 759
 
Conceptually, this analysis is built upon a new party’s life cycle between birth and its 
fifth election or death, whichever occurs first. Chronological time (for example, whether a 
party was born in 1989 or 2005) is not theoretically important for estimating the party’s 
performance trajectory over its lifetime.8 Therefore, rather than year, I will use a party’s age 
to measure time in this analysis. However, electoral cycles in different countries (and 
sometimes in the same country over time) run on different increments. Therefore, rather than 
counting a party’s age in years, I will count its age in election cycles. At the time of a party’s 
first electoral run for national office it will be 1 cycle old; at the time of its second run, it will 
be 2 cycles old, etc. A party in Chile that was born in 1989 and ran also in the 1993 election 
will be 1 cycle old in 1989 and 2 cycles old in 1993 (ex: PPD). When a party is born in 
Ecuador for the 1984 election and then runs again in 1986, it will be 1 cycle old in 1984 and 
2 cycles old in 1986 (ex: PRE). A party born in Venezuela for the 1998 election which goes 
                                                          
8
 Of course, if there are period effects associated with a party’s performance, chronological time may have a 
predictive effect on its performance trajectory. Therefore, chronological time will be incorporated into the 
analysis as a predictor in future research. 
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on to compete in 2000 and 2005 will be 1 cycle old in 1998, 2 cycles old in 2000 and 3 
cycles old in 2005 (ex: MVR).  
I limit my analysis to only the first five electoral cycles for each new party because, 
as I argue above, the early years of a party’s life are developmentally distinctive from its 
mature years. The choice to use five elections is somewhat subjective, and based mostly upon 
the observed performance of the best performing parties across the four countries. Their level 
of support seems to level off after around five elections. I do not expect the results reported 
here to be greatly effected by this choice. The majority of new parties do not live to the age 
of 5 election cycles old, and the model produces parameter estimates based upon the 
available data. The impact of the number of election cycles I use mainly alters the results in 
that more cycles leads the model to begin discriminating between the most enduring parties 
based upon their electoral performance in elections rather far in time from their birth. They 
farther we go from birth, the more the result will be incorporating elements of a party’s life 
that are unrelated to early developmental characteristics. An analysis that takes into 
consideration the entire life history of the most successful parties may be a worthwhile one to 
conduct, but it lies beyond the scope of this project and my ultimate concern with predicting 
a new party’s early course. See Appendix 2 for a complete list of the new parties and their 
electoral history over its first five elections. 
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Findings 
I estimate SPMMs that allowed for 1-8 groups of vote percentage over time using 
zero, first, and second order polynomials for each group. Improved fits were obtained for 
each new group through 5 groups; however, no improvement was obtained when 6 and 
subsequent groups were allowed. The Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) supported the 5-
group model as the best fitting. The preferred model also had trajectories with differing 
orders in the polynomial. One trajectory was flat (an intercept, but neither a slope nor a 
quadratic term), two had a constant rate of change (an intercept and slope but not quadratic), 
and two had a variable rate of change (an intercept, a slope and a quadratic). Thus, the 
analyses presented here are based on the 5-group model, with individual parties being 
assigned to their most likely trajectory group using posterior probabilities, a value calculated 
post-estimation using the model’s parameter estimates as described above. 
Of the five trajectories, one consists of “flop” parties which are estimated to enter 
with a vote percentage of 0.1% and drop off at a rate of .36% of the vote per election. This 
groups is estimated to comprise 89.4% of the population. The second trajectory group, “flat” 
parties, enter with about 6% of the vote and neither grow nor die. They make up 2.5% of the 
population. The third class of parties, which I call “flash,” enter with about 12.2% of the vote 
and lose 8% by the second election, and continue losing at a steadily declining rate. They are 
estimated to be 4.3% of the population. The fourth class of parties, which I call “contenders,” 
enter with over 12% of the vote and grow at a rate of about 1% per election. They make up 
3.0% of the population. Finally, the fifth class of parties are “explosive” parties, with an 
intercept of over 33% of the vote and a growth at an initially high rate that steadily declines. 
They are estimated to be 1% of the population. See Figure 2.7 and Table 2.3 below. 
 43 
Figure 2.7: 
New Party Trajectories 
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Table 2.3:  
5-Group Model of New Party Electoral Performance 
(Latent Trajectory Model; parties N=299; panel N=758) 
Group Population Prevalence Share Parameters     
Flop 89.20% ** Intercept 0.11** 
      Slope -0.36** 
Flat 3.00% ** Intercept 6.26** 
Flash 4.32% ** Intercept 12.24** 
    Slope -8.44** 
      Quadratic 0.85** 
Contender 2.50% ** Intercept 12.38** 
      Slope 1.15** 
Explosive 1.00% * Intercept 33.11** 
    Slope 55.66** 
      Quadratic -9.93** 
* significant at .1 level; ** significant at .05 level. 
Intercepts are undefined at t=0 and have been adjusted to t=1 
 
The figure truncates the trajectory of the explosive group to three points because it is 
estimated to be a group of only three parties, all of which are relatively new. Bolivia’s 
Podemos has completed only in one national legislative election, Bolivia’s MAS has 
completed in only two, and Venezuela’s MVR has completed in only three. 
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 Table 2.4:  
Party Classifications using Posterior Probabilities 
Explosive  Contender 
Bolivia Chile Ecuador Venezuela  Bolivia Chile Ecuador Venezeula 
MAS None none MVR 
 
MIR PPD ID none 
PODEMOS          RN PRE   
           UDI PRIAN   
           PSCH     
         
Flash  Flat 
Bolivia Chile Ecuador Venezuela  Bolivia Chile Ecuador Venezuela 
NFR None PD CCN1 
 
MIP none FRA LCR 
Condepa   PUR Conver.  UN   MPD MAS 
UCS     FDP1      MUPP PPT 
      FND1      DP   
      MEP          
      PODEMOS          
      PRVZL          
         
Flop      
Bolivia Chile Ecuador Venezuela      
...All Others... 
     
             
 
The case classifications in Table 2.4 are based upon the posterior probability 
calculations reported in Appendix X. In all but seven of the cases, we can predict with at 
least 97% certainty that the parties are properly classified. The smaller level of certainly for 
the remaining seven parties is not surprising, and I will discuss them each in turn. 
In Ecuador, PRIAN and PSP have both only competed in one national election for the 
purposes of this analysis. Both competed again in the 2006 election, which lies outside the 
scope of this analysis. PSP is the party of Lucio Gutierrez, who was removed from the 
presidency about two years after being elected in 2002. His party began as an electoral 
vehicle and performed very poorly in congress that year. However, it performed very well in 
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2006. The new data point would likely lead PSP to be reclassified as a “contender” with a 
fairly high probability. PRIAN is the electoral vehicle for Ecuador’s wealthiest man, Alvaro 
Noboa. It evolved out of several regional electoral movements and registered as a national 
party for the 2002 elections. PRIAN has built a substantial clientelistic network and in 2006 
did extremely well. Its status as a “contender” would be more probable, and probably nearly 
100%, with the new data. Pachakutik, the indigenous party, arose as the electoral arm of the 
national indigenous social movement, CONAIE to contest the 1996 elections. It has been 
hailed in the popular and scholarly press as a potent and well-organized political force, but it 
is likely to remain a small though enduring player in the national political arena. Additional 
data points, including its 2006 performance of 5.6% of the vote, will further consolidate its 
classification as a “flat” party. 
In Bolivia, both the parties with low posterior probabilities are new comers. MIP, the 
party of the radical and marginal indigenous leader Felipe Quispe, has only contested two 
elections. UN, the party started by Samuel Doria Medina, one of Bolivia’s wealthiest men 
and a defector from the traditional MIR party, was formed to contest the 2005 elections. 
Finally, in Venezuela, the ambiguity of Podemos and PPT arises because both are 
newcomers to the political scene, with Podemos competing once in the 2005 elections and 
PPT contesting three elections since 1998. Podemos originates as the pro-alliance faction of 
MAS which stayed with Chavez’ governing alliance in 2000 after the rest of the party left the 
alliance. PPT formed when the more radical of two factions peeled off from the moderating 
LCR in the mid-1990s and, from the 1998 election through today, has allied with Chavez’ 
governing MVR party. As their electoral history grows, and if they remain members of the 
governing coalition, they will likely settle in with a low but enduring percentage of the vote. 
 47 
Table 2.5:  
Posterior Probabilities* 
Country Party Max Post. Prob. Alt 2 Alt 3 
Ecuador PRIAN 56% Contender 44% Flash   
Venezuela Podemos 57% Flash 37% Flat   
Bolivia UN 52% Flat 43% Flash   
Ecuador MUPP 88% Flat 8% Flop 4% Flash 
Venezuela PPT 60% Flat 40% Flop   
Bolivia MIP 61% Flop 39% Flat   
Ecuador PSP 87% Flop 12% Flat   
*All other parties classified with >97% probability  
 
This model is based upon a sample derived from my definition of new political 
parties. In the course of coding parties as new or pre-existing (which I will call “legacy 
parties”), I omit 24 legacy parties from this analysis. Earlier in this chapter I conceptualize a 
party’s life-cycle using a developmental metaphor and argue that the early years of a new 
political party constitute a distinctive phase and are subject to a different explanation than 
one would use to account for the performance of legacy parties. Democratic transitions, 
however, introduce some ambiguity into the coding decisions. For the transitional elections, 
one may wonder whether I should have coded all parties as effectively new. Alternatively, 
one may wonder whether the results of the trajectory models are sensitive to my analysis of 
the continuities and discontinuities in the life of a party over the democratic interruption and 
the resulting coding decisions I made. For example, would the result have changed if I 
counted Chile’s Socialist Party (PSCH) as a legacy party rather than a new party? Or if I had 
counted Ecuador’s Social Christian Party (PSC) as new rather than a legacy party? In order 
to test the sensitivity of the results to these issues, I estimated models on two alternative 
samples. First, I estimated a model using just legacy parties. Second, I estimated a model 
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which included all cases, legacy and new. The results, which appear in Appendix X, sustain 
the approach I adopt in this chapter.  
Discussion and Conclusion 
This result offers a compelling alternative to the approach most comparativists have 
used to group new parties for the purpose of explaining their performance. First, it suggests 
that we move away from the dichotomous classification scheme of successful parties and 
failed parties separated by an arbitrary cut-point (Kitschelt 1988, Van Cott 2005, Harmel and 
Robertson 1985, Hug 2001). The result here is supported by a number of studies which have 
theorized, often one by one or on a small subset, on different sorts of party performance 
profiles. The novelty here is that the analysis takes place in a cross national time series 
context.  
Second, this chapter illustrates how we can use a much richer set of data in studying 
electoral performance, even when conducting a quantitative analysis. Some early studies 
have used the country as the unit of analysis—in some countries successful new parties arise 
while in others they don’t (Harmel and Robertson 1985). Not surprisingly, these studies find 
system-level variables such as the electoral system to predict success and failure. Other 
studies have observed parties at only the first election in determining success or failure (Hug 
2001). A single point of observation misses several important distinctions, especially if two 
or more sets of parties enter with the same vote share, but go on in different directions. The 
implication of looking at more detailed data of a party’s performance, rather than at a country 
or a party’s single time point, is that it places the analytic lens more squarely on the party as 
the unit of analysis and implies that party-level variables may take on greater explanatory 
power. 
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Third, this project illustrates some benefits of adding to the literature—which to date 
looks primarily as single case studies (in Latin American Keck 1992, Bruhn 1997, Ellner 
1988), single country studies (Scully 1992), or single party family studies (Hawkins 2003, 
Kitschelt 1989)—by looking generally across countries and party systems. Cases that seem 
idiosyncratic in a limited sample may be part of a bigger class in a generalized approach. Or, 
cases that appear similar in one sample may in fact be different. For example, in Van Cott’s 
(2005) analysis of indigenous parties in the Americas, she identifies Ecuador’s Pachakutik 
and Bolivia’s MAS as two cases of party success and sets out to explain why they are 
distinctive. My analysis indicates that the electoral performance of these two parties are 
qualitatively distinctive.9 The implication is that, rather than explaining why they both 
succeed, we must explain why one is “explosive” and the other is languishing as a “flat” 
party. Furthermore, given that there are other explosive parties in the region—including one 
in Bolivia which arose at about the same time as MAS—the explanation for why MAS’ entry 
is so stunning may have less to do with factors related to its roots in an indigenous 
movement, and more to do with other organizational or system factors which it shares with 
its current main rival Podemos and the MVR in Venezuela.  
There are three important implications of these results for the larger literature on new 
party performance. First, the results alter the explanatory goal. It suggests that large-N 
comparative studies come to terms with what small-N studies of party performance have long 
accomplished: there are more distinctive performance profiles which will require more 
nuance in our explanatory models, at least in the contexts where these distinctive types are 
observed. 
                                                          
9
 Of course, it may be too soon to conclude that they are successful or whether they are “flash,” “explosive,” or 
“flat” parties given that both have a relatively short historical record. 
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Second and related, the fact that certain party systems are able to generate multiple 
types of parties suggests that features of the parties themselves have a large and independent 
influence on performance, over and above system-level variables. In many instances, the 
system has been relatively fixed, yet parties of two or more different types have emerged.  
Finally, the results of this chapter seem to confirm that system-level variables have an 
influence on party performance. Two observations are worth making because they may be 
relevant to the larger literature on party system change. First, Chile is a system which 
generates only two of the five types: contenders and flops. Something about the system 
makes it inhospitable to flash, flat, and explosive types. The cause may involve Chile’s rather 
restrictive binomial electoral system. Alternatively, it may involve the relatively more 
institutionalized and programmatic nature of competition. Second, parties of the “explosive” 
type are only found in two of the four party systems: Bolivia and Venezuela. Furthermore, 
the three explosive parties all emerged following party system collapses. This suggests that 
not only is the explosive trajectory distinctive from the conventional type of success we 
observe among new parties, but that it only arises under very particular circumstances that 
may have to do with representation failures and the openness of party systems to outsider 
candidates. 
 
  
 
CHAPTER III 
PREDICTING NEW PARTY PERFORMANCE IN NON-PROGRAMMATIC PARTY 
SYSTEMS: A LARGE-N ANALYSIS 
Introduction 
In the stage of this project, I analyze predictors of new party performance. 
Explanations of new party performance in democratic systems are often based upon the 
assumption that party competition is programmatic. From this starting point, models of 
successful new entry either involve the strategic interaction of new and existing parties in a 
one or low dimensional issue space or they involve a demand-side model predicated on a 
new and distinctive social structural constituency. The former comprise the spatial and 
directional models of party competition and the later the work on political cleavages. 
However, in many developing countries—as well as in several advanced industrial 
contexts—party competition is not highly programmatic. Instead, parties secure votes by 
alternative linkages, such as clientelism or personalism (Kitschelt and Wilkenson 2007, 
Kitschelt 2000, Mainwaring in The Handbook of Party Politics). In such systems, 
explanations rooted in a spatial or cleavage model will not function well. Strategic interaction 
may still takes place, but advantage is derived from a separate bundle of strategic 
characteristics which may have nothing to do with a party’s ideology, with its attainment of 
programmatic goals while in government, or with the underlying social structure of society. 
Instead, winning votes may instead be derived from other capacities, such as the ability to 
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build or co-opt clientelistic networks. The purpose of this chapter is to test explanations of 
new party performance derived from the assumptions of programmatic party competition in 
non-programmatic contexts, and compare them with measures derived from non-
programmatic models of party competition. What distinguishes the five trajectory groups 
identified above from each other in systems dominated by non-programmatic—personalistic 
or clientelistic—linkages between themselves and the voter? 
 This chapter progresses through five sections. First, I review the literature on new 
party performance as it has developed in the context of programmatic party competition. I 
include in this review expectations derived from cleavage and spatial theory as well as from 
the literature on electoral systems. Then, I recommend a research design that goes beyond the 
traditional focus on individual country contexts and individual party families and looks 
generally across countries and families at all new political parties. I develop preliminary 
hypotheses, derived from the literature, of alternative and organizationally-based predictors 
of new party performance. Finally, in sections three and four, I use multinomial logic models 
to test competing explanations of new party success. In particular, I argue that the results of 
this project encourage theoretical development of a heretofore neglected explanatory 
approach which places the nature of the party as an organization in a prominent role of the 
analysis. In volatile political systems where linkages between voters and parties are based 
upon personalistic or clientelistic exchange, rather than programmatic exchange, strategic 
advantage for success in the long-run requires access to resources, the construction or 
cooptation of many dense local clientelistic networks, and at most weak organizational and 
ideological ties with mass social groups such as labor unions or ethnic-based organizations. 
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Explanations of New Party Performance in Programmatic Party Systems 
A large body of work has evolved from Lipset and Rokkan’s influential article on 
political cleavages (1967). In their approach, the party systems are formed as societies are 
reshaped by changes to their fundamental orientation and those social divides are transferred 
to the political arena. New party entry and performance will depend upon the particular 
domestic configuration of social forces.  
In the Latin American context, Collier and Collier (1991) and Scully (1992) are 
perhaps the two accounts of party system change most self-consciously shaped by cleavage 
theory. Collier and Collier look across countries at how labor movements grew during 
industrialization, and they trace variation in the party systems of the region to the differing 
ways in which labor was incorporated politically into the regime. Scully looks at Chile over 
time and identifies three distinct episodes of social cleavage formation, each of which was 
orthogonal to the main axis of cleavage at the time it arose, and shows how entrepreneurial 
politicians transferred this cleavage into the political arena for electoral advantage. 
Explanations in the tradition of cleavage theory work in contexts where political competition 
is fundamentally programmatically structured.  
Testing these effects in a cross-national time-series research design is difficult 
because the sources of new cleavages are particular to domestic social structures and political 
configurations. The convention in large-N studies has been to use very imperfect proxies of 
the underlying social structure. For example, Harmel and Robertson (1985) use measures of 
pluralism, inequality, post-materialism, and population, while Hug (2001) uses measures of 
population, ethnic fractionalization, linguistic and religious homogeneity, unemployment and 
economic growth, and Kitschelt (1988), who is studying left-libertarian party success, uses 
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per capita income, employment and the size of the student population. I don’t expect these 
theoretical frameworks to have potency in the inchoate party systems of this project. 
Nevertheless, I will test for effects of the per capita income, urbanization, informalization 
and the presence of indigenous minorities.  
Another body of work on new party entry and performance has arisen from Downs’ 
spatial model of party competition (1957). The direct descendents of this approach, as well as 
the many innovators on it—such as directional theory (Rabinowitz and Macdonald 1989) 
agent-based modeling (Kollman, Miller, and Page 1992, Laver 2005)—all depart from the 
assumption that party competition is programmatic. New party performance in this context is 
derived from the ability by an entrant to successfully stake out new territory in a one or low 
dimensional political space (Sundquist 1973, Dalton, Flanagan, and Beck 1984). 
More recently, a literature has developed which looks at the strategic interaction of 
parties in a competitive environment to account for the electoral performance of new parties 
(Kitschelt 1988 and 1994, Hug 2001, etc). In this context, attributes of the parties themselves, 
rather than just attributes of the system and electorate, have become prominent and potent 
elements of the explanation. Two works are illustrative. In a relatively simple formulation, 
Van Cott (2005) argues that the formation and success of new indigenous parties in the 
Andes took place following a period of decline on the left. More nuanced explanations have 
tied successful new entry to factors that influence the ability of existing competitors to adjust 
to the threat of new entrants, as when Kitschelt argues that left libertarian parties of Western 
Europe were able to emerge and succeed where opposition to nuclear power was strong and 
salient and where traditional social democratic parties were unable to adjust (1988).  
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Measurement of these concepts, which have been broadly classified as “the demand 
side” of political contestation, have also been imperfect. Harmel and Robertson (1985) use 
the effective number of political parties, while Hug (2001) uses taxation level, the number of 
parties in government, the presence of referenda, and government instability and Kitschelt 
(1988) finds strike level, the presence of the left in government, social security expenditure 
and the presence of a nuclear power controversy to be important. Again, the latter’s precision 
is possible because he confines his project to a single party family. I will adopt a measure of 
the existence of organized social mobilizations and a measure of the electoral strength of 
other parties in the same ideological block as the new entrant, as described below. 
In one of the most recent developments from within the spatial tradition, Laver and 
Schilperoord’s (2007) “agent-based modeling” approach to party birth and death is based 
upon the idea of a citizen candidate. In his theoretical model, a two dimensional political 
space is randomly filled with 1000 citizens. Any one of these citizens can transform him or 
herself into a political party leader who then follows a strategy (defined by a set of 
parameters and based upon the policy positions of the other parties in the system and the size 
of their support) to compete in the political space with other citizens-turned-candidate. The 
transformation from candidate to party leader occurs when a citizen’s accumulated 
dissatisfaction with the policy positions of other parties in the system surpasses a certain 
threshold. Does this conceptualization reasonably approach the empirical reality of new party 
formation? As a model in the spatial tradition, where one assumes voter preference 
distributions over a certain issue, it may approximate the voting behavior and party formation 
behavior in programmatic party systems. However, the assumption that new party formation 
will be executed by any average citizen based exclusively upon Euclidean distances between 
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ideal policy positions seems to deviate significantly from the behavior of citizens and parties 
in elitist and non-programmatic party systems. In fact, new party formation almost never 
occurs at the initiative of a citizen that is not already a political activist or professional. This 
fact implies that new party formation is not determined by issues, but instead is highly 
influenced by organizations and non-policy related elements, an issue to which I will return 
later. 
The next set of variables I consider relate to the institutional environment. Several 
large bodies of work have arisen which link the electoral system and other system-level 
institutional rules to patterns of stability or instability in system-wide party support and party 
entry (Roberts and Wibbles 1999, Tavits 2005, Van Cott 2005) and to the electoral 
performance of new parties (Hug 2001, Birnir 2004). Baring in mind that this analysis of is 
party performance and not party entry, I will consider the effect of decentralization, party 
entry rules, survival rules, and the threshold of representation. 
Institutional rules operate in three general theoretical ways on new parties. First, there 
exist a set of rules which either individually or in combination can either stifle or encourage 
new party entry. In particular, I refer to decentralization and party entry rules. These rules 
have a large effect on what happens to parties with respect to entry, but little effect with 
respect to performance, except indirectly to the extent that they encourage or discourage the 
fragmentation of parties. Second, there is a set of rules which, given entry, specify whether a 
party can continue to survive as an officially recognized organization, free to compete in 
future elections. These rules operate on the smallest parties by determining whether they 
must disband or can continue contesting (and losing) elections. Third, there is a set of rules 
which impact directly on the ability of new party entrants to harvest votes. In particular, I 
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refer to rules which individually or in combination determine the threshold of representation. 
I hypothesize that these rules will have an effect on which type of party, from among the full 
set of five trajectories, will occur across systems. Of the three types, the first are not germane 
to this project, the second have a small effect on only a subset of very small new entrants, but 
I expect the third to have an effect on entire systems, following a large body of literature. I 
will address each of the three types in turn. 
The rules which effect entry operate primarily on the low or potentially low vote-
getters through the decision calculus of party leaders. These rules include party registration 
requirements, such as signature collections and geographic distribution, and decentralization 
of the political system. Registration requirements function by setting the cost of entry. 
Decentralization functions by opening up venues for electoral competition to potential sub-
national entrants which might then launch a national electoral campaign in alliance with 
others, or independently. Both types of institutions influence the entry decision; therefore, 
they are not relevant to the research question I address, which predicts performance given 
entry, not entry itself.10 To include these variables here would be to misspecify the model.11 
In order to perform a test of these rules on entry, one might perform an event count model of 
                                                          
10
 Brandler (2001) argues that Venezuelan decentralizing reforms beginning in 1979 opened up many 
opportunities for new party entry, but that electoral rules prevented these new entrants from winning seats at the 
national level thereby accelerating the decline in legitimacy of the system and, ultimately, its collapse. 
11
 In addition to the permissive effect decentralization has on entry, it has also been theorized to operate directly 
on party performance by providing a venue for new parties to learn and gain credibility. An aspiring new party 
can work up to national competition rather than entering with a political organization that has national reach. By 
competing locally before doing so nationally, a new party can gain experience by tackling smaller issues and 
grooming local leaders; it can construct an organization built around a local constituency; and it make more 
credible claims when it comes time to compete nationally. Case studies of the Brazilian PT, the Ecuadorian 
Pachakutik, and the Bolivian MAS all point to the importance of having made local inroads before launching a 
national organization. It is important to note that according to this approach, decentralization is an organization-
based theory where sub-national electoral venues act as new party incubators.  
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the number of flop parties per election using the entry rules as predictors. In effect, the 
election is the unit of analysis (Hug 2001).  
The rules which effect party survival, on the other hand, will help explain party 
performance to the extent that it specifies what is possible in election at time t+1, given the 
result of election at time t. These survival rules come in various forms. In Bolivia, for 
example, a party not attaining a given threshold is required to reimburse the electoral 
authorities of its share of the costs of printing the ballot.12 In Ecuador, there have been rules 
which specify the conditions under which a party will be declared extinct. These rules have 
varied over time and have been inconsistently enforced. Whatever the details, these rules are 
designed to operate on the very poor performers. As such, if the trajectory model had 
distinguished multiple groups at the very low level, one might theorize that survival rules 
would predict group placement, and in particular that it would distinguish between 
membership in one or another of the very low groups. Given, however, that the trajectory 
model only distinguishes one group—the “flop” trajectory”—at low levels, I do not expect 
this variable to predict group membership; theory does not hold that it will distinguish 
between flop parties and the other groups of parties. Consequently, I do not include it in the 
model. 
The last set of rules, those which designate thresholds of representation, are theorized 
to predict party performance; in terms of the modeling used here, they will predict group 
membership.13 These rules consist of features of the electoral system such as district 
magnitude and vote thresholds for representation. In its earliest formulation—Duverger’s 
                                                          
12
 This threshold has varied over time, equal to 50,000 votes from transition to 1997 and equal to 2% of the vote 
since then. 
13
 Kitschelt , for example, states that these electoral rules will effect party success, but not party formation 
(1989, fn 26, p 224). 
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Law—single-member district plurality rules will generate two large parties at the district 
level (Duverger 1959). As the seats per district rise, smaller parties can gain representation. 
In very large districts, very small parties can gain representation unless the electoral law also 
specifies a minimum threshold for acquiring seats. Whether directly through thresholds or 
indirectly through district magnitude, and whether through the mechanical or psychological 
effects of these mechanisms (Coppedge 1997, Taagepera and Shugart 1989), these laws 
influence performance.14  
The effect of a threshold of representation on party performance will be strongest at 
the highest threshold and become weak at an increasing rate as the threshold drops. For 
example, in a single member district plurality setting a party would need 37.5% of the vote to 
capture the seat, following Lijphart’s (1994) formulation of the “effective threshold of 
representation”: 
Effective threshold=75%/(m+1), where m is the district magnitude 
Similarly, in a two-seat district the threshold is 25%, in a three-seat district 18.75%, etc. 
According to this formulation, the relationship between district magnitude and the effective 
thresholds is as follows in Figure 3.1. 
                                                          
14
 Additionally, other features have an impact, such as the electoral formula—d’Hondt, Sainte-Lague, etc.  
(Taagepera and Shugart 1989) 
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Figure 3.1:  
District Magnitude v. Effective Threshold of Representation 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Seats/District
Ef
fe
ct
iv
e 
Th
re
sh
o
ld
 
This figure reveals the declining rate of the influence of district magnitude on 
winning a seat in a proportional representation environment. This relationship has a direct 
effect on party performance to those parties and voters for whom winning matters . We 
would not generally expect to see members of a trajectory group if its intercept is much lower 
than the effective threshold. So, for example, “flat” parties, which the model predicts will 
enter at 6% and stay there, will not be observed unless the district magnitude reaches 12, at 
which point the effective threshold drops below 6%. However, this is a rather abstract and 
strict application of the formula and two qualifications are in order.  
First, a party modeled as winning 6% of the vote might reasonable expect to win 
slightly more in an information environment of uncertainty. Say, for example, that  8.3% of 
the vote would fit within their expected range. At 8.3% of the vote, district magnitude could 
be as low as 8 and the party would still compete. The empirical existence of a class of parties 
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will be a function of the district magnitude, their ability to accurately predict their 
performance, and their risk aversion.  
Second, since this effect operates at the level of the district, average district 
magnitude across a country will obscure whether or not there exists variation in district 
magnitude within a country. In the contexts where population concentrations are very high in 
one or a few main cities and districts are overlaid on state (or its equivalent), average district 
magnitude may be low on average, even when the states with principle cities have very high 
district magnitude.  In Ecuador, for example, district magnitude in 2002 ranged from 2 to 18, 
as shown in Table 3.1 below. In the two districts which contain the two principle cities, 
district magnitude was 14 and 18, even though on average district magnitude was 4.5. In the 
two principle districts, therefore, a party will compete if it reasonable expects to win around 
5% of the vote in that district and we might expect to see greater diversity of electoral 
performance trajectories.15 On the other hand, in Chile, where all districts contain 2 seats, the 
minimum effective threshold of representation is 25%. The largest district magnitude serves 
as a floor on the trajectory groups we will observe in a country. Rather than average district 
magnitude then, the largest district magnitude will be a better predictor of the trajectory a 
party will have. In the countries of this sample, unfortunately, district size for all districts is 
not always easily available and so I will measure this effect with average district magnitude.
                                                          
15
 This example is illustrative and ignores for the moment the fact that during early elections in the series, 
electoral rules required that a party compete in multiple districts in the country. 
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Table 3.1: 
District Magnitude in Ecuador, 1979-2002 
          Seats           
Province 2002 1998 1996 1994 1992 1990 1988 1986 1984 1979
Azuay 5 5 missing 4 4 3 3 3 3 3
Bolivar 3 3 missing 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Canar 3 3 missing 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Carchi 3 3 missing 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Chimborazo 4 4 missing 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Cotopaxi 4 3 missing 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
El Oro 4 5 missing 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Esmeraldas 4 4 missing 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Galapagos 2 2 missing 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Guayas 18 18 missing 10 10 9 9 9 9 8
Imbabura 3 3 missing 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Loja 4 4 missing 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Los Rios 5 5 missing 4 4 3 3 3 3 3
Manabi 8 8 missing 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Morona Santiago 2 3 missing 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Napo 2 3 missing 2 2 2 2 2 2 1
Orellana 2 0 missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Pastaza 2 2 missing 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Pichincha 14 14 missing 8 8 6 6 6 6 6
Sucumbios 2 2 missing 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
Tungurahua 4 4 missing 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Zamora Chinchipe 2 2 missing 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Average 4.5 4.5  3.0 3.0 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.6
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In terms of predicting group membership of a party, the threshold of 
representation will not distinguish between all possible combinations, but only between 
those trajectories that fall below the threshold and those that fall above the threshold. 
Conveniently, in the multinomial model I use here, the statistical test in conducted on 
each pair of possible categories of the dependent variable in turn.  
A General Approach: Beyond Party Family and Country Cases 
The conclusions of most published studies of new party performance have been 
sustained to some degree by a flaw in the typical research design. Specifically, most 
studies are plagued by selection bias. Selection bias occurs because almost all studies—
the only apparent exceptions are Harmel and Robertson (1985) and Hug (2001)—restrict 
their case selection to a single party family, a single national context, or a single party. It 
is unclear whether propositions which arise in these studies would withstand empirical 
testing in more generalized samples. 
The flaw may sometimes be self-conscious. When there is reason to believe that 
party systems are programmatically structured, a research design which draws a sample 
in these restricted ways has advantages. Most importantly, the outcome is always a 
contingent one. When one asks: Why a Green party in Germany but not Italy? (Kitschelt 
1988, 1989); Why an indigenous party in Ecuador but not Guatemala? (Van Cott 2005); 
Why a labor party in Argentina but not Brazil (Collier and Collier 1991); Why a 
Christian Democratic Party in Chile but not Venezuela (Hawkins 2003) and in Italy but 
not the UK (Lipset and Rokkan 1967); or Why a Christian Democratic Party in Chile in 
the 1950s but not earlier (Scully 1992), there is great merit in being able to isolate and 
measure explanatory variables directly associated the particular mobilization. In fact, in 
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generalized studies like this one, it is nearly impossible to adequately incorporate the 
contextualized elements of those new contenders.  
Nevertheless, this approach leaves open the possibility that other causal variables 
which are constant within party family or within the country are left untested. A 
particular set of variables which may be overlooked are ones pertaining to the party as an 
organization. If members of a party family have similar values and their base is similarly 
constituted, then the organizational attributes—mechanisms of candidate selection, 
openness of the party organization, linkage mechanisms with constituents, etc.—may be 
similar as well. Likewise, to the extent that party systems constrain the possible 
organizational forms that its member parties may have, country studies may be ill-suited 
to uncover the influence of organizational variation.  
To be sure, not all party, country or family studies omit consideration of party 
organization. This misspecification of the causal structure has tended to grow more 
pronounced as the number of parties analyzed grows larger. Single case studies or small 
samples have tended to take into consideration the party as an organization, while larger 
comparative projects have tended to take more cursory approaches to organization. Ellner 
(1988) shows how MAS in Venezuela distinguished itself from other parties on the left 
by building a democratic and open political party. Similarly, Kitschelt (1989) argues that 
successful new left libertarian parties in Europe built democratic party organizations as a 
way to appeal to new constituencies which, unlike the traditional left, valued openness 
and participation in party life. In both of these studies, party organizational functions not 
in so far as it mechanically secures and delivers votes, but rather because it appeals 
programmatically to its target voters. Van Cott (2005) argues that successful new 
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indigenous parties arose only where a preexisting and nationally united social movement 
had grown up.  
Outside the narrow question of party performance, a great deal of the work on 
Latin American parties has been extremely interested in the party as an organization. 
Alcántara and his colleagues at the University of Salamanca have given the relationship 
between party organization and party origins the most careful treatment (Alcántara 2004, 
Alcántara and Freidenberg 2001). Case studies of party system change in general have 
also treated the topic (Ellner 1988, Bruhn 1997, Coppedge 1994, Mainwaring 1999, 
McGuire 1997, Roberts 1998, Levitsky 2003). But as Levitsky (2001) points out, there 
are immense areas in which we have little comparative data on parties as organizations. 
“We know virtually nothing about many parties’ membership levels and organizational 
densities, and we have little data on party members” (p. 106). Data about informal party 
organizations are in even worse condition, though Freidenberg  and Levistky 
(forthcoming) make some modest proposals with respect to concept and measurement. 
Levitsky (2001) continues: 
“Recent conceptual and theoretical innovations by scholars such as Angelo 
Panebianco (1988), Herbert Kitschelt (1994), and Richard Katz and Peter Mair 
(1994, 1995) would have been impossible were not it for the existence of a 
substantial amount of secondary material on those parties. No such pool of 
knowledge and data exists for Latin American parties.” 
Data scarcity is not the only reason for neglect of the party as organization. Some 
scholars have a normative objection. Gibson (1996) urges caution with respect to 
Panebianco’s organizational approach. He argues, “If our concern is to distinguish 
between parties in ways that are relevant to the broader conflicts of society, an 
organization-centered approach provides little to work with.” (p 19.) Yet, it is in precisely 
the political arenas I study here where I expect the influence of party organization to be 
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most profound. In contexts where broader conflicts of society are weakly articulated and 
growing weaker, especially with respect to conflict in the political domain, and in light of 
the evidence that parties across the ideological spectrum are increasingly adopting non-
programmatic modes of linkage to win votes, an organization-centered approach may 
become a more fruitful avenue of inquiry.  
In a poorly structured programmatic electoral environment, what critically 
distinguishes the electoral fortunes of parties may not be their programmatic content and 
ties with organized sectoral or social interests, but the availability of resources and the 
access to or ownership of the organized distribution network of local political machines. 
Political entrepreneurs must grapple with securing the vote where parties are not trusted 
or expected to deliver broad public goods (Stokes 2005, Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 
forthcoming). 
An important premise of this project is that a research design which includes a 
relatively large sample of cases that cut across party families and national contexts will 
provide a fruitful and unbiased context to compare the impact of institutional, social-
structural, programmatic, and organizational explanations. Of course, my theoretical 
expectation is context specific, and leaves untreated the relative importance of a party’s 
organizational features in programmatic party systems.  
The theoretical expectations concerning the influence of party organization on 
new party performance is not well developed, and in Chapter Four I will take up this 
issue. At this stage, where I conduct an initial analysis to determine if the conventional 
explanations hold up in a non-programmatic party system, I seek some preliminary and 
blunt indicators of the effect of organization on party performance. There are hints in the 
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literature are party adaptation in the neo-liberal era, and in the literature on clientelism 
and informal party institutionalization.  
As the strength of unions decline and urbanization and informalization has grown, 
parties across the spectrum have shifted towards more clientelistic linkages with non-core 
constituencies. Levitsky (2007) argues that labor-based parties which survived the neo-
liberalizing reforms of the 1980s and 1990s were those which were only loosely tied to 
unions, had access to a politicized state, and where the labor-based parties faced strong 
electoral challenges. For other work on party adaptation: on the Brazilian PT see Samuels 
2004 and Hunter 2006; on the Uruguayan Frente Amplio see Luna forthcoming; on the 
Chilean UDI see Luna manuscript; on the Argentine Peronists see Levitsky 2003). 
Stokes’ (2005) analysis of clientelistic party behavior shows that successful clientelistic 
linkage requires that parties be deeply embedded in local communities so that they can 
accurately infer voter choices and circumvent the secret ballot. 
I argue that in a non-programmatic competitive environment, electorally 
successful parties as we normally think of them—that is, parties that enter the electoral 
arena and grow to a point were they are among the principle party players over the 
medium to long term—will be those that a) attain access to a significant resource base; b) 
establish clientelistic networks over a critical mass of the territory; and c) are 
programmatically weakly constrained by social structural organizational ties and 
ideology. These requirements are not qualified by institutional configurations at the time 
of a founding elections, but during regular electoral competition they are contingent upon 
a threshold of representation that is minimally permissive. Parties that form around the 
status of an individual or with mass media strategies will have an initial level of electoral 
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success commensurate with the candidate’s reputation, but success will be fleeting unless 
that party invests in a distribution network characteristic of clientelistic exchange so that 
they can secure reliable and defensible electoral bailiwicks. Parties that invest in an 
organization compatible with formal programmatic party-voter linkages may not be 
electoral contenders, though they may eek out a modest electoral existence at the margins 
of political competition. The reasons for this are twofold. First, a robust clientelistic 
political machine is incompatible with a robust programmatic linkage strategy (Kitschelt 
2000). Second, a programmatic linkage strategy is electorally vulnerable when the system 
as a whole is dominated by non-programmatic ties to voters.  
Methods and Data 
This analysis functions as a the quantitative part of a larger nested research design 
as described in Chapter 1 (Lieberman 2005). That is, this analysis is designed to compare 
competing explanations of new party entry on a relatively large sample and with a 
quantitative approach. The concepts and measures of the explanatory variables are 
relatively coarse and highly aggregated and will offer at best suggestive evidence. A 
statistical  model with additive terms on the right hand side is not well suited for 
persuasively establishing causal mechanisms or conditional effects, at least not in 
samples constrained to tens or hundreds of cases. If the results suggest that explanations 
derived from a programmatic model of party competition don’t function or that they 
function incompletely, and that measures based upon a non-programmatic model of 
competition are a preferable or complementary alternative, we can conclude that the 
proposed theoretical gaps in the knowledge are plausible and therefore justify a 
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qualitative approach, nested within the quantitative approach, which is more suitable to 
building and testing hypotheses of a causally complex and conditional nature. 
I have constructed a dataset that includes all the parties from Chapter 2 except 
those from Chile. Because my argument is contextually circumscribed to non-
programmatic party systems, I exclude Chile. In order to properly incorporate parties in 
Chile or any other programmatic party system into a statistical analysis, I would need to 
test interaction effects because my argument is that one set of variables will have one 
effect in programmatic contexts but a different effect in non-programmatic contexts. This 
technique is beyond what is possible in the small dataset of this project. Bolivia, Ecuador 
and Venezuela all scored low on the scales of programmatic orientation of politicians 
(Kitschelt and Zechmeister 2003), representation (Luna and Zechmeister 2005), and 
ideological orientation (Rosas 2005). These indicators all measured the systems in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s. There may be some question as to the programmatic status of 
Venezuela from its transition in 1958 until the breakdown of the two-party system in the 
1990s. While Venezuela’s party system may have been very institutionalized during that 
time, it is not clear that it was programmatic. The very foundation of the two party system 
emerged out of a pact between the main parties, and there is ample evidence that this 
collusion led not only to stability, but also to pervasive corruption and clientelism 
(Coppedge 1994, Martz 1966). 
The first set of variables I test pertain to the organizational features of the new 
entrants. First, I code a dichotomy if the new party entered at the first or second election 
following a transition to democracy. I expect early entrants following a regime change to 
have an early mover advantage over later aspirants. This advantage is likely to be derived 
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from their ability to secure voter loyalties early before they are hardened. These loyalties 
may, of course, be secured with programmatic linkages; however, in the party settings I 
study it is more likely that the loyalties are based upon the incorporation of voters into a 
clientelistic network. Second, I am interested in a parties access to resources. In reality 
those resources can come from different places. For example, one of the “contender” 
parties in Ecuador, PRIAN, has used the personal fortune of the countries richest man and 
his network of businesses to build a powerful clientelistic network. Most commonly, 
however, they come from a position in government. In highly fragmented party systems 
that are presidential, parties may also secure access to resources by supporting the 
presidents legislative agenda from outside the government (Mejía 2004). Data on party 
participation in the executive is available, but comprehensive data on legislative 
coalitions and on the personal private fortunes of party founders is not available. Thus, I 
code each party dichotomously on whether or not they held a cabinet post at the time of 
or preceding their first lower house electoral bid. Lastly, I measure the nationalization of 
each party using district level data according to approach of Jones and Mainwaring 
(2003). I expect more nationalized parties to have a high initial level of success, enduring 
success, or both.  
Finally, quite in contrast to the expectation in the programmatic literature, it is 
possible that the most highly successful parties will be on the ones which are 
ideologically diffuse and flexible. Levitsky (2003, 2007), for example, argues that the 
labor-based parties most likely to successfully adapt to a post-reform competitive 
environment will be ones with weak ties to organized labor. Of course, organizational 
linkages and ideological content are different concepts, but they will often covary. 
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Furthermore, I expect that programmatic strategies will be a weak and vulnerable in 
systems that are poorly structured and clientelistic or personalistic. I will test to see if 
weak programmatic content is advantageous by using Coppedge’s (1997) expert survey 
of party left-right identity. I will code a dichotomy which distinguishes parties that are 
either “centrist” or “personalist” from those that are coded on the left-right scale.16 
The next set of variables is designed to measure programmatic party competition. 
If programmatic forces structure party performance even in the sample of cases analyzed 
here, I would expect a new party’s gains to be at the expense of existing parties in their 
general programmatic vicinity. This is difficult to measure without detailed information 
on parties and their programmatic profile. Comparable data exists primarily for the large 
parties, and only very rarely over time. One partial exception is Coppedge’s analysis of 
parties in the region (1997). For this project, I derive a measure from Coppedge’s codings 
of Latin American parties. Parties are classified as left, center, right, personalist, other, 
and unknown according to his criteria. I updated his coding for the most recent elections. 
The measure I derive takes the gain or loss in the block from the last election but 
excluding the vote share of the new entrant. No value is computed for “unknown” parties. 
“Other” parties are predominantly ethnic-based parties, though it includes a tiny Chilean 
green party. If contender parties are observed when we see large losses from its 
ideological block, we have tentative evidence that programmatic forces are in play. 
Voters are shifting their allegiances within the block, but not outside of it. 
Alternatively, programmatic demands may arise from newly mobilized 
dimensions of competition which might not be picked up by this left-right scale. In order 
                                                          
16
 Coppedge’s definition of “center” consists of parties that have no “salient social or economic agenda” or 
those that  are so divide between left and right that “no orientation…is discernable.”  
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to test whether contenders more commonly arise in the face of organized demonstrations 
of public discontent, I incorporate protest data. I use Banks (2001) Cross National Time 
Series. Despite important shortcoming with these data (Nam 2006), they remain the only 
cross-nationally comparable source for this region. Specifically, I use a count of the 
strikes, riots, revolutions and demonstrations that take place in the year of and the year 
before the election. 
The third set of variables I test concern social structure. Successful new parties 
are presumed to emerge following demographic shifts or at the time that existing latent 
divides become politicized. Two such variables are relevant to the period under analysis 
in this chapter. First, I test whether ethnic fractionalization advantages one or another sort 
of party performance profile and measure it using Alesina et al (2003). This variable is 
time invariant. Second, I test whether the trends towards urbanization and economic 
informalization lead to successful new party entry of any particular sort. I expect that the 
growth of the urban and/or informal masses, disorganized and unanchored from trade 
unions, ideology, social movements, and existing networks of encapsulation or 
clientelism, will lead to a higher frequency of flash or explosive entry. I measure informal 
and urban growth as a percent change since the last legislative election. Informal 
employment does not include agricultural employment. 
The third set of variables I test relate to the institutional environment. 
Specifically, I test the effect of average district magnitude. Where district magnitude is 
lower, I expect that parties with a high intercept and positive slope—contenders and 
explosive parties—will be more likely than the others.  
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Finally, I include two controls which test whether parties that are at least initially 
electorally successful are more likely to arise following or in the midst of economic 
crisis. I measure economic decline using a dummy variable for high inflation, where 
inflationary elections are considered those with an average of 20% per year in the year of 
and the year before the election. I also use a measure of per capita economic growth over 
the year before and the year of the election. Summary statistics of the independent 
variables appears in Table 3.2 below. 
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Table 3.2:  
Summary Statistics of Independent Variables 
 N Min Max  Mean 
Organization         
-Party Nationalization 266 0.04 0.84 0.34 
-Entry at Transition 279 0 1 0.12 
-Cabinet Participation 279 0 1 0.06 
-Ideologically Diffuse 89 0 1 0.20 
Programmatic Competition         
-Block Loss 74 -32.6 23.3 -6.3 
-Protest 224 0 14 4.9 
Social Structure         
-Urbanization 279 4.9 50.9 18.2 
-Informalization 276 -17.6 40.8 19.1 
-Fractionalization 279 0.50 0.74 0.54 
Institutions         
-District Magnitude 279 2.9 14.4 7.1 
Control         
-High Inflation 279 0 1 0.53 
-Economic Growth 276 -10.0 8.4 1.08 
 
I use multinomial logit to test the effect of these variables on a party’s status as a 
flop, flat, flash, contender or explosive party. Multinomial logit estimates the model one 
pair at a time—it estimates a model for each category of the dependent variable relative 
to the omitted category. I will omit the “contender” group, thereby making it the 
reference category. Since the dependent variable is categorical, any given pair of 
outcomes might be of interest. I will limit the scope of the analysis to comparisons 
between the contender trajectory and each of the others because it is the most 
theoretically important category. Despite my arguments in Chapter 2 about the wider 
diversity in party performance profiles that arise in the inchoate and non-programmatic 
party systems of the region, the “contender” group conforms most closely to conventional 
understandings of party success.  
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The number of parties, 279, is relatively small and even smaller when including 
some of the variables with missing data. Furthermore, because multinomial logit 
generates estimates one pair at a time, some estimates are generated on small samples. 
For example, since I will use “contenders” as the reference group, the estimates which are 
derived from a comparison of the outcome “explosive” where n=3 and “contenders” 
where n=8 are off an effective sample of 11. Not surprisingly, it was most difficult to 
achieve model convergence for this pair, and ultimately no variables were significant, as 
described later in the results. 
I tested alternative specifications seeking robust effects and seeking to trim 
insignificant variables. The results in Table 3.3 below are of the trimmed model. To 
interpret the results, each trajectory group is compared with the contender group. A 
negative coefficient means that the independent variable makes the “contender” group 
more probably than the group for which it is estimated, and a positive coefficient means 
that the independent variable makes the trajectory group for which it is estimated more 
probable than the contender group. Comparisons between other groups are sometimes 
theoretically relevant and can be tested with a Wald test and I report significant results in 
the text when they are relevant. 
Quantitative Results and Discussion 
The results of the model are reported in Table 3.3 below. None of the variables I 
used as measures of programmatic party competition or social structure were significant. 
Of the controls, only the measure of high inflation was significant, and so I retained it in 
the model. The negative coefficient implies that on the heels of high inflation, new parties 
are more likely to be contenders than flat or flash parties. This result is consistent with 
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Burklin’s (1984) “breakdown” theory of green party success, as described by Kitschelt 
(1988). Voters may be more likely during an economic crisis to turn more seriously and 
durably to new entrants than when the economy is relatively stable.  
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Table 3.3:  
Predictors of Trajectory Group Membership 
(Multinomial Logistic Regression, "Condender" as the omitted comparison group) 
 
 Trajectory Group 
Predictor Flop   Flat   Flash   Explosive   
1st Mover -5.12** -3.97** -3.06* -43.51 
            
In Gov't 1.01  4.03** 5.36** 3.11 
            
Party Nationalization -10.18** 5.65  -6.89  8.15 
            
District Magnitude 0.58** -0.40  0.29  -2.04 
            
Inflationary -2.00  -4.98** -4.89** -9.09 
            
Constant 8.28** 9.75** 5.82  11.32  
N 266       
Pseudo R^2 0.40              
* significant at .1 level; ** significant at .05 level.      
 
With respect to the variables I used to measure the concepts associated with non-
programmatic party competition, the results are mixed. First, I expected that contenders 
would have a more diffuse or less identifiable ideology, but my measure of the concept 
was not significant and was dropped from the model because it severely restricted the 
sample size. It may be that the crucial ingredient of success is that the party be weakly 
constrained by formal ties to an organized constituency. Organized constituencies such as 
labor or business unions or social movements, more so than a shallower ideological 
predisposition, may be the mechanism by which attempts by parties to establish 
alternative linkages are challenged. I will make this argument with respect to ID in 
Ecuador later in chapter 5.  
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Second, I expected that parties which gain access to the executive during their 
first electoral competition would use that position to secure resources to build a strong 
and enduring clientelistic party. However, the results indicate that when a party’s entry 
corresponds with a cabinet portfolio at or before their first legislative election, they are 
more likely to be flash or flat than contender parties. Perhaps the result is a consequence 
of the fact that a position in the executive is a poor and incomplete proxy for measuring 
whether or not a party has access to party-building resources. Alternative sources include 
private sources or executive office at lower levels of governance, as for example the 
mayoral office of a capital city. In fact, since clientelistic machines are by design rooted 
in direct exchange between principle and agent, it would not be surprising to find that a 
successful clientelistic party arises out of participation in a local government post, such as 
the mayors office of a major city.  
Additionally, the executive office may be a bad platform for launching a political 
party because the executive will often be held responsible for social, economic and 
political failures which have been so common in the three countries of this study. Parties 
that arrive in the executive from the start may be punished in subsequent elections, either 
languishing as “flat” parties or dying as “flash” parties. Membership in the opposition 
may be a more promising initial position for long-term durability.  
Yet another interpretation to account for the significant coefficient for the flash 
party is that participation in government may be capturing the existence of a personalist 
or outside politician who runs for the presidency and wins. With only a weak party 
behind him, the party disappears soon after he leaves office. Many of the flash parties 
either won office directly—PUR in Ecuador and Convergencia in Venezuela—or were 
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important coalition partners of the president, especially in the Bolivian case where 
presidents rely on a legislative coalition to win office, as was the case with NFR and 
UCS.  
Third, since I expect contenders to be parties which can build a deeply rooted 
clientelistic network, I hypothesized that they would be more nationalized than the other 
types and that there would be a first mover advantage, with parties that incorporate local 
party bosses into their network early being more credible distributors of patronage than 
late-comers. The results confirm that when new party entry takes place at the time of 
transition, the party is more likely to be a contender rather than a flop, flash or flat party. 
This supports the concept of a first mover advantage. Second, when parties are 
nationalized, they are more likely to be contenders than flop parties. Though not 
significant in the model, the sign on nationalization for flat and flash parties is also 
interesting and consistent with expectations. Flat parties, which tend to be cadre/leftist 
parties are the most programmatic in the sample, are estimated to be more nationalized 
than contenders. As parties which make primarily programmatic appeals, I expect them to 
have the most even support around the territory than parties that make non-programmatic 
appeals. Personalist and clientelistic parties are likely to have support which is much 
more pockety.  
Lastly, I tested for effect by electoral systems, as measured with average district 
magnitude, and found the expected result: as the district magnitude increases, the 
effective threshold of representation declines and the probability that new party entrants 
are flop rather than contenders increases. Also significant, but not reported here, is that as 
district magnitude increases, the probability that parties will be of the flop sort rather than 
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of the flash or flat type. A more familiar formulation is that as district magnitude 
declines, contender, flash and flat parties become more probable than flop parties. This 
result confirms that the effect of the electoral system is rather trivial, at least at moderate 
and high levels of district magnitude. Electoral systems have the most powerful influence 
on the performance of new party entrants when district magnitude is very small. 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to explore competing models of party 
performance in non-programmatic party systems. If tests of the extant literature had been 
confirmed and tests of preliminary indicators of my alternative model had been 
disconfirmed, it would have been unnecessary to engage in a theory building exercise for 
the new context. However, this analysis found no evidence to support the arguments that 
social structural or programmatic party variables predict electoral performance. 
Furthermore, it found tentative support for elements of an organizational and non-
programmatic focused explanation of electoral performance. Party organizations in the 
region remain a black box, and so further investigation will require a theoretical model to 
generate predictions for how party organization and strategy influence electoral 
performance. I turn to this task next in Chapter 4. Testing of the theory will follow in 
Chapter 5, where I closely examine new parties in Ecuador which emerged since the 
1978 transition to democracy. 
  
 
CHAPTER IV 
A LINKAGE-BASED APPROACH TO PREDICTING NEW PARTY 
PERFORMANCE 
Voters and Their Collective Action Problem 
 In this section I argue that parties serve as a potential solution to a key collective 
action problem for voters. The dominant explanations of party performance address 
institutionalized and programmatic party arenas in which parties have settled on a 
particular organizational form—the party as a brand with a relatively fixed set of 
positions on relatively few bundles of issues—to solve a voter’s collective action problem 
in a particular way. I argue that the range of possible collective action solutions is wider 
than the programmatic party solution and use generic solutions outlined in the literature 
on collective action problems to develop the range of solutions available to new party 
entrants.  
 In Chapter III, I demonstrated that explanatory models based upon programmatic 
party competition do not adequately account for new party trajectories in Ecuador, 
Bolivia, and Venezuela. In this chapter I develop an alternative model which explains 
new party performance in these non-programmatically structured contexts.  
 Non-programmatic structuration does not imply that parties and politicians fail to 
mobilize highly salient political divisions. Indeed, political campaigns in Latin America 
of the last quarter century have demonstrated the potency of positions for and against 
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liberalizing economic reforms, the incorporation of indigenous communities, government 
reform and transparency, among many other issues. In many cases, parties—especially in 
campaigns for the presidency—win or lose elections on these bases. Such easy rhetoric, 
however, does not constitute programmatic party competition, which is a concept that 
implies deeper organizational ideology work and enduring ideological and 
organizationally structured relationships between parties and voters. I argue that to the 
extent that the easy rhetoric is sent to and received by an electorate, it are largely a 
supplemental strategy for a new entrant, and that the critical and enduring linkage for an 
aspirant seeking to be a contender must be based upon ties to the electorate that are 
derived from vote-buying or very narrowly targeted club-goods, where the basis of the 
club is most commonly a geographical location and not an economic sectoral or social 
location. That is, a necessary condition for parties that seek to be contenders in a party 
system that is neither institutionalized nor programmatically structured is that they 
establish and maintain vote buying and machine relationships with targeted and highly 
concentrated voters in pockets around the country.  
Programmatic party competition as a long-term strategy fails in contexts where 
economic, social and civil society organizations are weak and fragmented, where 
inequality is high, where party systems are inchoate, and where the state is politicized. In 
such a context, a programmatic message targeted to a broad-based constituency is simply 
not credible because the political environment lacks the attributes upon which 
programmatic competition is based. A credible programmatic pledge requires that voters 
have the expectation that there is some reasonable chance of attaining the pledge if 
elected—that is, it requires that voters can behave as prospective voters looking to the 
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future with a significant amount of confidence in the capacity of a party to deliver.17 If 
voters lack confidence in the institutions of governance, or if winning doesn’t lead to 
governing because governance is so fragmented and politicized, then even if voters 
support a given position or platform and trust the intentions of the party, it would be 
naïve to behave as prospective voters. Where chronic failures in governance yield voter 
time horizons that are short or non-existent, voters are only at best capable of making 
retrospective decisions with respect to aggregate outcomes, such as inflation rates or 
social stability and at worst they make voting choices based upon other modes of linkage 
altogether. Knowing this, parties have few incentives to invest in programmatic party 
development as a strategy to project it into the national political arena. The result is a 
vicious cycle of a politicized state incentivizing particularistic parties which then further 
politicize the state. 
In order to think about this problem, it is useful to consider Aldrich’s (1995) 
conceptualization of parties as potential organizational solutions to the collective action 
problem of voters. Although Aldrich theorizes on parties as a solution to three additional 
problems—collective action problems for candidates, ambition problems among 
politicians, and social choice problems among politicians—party success as 
conceptualized here, as electoral success, leads us to consider only the one problem. 
One way to approach the voter’s collective action problem is by using the 
“calculus of voting” model (Downs 1957). Though I don’t seek to make a strong rational 
choice argument for voting and turnout with respect to the assumption of voter 
rationality, the calculus of voting approach provides a useful heuristic for thinking 
                                                          
17
 This is not to say that voters will necessarily behave as prospective voters, and in fact most voters use 
retrospective voting strategies to simplify the voting decision (Fiorina, 1981). 
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conceptually about voters and their motivations, even if those motivations may have 
sources other than rationality.18 It is not necessary that I enter the debate about whether a 
strict assumption of instrumental rationality is required, or whether extra-rational motives 
“stretch the rational choice model or break it” (Chong 1996). Either way, I can use the 
calculus of voting approach to isolate distinctive motivations that a voter may have for 
voting and to think about how parties may use alternative strategies to influence those 
motivations. In the calculus of voting model as specified by Riker and Ordeshook (1968, 
1973), the reward for voting, R, is: 
R=P*B+D-C 
where B is the differential benefit a voter receives if her preferred candidate wins over an 
alternative candidate, P is the probability that her vote will decide the election, D is for 
duty or any positive reward the voter receives from the act of voting,19 and C is the cost 
of voting, summarized in Table 4.1.  
                                                          
18
 Green and Shapiro (1994, chapter 4) offer a thorough critique of rational choice approaches to the 
paradox of voting, in which the calculus of voting model predicts that at equilibrium, few citizens would 
vote. Of course, Aldrich (1995) argues that the political party is a solution to the turnout problem, and so in 
most democracies we are observing turnout net the party solution. See Hershey (2006) for a review and 
critique of the paradox of voting by a rational choice theorist and Friedman (1996) for a diversity of 
positions on the issue, including a contribution by the psychologist, Abelson (1996), who outlines the 
foundations for expressive, rather than instrumental, motives for voting. 
19
 Many authors criticize Riker and Ordeshook for incorporating the D term into Downs’ original 
specification on the grounds that it uses a post hoc adjustment designed to rescue the model and conform to 
the empirical reality that many citizens, in fact, vote. It is a term which so stretches the assumption of 
instrumental rationality that the model and its predictions become non-falsifiable in the sense that it leaves 
little outside the purview of rationality; competing, non-rationalistic, explanations cease to exist. However, 
it does not lead to tautology in my approach, where the explanation allows room for non-instrumental terms 
in the decision calculus and where the purpose of the analysis is to explore the diversity of linkage 
mechanisms between party and voter, and the domain of applicability for each. 
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Table 4.1:  
Terms in the Calculus of Voting Model 
Term Meaning Example 
R-Reward The reward a voter receives from 
the act of voting 
This is the left-hand-side term, and 
as such is the combined effect of the 
other terms. 
P-Probability The probability that a citizen, by 
voting, will bring about the 
benefit, B. 
Essentially, the probability that a 
citizen’s vote will decide the 
election. 
B-Benefit The differential benefit that a 
voter receives from the success of 
her most preferred candidate over 
her less preferred one. 
This term is often derived from a 
programmatic offering, but may be a 
selective incentive that is conditional 
on the candidate’s victory. 
C-Cost The cost to the individual for the 
act of voting. 
Includes costs associated with 
registering to vote, making a 
decision, opportunity cost of the time 
to vote, transportation costs, etc. 
D-Duty The satisfactions to the citizen for 
the act of voting. 
Satisfaction from affirming regime 
support or partisan support. 
 
Notice, this is not a model to predict which candidate the voter will choose—she 
will always choose her most preferred candidate—but rather a model for predicting 
whether the voter will go through the trouble of voting. Also notice that B, the benefit she 
will receive if her candidate wins, is discounted by the value of P in deciding whether she 
should vote or not, which is distinct from the fact that the benefit, B, will accrue to her if 
her candidate wins. She will only vote when R, the reward for the act of voting, is 
positive, though she will of course expect to receive (if her candidate wins) the benefit, B, 
whether she votes or not.  
 This expression represents a collective action problem because most individual 
voters, if left to their own individual decision calculus, will receive a negative reward, R, 
for going through the trouble of voting when other supporters of their preferred candidate 
are voting. The more voters there are, the lower the probability, P, that their vote will 
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count. It is not a stretch to assume that the P*B term essentially disappears to zero, with 
the only remaining incentives for voting being D and C. The individual voter, then, will 
free-ride. That is, when their preferred candidate wins and delivers the benefit, B, the 
voter will get the benefit without going through the trouble of incurring a negative 
reward, R.  If all voters preferring a given candidate perform this calculation and fail to 
vote, their candidate will lose and each individual’s payoff will be worse than if they had 
all voted. 
A simple prisoner’s dilemma illustrates the problem. Table 4.2 below shows the 
payoff two voters, both preferring the same candidate, will receive given the outcome of 
an election. Assume that if their candidate wins and delivers some good, each will receive 
the benefit of winning, Bw, of 1. If their less preferred candidate wins, they will receive 
no benefit, 0. Assume that both voters have little reason to believe that they will be 
casting the deciding vote, and therefore that P is zero, making the P*B term zero. Assume 
that one or two votes will be enough for their preferred candidate to win, but no votes 
will result in a loss. Assume there is no intrinsic duty in voting, D=0, but that the cost of 
voting—registering to vote, getting to the poll, and investing in the process of figuring 
out which candidate will give them the benefit of 1—is some small value, say .1. In this 
case, each voter’s reward for voting, R, is: 
R = P*B+D-C = 0*1+0-.1 = -.1 
The overall benefit for each voter will then be the benefit of winning plus R, which in this 
case is negative. Thus, if a voter’s candidate wins and she votes, the overall benefit is 
Bw+R or .9; if her candidate wins and she doesn’t vote, her overall benefit is 1. In the 
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matrix below, voter 1’s payoff appears first in parenthesis and voter 2’s payoff appears 
second.  
Table 4.2:  
The Collective Action Problem for Voters 
  Voter 2 
  vote  not vote 
vote (.9, .9) (.9, 1) Voter 1 
 not vote (1, .9) (0, 0) 
 
In this scenario, though the Pareto optimal solution is for both voters to vote, both 
voters will conclude that their vote will not be decisive and that not voting will save them 
the cost of voting; that is, each will free-ride. Therefore, both voters will not vote and the 
outcome will be the bottom right payoff of 0, 0, a Pareto inferior solution. This type of 
outcome—the potential that an individually rational decision will lead to Pareto inferior 
outcome—is what makes a collective action problem. 
 Aldrich’s insight is that parties are motivated to form in order to help voters solve 
this problem, thereby making parties a collective action solution for voters. Parties, 
however, have several alternatives for approaching this problem, and it is the particular 
solution that parties adopt which leads to the conceptual distinction between what 
Kitschelt (2000) has called personalistic, clientelistic, and programmatic party types.20  
Collective Action Solutions to the Voter’s Collective Action Problem 
 In order to develop the menu of party solutions for the voter’s collective action 
problem, it is helpful to return to the “calculus of voting” equation and bring into 
                                                          
20
 Though I largely retain the party types that Kitschelt elaborates, my argument differs in that he claims the 
party types are distinguished by which type of problem they solve while I argue here that they are 
distinguished by how they solve the problem. I’ll return to this point later. 
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consideration the distinction between the types of goods a party can deliver to voters. 
First the latter. Parties seek to deliver goods to voters in exchange for their vote. Goods 
can be private goods, club goods, common pool resources, or public goods. These four 
types of goods can be distinguished by their classification on two features: rivalry and 
excludability. A private good is both rivalrous and excludable. A club good is not 
rivalrous but it is excludable. A common-pool resource is rivalrous but non-excludable. A 
public good is neither rivalrous nor excludable. Figure 4.1 represents the distinction. 
Figure 4.1:  
Types of Party Deliverables 
 Excludable Non-excludable 
Rivalrous Private Goods Common Pool Resources 
Non-rivalrous Club Goods Public Goods 
 
 In the context of party-voter linkages, private goods are selective incentives or 
party payoffs to voters for support. Parties, in attempting to secure a vote, can deliver a 
job, a sack of flour, or some other favor. Public goods, on the other hand, are provided to 
all, and one voter’s consumption doesn’t limit another’s. In the context of national 
electoral politics, public goods are rarely the substance of contestation. Instead, they are 
provided by the state, with a typical example being national defense. It is difficult for 
parties to claim credit for public goods primarily because all other parties can also claim 
credit. Competition on valence issues, such as corruption, belongs in the domain of public 
goods. Most goods promised by parties are club goods, at least from the perspective of 
the nation as a whole, because so much of what parties promise is rooted in distributional 
politics. However, club goods vary in the breath of club membership. In terms of 
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electoral politics, club goods vary in the target voter base of a given campaign promise. 
The construction of a public highway and a neighborhood park, for example, represent an 
extremely broad and an extremely narrow club benefit, respectively. They are both club 
goods to the extent that budgetary allocations are zero sum, where money that goes 
towards a good that benefits one club means that the money won’t benefit a different 
club—that is, they are excludable by the very fact that they are located in one locale 
rather than another or targeted to one group of voters rather than another.  
A party’s strategic choice of what type of club good to pledge will depend, to a 
large extent, on the degree to which the underlying social structure is constructed on the 
basis of broad-based social groups or highly fragmented and particularistic interests 
(Weyland 1996). If, for example, workers are organized into corporatist structures with 
peak associations, a new party will be able to campaign on wages or working conditions, 
and those promises will reach a broad-based club. If, on the other hand, union density is 
low, sectoral divisions are deep, a large percentage of the population is employed in the 
informal sector and living in new and sprawling urban shantytowns, new entrants have 
little choice but to target much narrower clubs, often neighborhood by neighborhood, 
with pledges of soccer fields, the extension of water services, and the like.  
Now, returning to the calculus of voting model and incorporating the distinctions 
between private, broad club goods, and narrow club goods, from the perspective of a 
voter contemplating the calculus of voting, the party can devise a strategy which operates 
on any of the terms in the calculus of voting model to overcome collective action 
problems and thereby mobilize voters. Of course, a new party’s concern is not to 
generally solve the collective action problem, but to solve the collective action problem 
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of likely or potential supporters. That is, whatever their strategy, it will be a 
discriminating one in which it solves the problem but only for its likely supporters. The 
strategies outlined here are pure strategies, and I will take up the issue of whether parties 
combine strategies later. 
A party can operate on the B term with a campaign that sharpens and raises the 
relative benefit for a voter of their victory rather than the another party’s victory. Or, they 
can operate on the D term, by constructing a sense of loyalty to the party. Alternatively, 
they can operate on the C term by lowering the costs of voting or raising the cost of not 
voting. I will outline potential party approaches using four scenarios. 
In scenario 1, a vote-buying strategy, the party focuses exclusively on the cost of 
voting term, specifically by offering a private good to offset the cost a voter incurs. This 
is a very narrow definition of vote-buying and excludes other modes of direct exchange 
between parties and voters which are typical of clientelism. For example, it excludes 
exchange  which occurs at times not close to an election and it excludes the exchange of 
narrow club goods for the support of entire social or geographic locations. In the vote-
buying scenario, the voter is indifferent to the benefit, B, accrued if the candidate wins. 
They may perceive the benefit to be zero or even negative, as long as the payoff offsets 
the combined effect of the other terms. The voter will have little sense of duty, D, to the 
political regime or the party. The task for a party is simply to offset the opportunity cost 
of voting, to facilitate voting on election day, to make the act of voting simple, and if 
necessary, to enforce compliance. Notice, when operating on the cost term alone, the 
delivery of the private good is independent of the outcome of the election—the voter 
receives the good for voting, win or lose. It is easy to imagine this scenario. The voter 
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will be poor and believe he has no stake in the outcome of the election. Such a person 
will often accept a gift sufficient to surpass the opportunity cost of voting. The gift may 
be equal to the voter’s wage rate over a couple hours of work. If election day is a national 
holiday or the voter is idle, it may be even lower. The party will offer a ride to the polling 
station to offset the time and transportation costs. On the ride, the party will provide the 
information necessary for casting the ballot, often nothing more than a party list number 
or symbol. Finally, the party can go even further and usher the voter through the polling 
station and assist in the marking of the ballot if circumstances allow.  
A party which seeks to operate on the other terms in the equation faces a different 
challenge, and they will often operate multiple terms at once. They can adopt scenarios 
two, three of four, as follows. In scenario two, the party will adopt a programmatic 
strategy by offering a broad club good. In order to do so, the club must exist or be 
constructed by an entrepreneurial politician, as when ethnic or social identities are 
mobilized. The party’s strategy is to offer a program of significant and credible benefit 
over what the alternative parties offer. It is important to note that the benefit a 
programmatic party offers must be credible, and one can think of the value of B in this 
circumstance as being discounted by the probability that the party, if elected, will be able 
to deliver the benefit. We can adopt the term pc as a term to capture the probability that 
the expected benefit, B, is credible if the party is victorious. The calculus of voting 
model, as a model developed for application in contexts of programmatic party 
competition, does not include a term for this discount rate. One could easily incorporate it 
and assume that it was 1 in contexts where party systems are institutionalized, 
competition in the party system as a whole is programmatic, and electoral victory implies 
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that a party will implement its program. In many contexts out of the developed world, 
however, this term will take on a value less than one, and in a country with poor 
governance, an inchoate party system, and fragmented society it will be much less than 
one. 
Parties that rely on programmatic strategies often operate on the duty term, D, by 
leveraging group solidarities, collective identities, or shared ideologies that may exist 
among members of the targeted broad club. Finally, a programmatic party solves the 
voter’s information problem by building a strong and enduring brand name (Snyder and 
Ting 2002) which is associated with support of the provision of the good, such that the 
voter’s task of choosing is simple.  
In scenario three, the party adopts a machine strategy by offering a narrow club 
good. Their linkage strategy will be similar to the programmatic party in that they offer a 
club good, but the nature of the good—in other words, the benefit, B—will be different. 
In particular, this party will deliver club goods targeted at geographic constituencies, and 
local representatives to the national legislature (or other sorts of delegates from the party 
center) will act as brokers between the center and the constituency. This type of club 
good, commonly called pork, has a benefit term, B, which, unlike a broad club good, is 
not so discounted by small credibility probabilities. If elected, a voter can be confidence 
that the party will deliver. The strategy of delivering a narrow club good is distinctive 
from the vote buying strategy in that the former is contingent on the outcome of the 
election, while in the latter it is independent of the outcome of the election. Machines 
provide a benefit if they win; the pure vote-buyers provide a payoff regardless. Parties 
that adopt this linkage strategy can’t count on an ideologically-rooted duty term, D, to 
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motivate voter turnout since the linkage is not ideologically based. They can, however, 
operate on the duty term by cultivating loyalty rooted in kinship ties or hierarchical 
networks of relationships typical of mafias. The costs of voting, and particularly the voter 
information problems, for this type of party will often be solved by local politicians who 
build reputations as reliable providers of the local club goods and as tenacious advocates 
for local interests. 
Finally, in the fourth scenario, the party solves the collective action problem by 
adopting a personalistic strategy which offers a charismatic or prominent personality as 
the benefit over which voters are choosing. With this linkage strategy, the party 
highlights the qualities of the leader, their ideas, and their interest in the plight of the 
people. The personalistic party need not sound ideologically empty, though in fact they 
are almost always quite ideologically flexible per the discretion of the leader (Stokes 
2001). On the other hand, personalistic politics my be ideologically incoherent by design 
when the politician is aware that complex or ambitious proposals are neither effective nor 
credible. Whether ideologically sounding or not, the central element of the linkage is to 
highlight the central personality. Though Mainwaring and Torcal (2005) measure 
personalistic strategies by looking for newcomers and independents (2005, p. 216), such 
strategies can be adopted by long-standing parties and found among politicians with very 
clear partisan affiliations. In terms of the calculus of voting, the strategy aims to amplify 
the benefit term, B, by promising many things to many people; to amplify the duty term, 
D, by creating a person affection for and loyalty to the leader; and to reduce the cost 
term, C, by simplifying the information burden by casting the choice as one for or against 
the central personality.  
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The theoretical framework I have developed here is distinct from the one 
developed by Kitschelt (2000), where he argues that programmatic, clientelistic, and 
personalistic parties differ in that programmatic parties solve both social choice and 
collective action problems, while clientelistic parties solve only collective action 
problems and not social choice problems, and personalistic parties solve neither. The 
approach used here states that all types of parties attempt to solve the collective action 
problem facing voters. I argue that the three types of parties are different in how they 
solve the problem, not in whether they solve the problem. Furthermore, this alternative 
application of Aldrich’s general scheme to the personalistic-clientelistic-programmatic 
typology applies to the social choice problem facing politicians as well. For Aldrich 
(1995), the social choice problem addresses the instability of voting in congress if 
members are operating outside of parties. In such a setting, voting in congress based upon 
temporary coalitions can “cycle” and yield no equilibrium in the voting outcomes. This 
problem is not germane to the issue of party-voter linkages in the way that Aldrich 
develops it. As a social choice solution, parties enable politicians to acquire and maintain 
durable voting coalitions in congress. Second, this phenomena of cycling in the 
legislature can occur whether the legislator’s preferences and their voting are over 
programmatic or non-programmatic goods. Clientelistic and personalistic legislators face 
the same social choice problem as programmatic legislators, and will often opt to solve it 
by building a party organization which can sustain a durable government coalition, 
though the mechanisms they choose may differ (Morgenstern 2004). In sum, each type of 
party can act as a solution to each of Aldrich’s four problems, but they will do so with 
distinctive approaches that are deployed with distinctive organizational forms. The focus 
 95 
of this project is on voter mobilization and the collective action problem of voters, and in 
the next section I turn to the issue of which organizational form parties will adopt in order 
to solve the problem using one of the four strategies outlined above.  
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Table 4.3:  
Party Strategy and Calculus of Voting 
Party Strategy The party will... 
Scenario 1: The Vote-Buying Strategy 
  Marginal Benefit, p*B ...make no effort to alter. 
  Duty, D ...make no effort to alter. 
  Cost of Voting, C ...offset with selective benefit. 
    ...reduce election day costs with service. 
    ...reduce information costs with simple cues. 
    ...reduce net cost of voting by inflicting a punishment for not voting. 
Scenario 2: The Programmatic Strategy 
  Marginal Benefit, p*B 
...increase B using credible offers of broad club good to preexisting or newly 
created clubs. 
    
...reduce the probability that the voter will decide the election as the breadth of 
the club increases. 
  Duty, D 
...increase D by creating or targeting cohesive and solidaristic clubs or 
cultivating a strong party identification. 
  Cost of Voting, C ...reduce information costs with a strong and enduring brand name. 
Scenario 3: The Machine Strategy 
  Marginal Benefit, p*B 
...increase B using credible offers of narrow club goods to geographically-based 
clubs. 
  Duty, D 
...increase D by incorporating citizens into a local machine culture and 
organization. 
  Cost of Voting, C 
...reduce information costs with the reputation of a local boss as a reliable 
source of club goods. 
Scenario 4: The Personalistic Strategy 
  Marginal Benefit, p*B 
...increase B by selling the party leader and his/her concern for the people as a 
broad club good. 
  Duty, D 
...increase D by creating a sense of personal connection between the leader and 
the voters. 
  Cost of Voting, C 
...reduce information costs by designing campaigns as a referendum on the 
leader. 
 
Organizational Diversity and Collective Action Problems 
 In this section, I map the correspondence between the collective action solutions 
available and developed in the prior section to particular organizational forms that parties 
on the ground adopt. At this point, I assume that parties adopt only one of the strategies 
above, and therefore consider them as a pure case. Later, I will take up this issue of 
whether and how parties combine linkage strategies. 
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Vote-Buying Party Organization 
 The distinguishing element of the vote-buying strategy is that it places a private 
good in the hands of a voter to offset the costs of voting. In this sense, it is clientelism 
narrowly construed. (Stokes 2005). What organizational form is required to execute a 
successful vote-buying strategy?  
First, such a party must have access to resources which they can then distribute in 
exchange for the vote, and they include the cost of the selective benefit and any other 
service provided to the voter. The source of the resources can be vote poor but resource 
rich domestic supporters, in which case the party executes the transaction with vote rich 
but resource poor supporters (Kitschelt 2000). Alternatively, parties that have access to 
the state at either the sub-national or national level can channel state resources to the 
electoral campaign if state controls are weak, as when legislators incorporate a high 
degree of discretion into spending bills (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, forthcoming). Although 
this project does not focus on the party in government or the legislature, it is clear that a 
vote-buying party will adopt institutional arrangements at the elite level that are 
complementary to the institutional form of the party in the electorate. The specific 
organizational arrangement at the elite level will depend on the degree of state autonomy 
from party politics, the degree of interest group corporatism or pluralism, and the nature 
of the economy—in short, on the source of the funds. It is sufficient here to say that the 
strategy will operate most efficiently when, whatever the source, there is high discretion 
and low transparency in the acquisition and distribution of funds.  
 Second, a vote-buying party will often have strong and enduring contacts in local 
electoral markets. Though the vote-buying linkage itself is by definition a weak one, it 
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requires an local infrastructure to deploy it. The party will have a well entrenched 
network of activists involved in neighborhoods. According to Stokes (2005), a “bottom-
heavy, decentralized” party is necessary because it allows parties to predict with high 
accuracy the voting intentions of a citizen, to bring pressure via the social networks of the 
locale on the voters to comply and not defect, to have information about whether or not 
particular voters comply, and to punish those who don’t comply. She terms this reversal 
of accountability between voter and office-seeker “perverse accountability” because if an 
office-seeker is armed with information about how the voters casts a ballot and is in a 
position to punish the voter for that choice, the voter is then accountable to the office-
seeker rather than the other way around.  
Stokes argues that voters will be less inclined to cooperate in a one-shot exchange 
of their vote for a payoff—under such conditions the voter will have an incentive to 
defect from the vote-buying agreement and vote for their preferred candidate.  The 
defection is reduced if the vote for payoff game is repeated. Thus, we could expect that 
parties adopting a vote-buying strategy will build an organization designed to return 
repeatedly to the same areas to harvest votes. The early network established in a given 
locale represents a sunk cost for a party, and the marginal cost of seeking those same 
votes the following election cycle will be much smaller than rolling out a new network of 
trust and accountability elsewhere. Vote buyers will have low electoral volatility in their 
core electoral bailiwicks. 
 Finally, again following Stokes, there is reason to believe that clientelistic 
strategies will operate most effectively in areas with relatively immobile residents and in 
small and medium-sized communities because the social fabric will be denser and 
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relationships stronger and more enduring. Vote-buying operates most efficiently when it 
is overlaid on such a community. Therefore, we can expect that vote-buying parties will 
target rural communities, and small and medium sized cities, rather than large cities or 
newly created urban sectors which arise in the course of urbanization. To the extent that 
vote-buying relationships endure and can be defended by party leaders, new parties 
which seek to deploy a vote-buying strategy will need to seek out unaligned voters who 
fit the profile of the citizen likely to be purchased. This may be difficult in a fully 
enfranchised electorate or one where the electoral marketplace is growing in the 
relatively transient urban shantytowns but not in the relatively stable small and medium-
sized communities. 
 In sum, vote-buying parties will solve the voter’s collective action problem by 
building an organization with distinctive features, and if new parties displaying the 
markers of this organization also follow a distinctive performance trajectory, we will be 
able to draw conclusions about the organizational predictors of new party performance. 
Programmatic Party Organization 
If programmatic strategies solve the voter’s collective action problem by credibly 
promising broad club goods, by leveraging solidaristic and ideological sentiments, and by 
reducing information costs with a strong and enduring brand name, the party will build an 
organization of a different sort.  
First, the party will invest heavily in articulating a coherent and credible party 
platform. This will require an organization designed to deliberate over and settle upon 
fairly detailed policy commitments that are consistent with the interests of its constituent 
members. As with the vote-buying parties, the party will require complementary 
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institutional arrangements at the legislative and executive levels, and these 
complementary arrangements will be designed to implement its legislative agenda and 
execute the law with the bureaucracy. Technical expertise and effectiveness in 
government will be part of the party’s appeal. For a new entrant in an institutionalized 
and programmatic party system where governance is effective, such a case may be 
difficult to make; for a new party in an inchoate and non-programmatic party system in 
an poorly governed state, the case may be impossible to make.  
Policy deliberation and commitment will take place in a context of formal or 
informal integration of its organization with that of the organized social, economic or 
civil society groups with which it allies. Whatever the specific nature of these links, it 
presupposes the existence of organization on the part of its allies in civil society. The 
programmatic strategy need not extend its organizational reach into local communities—
though of course it may where the underlying social relations are organized along 
partisan lines with encompassing organizations that operate down to the neighborhood 
level—but it will at least have strong relationships with opinion leaders and interest 
groups which are effectively members of the party coalition. A successful programmatic 
strategy will require that the party make strong and enduring commitments to deliver the 
broad public goods valued by the coalition members. Even if voters are not directly 
members of either the party or of the party’s constituent coalition groups, they will often 
filter the information they receive about a party through the mass media messages 
distributed by these groups.  
Where voters are highly encapsulated, the programmatic party can operate most 
efficiently, and so parties will seek voters deeply committed to issue positions, though the 
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particular competitive environment will determine the particular strategic move a party 
makes. For example, when an existing party is threatened with a likely electoral loss, 
Carmines and Stimson (1989) and Miller and Schofield (2003) describe alternative 
mechanisms through which programmatic politicians will mobilize new issues or stake 
out new policy positions, respectively, in the hope of capturing new voters. Issue activists 
turned partisan activists play a key role in cementing the identity of a given party with a 
given issue or position over the long-run, again highlighting the centrality of the 
organizationally articulated broad club goods to the programmatic strategy. In the context 
of new party entry, the comparative literature is filled with arguments concerning the 
strategic interaction of new parties and existing parties over issue divides, and the key 
role of organized social and economic groups in transferring those issues into partisan 
political competition (for example, see Lipset and Rokkan 1967, Collier and Collier 
1991, Scully 1992, Yashar 2005) 
A programmatic party will invest heavily in disseminating its relatively 
specialized policy positions either through its organizational infrastructure, or, more 
commonly in modern political environments, via the mass media.   
Whatever the specific mechanism might be, the party will invest its resources in 
specifying its programmatic message, in contesting attempts to alter it, and in developing 
channels to disseminate it. In so far as these investments are aimed at the electorate, I 
should emphasize, they are organizational solutions to collective action, and not social 
choice, problems. 
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Machine Party Organization 
If machine parties solve collective action problems by delivering club goods to 
extremely narrowly constructed constituencies, and especially those constructed on a 
geographic basis, they we can expect that they will build yet another type of distinctive 
party organization.  
This linkage strategy between party and voter is mediated by local brokers who 
develop deeply integrated and monopolistic political and economic organizations in a 
given location, and who can effectively defend their position against newcomers. This 
approach does not easily coexist alongside competing political organizations, so we 
would expect it to have a hierarchical organization where loyalty is valued, and benefits 
derived from electoral success are narrow club goods which will often resemble private 
goods. In fact, however, this strategy does not operate in a strict vote for payoff 
exchange; rather, the goods accrue to the party machine only if they win local office and 
the goods are then distributed often very selectively during the course of the term. The 
goods are designed to feed the pyramidal machine, and mechanisms of discipline and 
distribution exist throughout the organization to filter goods through the layers and down 
to the voter level, thereby ensuring the minimal level of community support. Patronage in 
the form of jobs, for example, is not strictly a vote-buying strategy because the jobs are a 
benefit not just for the recipient, but for entire families, extended families, or even larger 
units. The benefit of the job in a narrow-club good sense is that it provides much more 
than an offset of the costs of voting, but a livelihood for the recipient and his/her family, 
and a point of entry into the machine for solving problems on a larger menu of other 
items important for the good of the unit. To borrow somewhat coarsely from Esping-
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Anderson (1990), this local political and economic solution functions something akin to 
the male-breadwinner model, where kinship is emphasized over the market and the state 
for securing social provisions.  
The machine strategy will cultivate loyalty from local voters using carrots and 
sticks. On the one hand, the successful machine will reward loyal members with benefits; 
on the other hand, the machine is in a powerful position to punish disloyal citizens.  
Its success will depend upon its ability to be densely integrated into the local 
community. Therefore, even more so than the vote-buying strategy, on election day the 
machine approach will be able to deliver the voters, monitor compliance, and dole out 
punishment to defectors.  
In the geographical sphere of its control, the machine will have relatively few 
competitors and its strong position will be enduring. In some national settings, where 
party systems are fragmented and the institutional rules generate fragile ties between the 
local machine and the national party leaders, we might expect that the local machine will 
shift loyalties from one party to another depending upon the national competitive 
circumstances. Therefore, volatility in national voting tallies may obscure what at the 
local level is in fact high levels of continuity.  
Personalistic Party Organization 
The personalistic strategy solves the voter’s collective action problem by 
leveraging the attributes of the candidate to operate on all three terms in the calculus of 
voting. A focus on the candidate simultaneously pitches the candidate as the public good 
which will benefit the populace, creates a bond between the voter and the candidate, and 
reduces the voter information burden to perhaps its simplest terms.  
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As a pure strategy, it is perhaps the least costly approach in that it is a virtually 
organizationally unmediated linkage between the party and the voter. This linkage can 
forego the organizational intermediaries that link the party and the voter and rely 
exclusively on the mass media and the reputational capital of the party leader.  
This strategy will be most effective when it removes the focus from the 
programmatic differences between itself and other alternatives and focuses instead on the 
competence and integrity of the party leader.  
Combining Pure Strategies 
Some parties build an organization that combines two or more of the four pure 
strategies. Since building a party is resource intensive, and since some collective action 
solutions will be at odds with others, we should not expect all combinations to easily 
coexist or be equally likely.  
One difficult combination will be the programmatic strategy with either the vote-
buying or the machine strategies. There is an inherent tension in these linkages in that the 
former is grounded in relatively large bundles of principled positions, while the latter two 
eschew principle. The programmatic strategy generates voter loyalty with a record of 
delivering broad public goods which, as I have defined them, overlay a social or 
economic location. To the extent that these locations correspond to the geographical 
location of vote-buying and machine strategies, the tension may be less than when the 
broad clubs are not geographically concentrated. But even when it is, the internal 
allocative process of resources will generate tension as the programmatic activists 
attempt to marshal resources to build social and economic coalitions, negotiate policy 
trade-offs, commit to party platforms, and advertise their message while the machine or 
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vote-buying activists seek to skim resources for more discretionary purposes (Kitschelt 
2000). 
In spite of the tensions inherent in the attempt, there are important accounts of 
programmatic parties in the Americas diversifying their linkage strategies to include 
clientelistic relationships with non-core voters (on the Brazilian PT see Samuels 2004 and 
Hunter 2006; on the Uruguayan Frente Amplio see Luna forthcoming; on the Chilean 
UDI see Luna manuscript; on the Argentine Peronists see Levitsky 2003). Two 
observations are of note. First, in each case the diversification is presented as a strategic 
adaptation of an existing party motivated by the need to become or remain competitive at 
the highest levels in the national arena. Each of these parties began their lives and 
established their reputations almost exclusively as programmatic alternatives. For 
example, Lula’s more pragmatic faction within the party did not triumph over the more 
doctrinal labor faction until his party had accumulated over a decade of experience 
successfully mobilizing labor voters and governing at the local and state levels (Samuels 
2004). Second, even when parties have adapted by using mixed linkage strategies, the 
augmentation of the primary programmatic linkage with a clientelistic one has generated 
tensions within the party.  
The organization apparatus used to sustain a vote-buying strategy and a machine 
strategy are very similar, and so empirical examples of parties using both of these 
strategies will be relatively common. Furthermore, neither approach is logically 
contradictory with the other.  
The personalistic strategy is one that could be deployed as a supplemental strategy 
to the others, though it will coexist much less comfortably with the programmatic 
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strategy than with the others. This strategy will most often target “floating voters” who 
are not incorporated into either machine, vote-buying or programmatic cultures or 
organizations. In combination with the programmatic strategy, personalistic appeals will 
most often be resisted, however, by the core constituencies to the extent that they dilute 
the message and damage the credibility of the party brand.  
The vote-buying strategy, like the personalist strategy, will often operate as a 
supplemental strategy…  
In sum, we can think of parties as having dominant and sometimes supplemental 
strategies linking themselves to voters to solve the voter collective action problem with 
one among several organizational solutions. 
Distinctive Organization, Distinctive Electoral Trajectory 
 In this section I relate the organizational solutions developed above theoretically 
to the new party electoral trajectories I find in chapter II. The are related because 
different electoral strategies, having distinctive voter-party linkages, will have distinctive 
electoral performances. In this project, the most general statement of my argument is that 
variation in the electoral strategy is causally related to variation in electoral performance, 
contingent on characteristics of the national electoral arena and net the effects of other 
correlates of electoral success, such as electoral rules.  
Personalist Strategies and Performance Trajectories 
 Personalistic strategies, when not combined with other linkage strategies, are the 
most vulnerable to exogenous shocks and attacks by competitors because they rely on 
relatively weak and organizationally unmediated bonds between the party and the voter. 
When deployed effectively at the national level, it may provide any given party with a big 
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boost in electoral support, but that support is equally vulnerable to erosion. In inchoate 
party systems where many voters are not linked by more enduring bonds to any parties, 
the personalistic strategy can make a big initial splash. Empirically, we see this outcome 
rather frequently and especially in presidential elections when outsider candidates 
mobilize vast amounts of voter discontent to capture executive office.  
 In terms of the electoral trajectories of new parties, we may therefore expect to 
find correlates of the initial electoral intercept. For the personalist linkage, the intercept 
will be a function the politicians ability to cover the country via the mass media with a 
simple message that reverberates in the imagination of the unaligned voters. The populist 
and anti-political appeals made by politicians such as Fujimori (1990) in Peru, Chavez 
(1998) in Venezuela, Correa (2005) and Gutierrez (2002) in Ecuador, and Collor (1990) 
in Brazil fit the profile. Each of these politicians competed for executive office with little 
or no electoral support in the legislature. Missing from this list, of course, are many failed 
personalist politicians. Personalist appeals that fail and have no alternative linkage to 
back up their electoral efforts barely register on the radar of electoral politics and we 
would expect to find them in the category of “flop” parties.  
 In addition to outsider politics, personalist politicians seem to have arisen from 
one of two additional sources in third wave democracies of Latin America. First, 
politicians who are locally successful have sometimes ventured into the national electoral 
arena posing as outsider or independent candidates. Their electoral success in local 
politics is most often based upon alternative strategies, and they are often machine 
bosses. Whether they mistake the organizational basis of their local support for 
charismatic appeal or have other incentives for making attempts at the national level, they 
 108 
nearly always fail in their aspirations for executive office. Second, politicians from a 
traditionally dominant national party sometimes split off and deploy a personalist strategy 
based upon the credibility of a real or mythical glorious past. Recent examples of this 
strategy are Caldera in Venezuela and Duran-Ballen in Ecuador.  
 In addition to an intercept, electoral trajectories are defined by a slope which 
represents the rate of growth or decline over time. The slope of the “flop” trajectory is 
largely irrelevant in that the near zero intercept tells the bulk of the story. But for 
personalist parties that manage to enter with a high intercept, as all of the above named 
politicians did, it is clear that we must make distinctions among the group.  
For initially successful personalist new parties, the intercept is not the destiny, and 
we can use a slope for that purpose. Initially successful personalist parties can be split 
into those which quickly died (for example, Duran-Ballen’s PUR, Caldera’s 
Convergencia, Collor’s PRN) and those which endured and grew (Fujimori’s C90, 
Chavez’ MVR, Guttierez’ PSP). There are features of the party’s organization which 
helps distinguish these groups. If they fail to win executive office, even if they come 
close, they tend to follow the “flash” trajectory because they have no venue from which 
to cultivate an alternative linkage strategy.   
If they win executive office, but once in office fail to either, 1) construct an 
enduring coalition of programmatic or machine politicians; or 2) fail to leverage their 
executive victory into more far reaching dominance of the state, then they will follow the 
“flash” trajectory. Like a house built upon sand, whatever their initial glory, they will 
soon decline. Personalist politicians who manage to do one or both of these things will 
follow either the “explosive” or the “contender” trajectories. The first alternative—of 
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altering strategy by building an enduring coalition—is more germane to democratic 
politics. To create an enduring party in a democracy, personalist linkages must be 
replaced by a dominant strategy of programmatic or machine linkages. One of the 
assumptions of this project, outlined and defended earlier in chapter II, is that the initial 
strategic approach of a party will not tend to change. The cases in the literature on 
strategic adaptation all highlight late-adaptors. We might not be surprised to find, then, 
that there are few empirical cases of personalist vehicles which immediately upon 
executive victory adapt to a programmatic, machine, or vote-buying linkage. The second 
alternative—of altering strategy by leveraging executive victory to broader state 
dominance—is more logically consistent with personalism because it need not diminish 
the dominance of the party leader. This approach will, however, be in tension with 
democratic norms and procedures and empirically we will find it in cases where the party 
leader has damaged the democratic credentials of the regime. For example, both Fujimori 
and Chavez adopted extra-constitutional maneuvers to translate their electoral victory 
into a transformation of the regime and state (On Venezuela see Ellner and Hellinger 
2003, Molina 2004). 
The personalist strategy, without executive office, is not a viable one. As a result, 
we should not expect to find personalist politics playing a very large direct role in 
legislative elections. Of course, personalism as a supplemental strategy will be attractive 
to parties with a legislative presence because it will provide coattail effects to the 
associated legislative and local politicians.  
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Programmatic Strategies and Performance Trajectories 
The explanation of this project is context dependent, and it departs from most 
other studies of new party performance because it seeks to understand new party 
performance in an arena of party competition that is hostile to programmatic strategies. 
Programmatic politics, I argue above, is a difficult linkage strategy because 
programmatic appeals are not credible. If this is correct, we should expect to find parties 
that attempt the programmatic strategy to follow an electoral trajectory which does not 
lead to a dominant position in the system. That is, we should not expect to find 
programmatic parties among the group of “contender” or “explosive” parties.  
Parties that make social or economic based appeals and which build coalitions 
with the organized bases of their appeals will only tap into a small segment of the 
population because most citizens don’t exist socially or economically in groups with an 
collective identity and organization. Even when group identities are constructed and 
organizationally manifested, as in the case of indigenous social movements in the Andean 
region (Van Cott 2005, Yashar 2005), it will be difficult to translate these social 
movements into strong electoral movements because short of an unlikely overwhelming 
occupation of the state institutions, the programmatic pledges of any such parties will 
ring hollow. That is, the target constituency may be very large, and that large 
constituency may be actively engaged in the life of the groups civic associations, but in 
the electoral arena the group members will discount the benefit that would accrue to them 
in victory by the extremely small probability that victory would deliver the broad club 
goods. This difficulty is reinforced to the extent that members of the target constituency 
are already integrated into existing machine organizations.  
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Nevertheless, programmatic parties operate on the “duty” term by mobilizing 
identity and ideology, and can be expected to cultivate enduring support from true-
believers. Therefore, over the medium-term—say, for example, over the five election 
cycles I observe in this project—we can expect programmatic parties to follow the “flat” 
trajectory where a relatively small cohort of supporters vote for the party consistently 
over time, scoring modest electoral victories at the national level, and prospering at the 
sub-national level to the extent that their target constituents are not incorporated into 
political machines.  
Target constituents who’s support is not as tightly cemented and who lie at the 
margins or outside the influence of the machine and vote-buying parties may initially 
support a programmatic new entrant, but their support will be fragile, and will dissipate 
when they discover that the party can’t deliver on its pledges. Therefore, support will be 
highest initially. 
Programmatic parties may find an opportunity for electoral success in one other 
circumstance which lies outside the regular cycle of legislative and executive electoral 
politics. Referenda or elections for constituent assemblies are critical junctures, during 
which a platform for or against a particular policy or a platform of state reform is a 
credible promise, leading voters to an altered calculus of voting.  
Machine Strategies and Performance Trajectories 
The machine strategy is the one viable party-voter linkage in an inchoate party 
system where state autonomy is low and the underlying social structure is fragmented and 
disorganized because a successful machine strategy does not depend upon the existence 
of any of these conditions, and in fact thrives in their absence.  
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The logic of a party machine strategy is local. Therefore, a successful party 
machine at the national level will be constructed in one of two ways. Either a national 
party will be a coalition of many local machines, each dependent upon the reputation of 
local bosses. As developed above, these machines will be well diversified beyond 
electoral politics, and will include state, economic and even social organizational 
components. This arrangement may be fragile, with frequently shifting coalitions, 
especially where national party competition is dominated by machine politics. 
Alternatively, a national machine party could be constructed on the backbone of a 
vertically and/or horizontally integrated economic enterprise with broad regional or 
national reach. The various local operations will be incorporated into the national 
organization with more durable, and largely non-political, associations and subject to the 
disciplinary mechanisms of the economic enterprise. This arrangement will be more 
durable. 
Successful new machine parties involve a substantial sunk cost, and can only be 
constructed under limited conditions. First, a successful new national machine party can 
be built when the party founder has an underlying economic infrastructure upon which to 
build the political machine. This will only work when the various parties to the 
enterprise—labor, suppliers, distributors, etc.—are weak and lack autonomy from the 
center. Second, a successful new national machine can be constructed if the component  
elements of a pre-existing machine are somehow dislodged and become available for 
incorporation under a new boss. These openings will often look like party splits, and will 
occur when an existing party loses its leadership and opens the door for a power struggle 
at the top, or when someone within the party challenges the leader. In many respects, 
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then, the party is not genuinely new but a reorganization at the elite level. Still, these 
transitions are critical junctures that can generate many new parties and predictable 
electoral trajectories. In general, one leader will emerge victorious by capturing the 
machine network of the preexisting machine and follow a “contender” trajectory, and the 
other party organizations will wither along the “flop” trajectory. 
Vote-Buying Strategies and Performance Trajectories 
Though conceptually distinct in terms of the calculus of voting, the vote-buying 
strategy will not often constitute a dominant strategy. As outlined above, the 
organizational infrastructure necessary to deploy this linkage is substantial and similar to 
the machine infrastructure. Therefore, I expect it to operate primarily as a supplemental 
strategy to the machine strategy.
  
 
CHAPTER V 
NEW PARTY ENTRANTS IN ECUADOR: 1978-2002 
Introduction 
 This chapter is an analysis of new party entrants in the Ecuadorian system since the 
1978 transition to democracy. It shows that parties which entered on the “contender” 
trajectory were ones which inherited or build a party with national reach, though support 
around the country may not have been very even; which used a machine linkage as its 
dominant strategy to connect with voters; and which have access to substantial discretionary 
resources. Because this explanation is context specific, applying to party systems which 
coexist with the state is politicized and fragmented, it begins with a discussion of the 
relationship between the state, parties and sectoral interests and it reviews the basic 
characteristics of the Ecuadorian party system. Then it moves into an analysis of eight new 
entrants—two each of the contender, flash, flat, and flop types. 
Particularistic Interests, Parties and the State 
 This section traces the evolution of organized interests in Ecuadorian society, and 
their relationship with the state. It describes the sectoral basis for profound regional and other 
geographical divisions and the propensity for horizontally and vertically integrated business 
conglomerates to develop, organize and lobby for particularistic political advantage in the 
course of their rivalries.  
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Sectoral Interests 
One of the most enduring and important questions concerning the Ecuadorian party 
system asks why the level of nationalization remains so low. According to the approach of 
Jones and Mainwaring (2003)—whose measure of Party System Nationalization (PSNS) is 
the sum of individual party nationalization scores, each equal to one minus the GINI 
coefficient of a party’s vote share across the roughly 20 departments21, weighted by their 
share of the national vote—Ecuador is the least nationalized party system of the North, 
Central and South American countries in their study. PSNS scores for provincial deputies in 
the national congress, updated and adjusted using the added detail of the electoral dataset for 
this project, are reported in Table 5.1 below. Party system nationalization begins the episode 
at .61, and is virtually unchanged from the start to the end of the period.  
Table 5.1:  
Party System Nationalization Scores in Ecuador 
Election PSNS 
4/29/1979 0.61 
1/29/1984 0.53 
6/1/1986 0.50 
1/31/1988 0.62 
6/17/1990 0.55 
                                                          
21
 There were 20 provinces from 1978 to 1988, 21 from 1990 to 1998 when the Amazonian province of 
Sucumbios was created out of Napo Province, and 22 since 2002 when Orellana was created out of Napo 
Province. For a theoretical account of the creation of the two provinces, see Ryder and Brown (2000). Note that 
the formation of these two provinces out of a larger existing province are inconsistent with the argument by 
Rice and Van Cott (2006) that new districts offer a unique opportunity for indigenous party mobilizations. 
These districts were not new in the sense that voters were newly enfranchised. If their creation implied some 
advantage for the indigenous party Pachakutik, it was not because “new districts present particularly favorable 
ground for new political vehicles because they do not have to compete with incumbents, who might otherwise 
have a tight grip on political resources and established ties with voters” (p. 720). Rather, according to Ryder and 
Brown, these districts were spun off of Napo because of the steady arrival of large numbers of migrants over 
several decades and the creation of boom-towns. Incumbents existed from before their creation. For example, 
the parroquia of Loreto (#6455) in the canton of the same name existed as a continuous unit in both Napo prior 
to 2002 and in Orellana since 2002. [Move this to its own treatment in the pachakutik section]. 
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Election PSNS 
5/17/1992 0.58 
5/1/1994 0.57 
5/19/1996 0.59 
5/31/1998 0.62 
10/20/2002 0.59 
 
In order to visually portray the degree of inequality of support across the provinces, 
Figure 5.1 shows a line for perfect equality and the Lorenz Curves for three multi-province 
parties22 from 2002—the one with the lowest PNS (META), the party with the highest PNS 
(PRIAN), and a party with a PNS which is about equal to the system average PSNS (MUPP).  
                                                          
22
 By definition, parties that only compete in one province have the theoretical and empirical minimum PNS of 
.045. 
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Figure 5.1:  
2002 PNS Lorenz Curves for Parties at Min, Max, and Mean 
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Most analyses of party politics and electoral behavior in Ecuador, including studies of 
nationalization, highlight the regionalization of the country. The three principle regions—the 
western coastal plains, the central Andean highlands, and the eastern Amazon jungle—are 
culturally, economically, socially, and politically distinctive.23 See inset of Figure 5.2 below. 
The coastal region is centered on the largest city, Guayaquil, and is economically dominated 
by financial and export-oriented enterprises. It is popularly understood as the hub of 
freewheeling business, the home of populism, and the origin of 20th century liberalism which 
                                                          
23
 In addition to the three main regions, the country contains the Galapagos Islands, which are alternatively 
classified as a separate special region or a part of the coast. Though it exists as its own province, the Galapagos 
is marginal to the political life of the country, except to the extent that it is an electoral district with contestable 
seats. 
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arose and successfully challenged the highland conservatism from the days of Spanish 
colonization. The coast was the destination and remains the home to the majority of post-
independence immigrants. It includes prominent Arab and Afro-Ecuadorian communities. 
The capital city, Quito, is located in the highlands region and is the base of the traditional 
conservative elite, where the Catholic Church is strong. Business enterprises in the highlands 
have traditionally been focused on domestic consumption and the hacienda system 
dominated until the 1960s. Indigenous groups are populous in the highlands. The Amazon 
region contains a mere 4% of the population and has been historically isolated, but the 
discovery of large oil reserves in the 1960s prompted some exploration, development, and 
migration into the region.  
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Figure 5.2:  
Ecuadorian Provinces and Regions 
 
Regionalization, in itself, however, is epiphenomenal of other forces. In particular, 
though regionalized party competition is evident in campaigns and electoral results, I argue 
that in more important respects party politics operates under a logic that is geographically 
concentrated to areas that are smaller than the region. As Bonilla observes, “Politics are ruled 
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by clientelism, by partimonialism, and by national coalitions based on links between local 
parties in Quito and Guayaquil and local caudillos in the provinces” (2001, p 7). Certainly, 
parties adopt some strategies that are rooted in the regional divide, a divide which has 
received considerable attention (León 2003, León 1994, Quintero 1991, Pachano 1985, 
Pachano 2006). These strategies are most prominent in presidential elections. For example, 
all competitive president/vice-president tickets are balanced with one candidate from the 
coast and one from the highlands. Nevertheless, the existence of these strategies only 
obscures the fact that enduring party-voter linkages are built on the basis of exchanges 
between parties and smaller constituencies over much narrower club goods. Pachano notes: 
“Because of the type of relationship parties have with their electorates, they are forced to 
produce results that do not satisfy the expectation of the population as a whole. The parties 
must be rooted in territorially and socially defined groups of voters in order to survive. This 
situation transforms parties into expressions of partiality and not of public good, and leads 
them to develop a great ability to represent specific interests and local arenas, but also leaves 
them with an enormous deficiency in representing national interests” (2006, p 102). 
In order to understand this persistent low level of nationalization, it is helpful to begin 
with a brief description of the structure of the economy. Analysts of the Ecuadorian economy 
from over the last three decades agree that ownership of most of the key manufacturing, 
agricultural and service sector enterprises is highly concentrated (EIU 2006, Martz 1987, 
Hurtado 1980). Ownership evolved into several competing horizontally and vertically 
integrated conglomerates which have distinctive geographical hubs. This pattern was due in 
large part to the geographical features of the country, with the three geographical regions 
largely isolated from each other up until the last three decades. Even within the three main 
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regions, communities were poorly connected. The central highlands, for example, contains a 
string of provincial cities occupying main valleys running north to south along the spine of 
the Andes. This geographical pattern inhibited transportation and telecommunication 
linkages between provincial Andean cities, which came relatively recently. It was not until 
the 1950s, when the country embarked on an import-substitution industrialization model, that 
it began to build an infrastructure of roads and communications adequate to integrate the 
country and sustain domestic markets that were national in scope (Hurtado, 1980). Until 
integration, the two main cities, as well as many of the isolated provincial capitals, each 
generated their own sub-economies and often with distinctive and competing interests. The 
legacy of this pattern with respect to capital ownership and political authority was a series of 
locally entrenched monopolies, or in the case of the largest cities, a few competing 
oligopolies. The social and economic changes that were sparked by industrialization and later 
by economic liberalization have challenged the control of these entrenched brokers, but to a 
large extent these challenges have not been successful.24 
Economically, Ecuador has been a laggard in its liberalizing reforms and many 
sectors of the economy remain insulated from competitive forces and concentrated in the so-
called “grupos monopolicos,”—monopolistic groups. These groups classically carry the 
family name of the top broker or founder and in common parlance, Ecuadorians are fond of 
referring to them as “mafias.”25  For example, the Noboa Group, headquartered in Guayaquil 
and best known as the world’s top banana exporter, is a conglomerate which controls 
                                                          
24
 As I write, newly elected president Rafael Correa, who ran without any congressional candidates and on a 
platform promising state restructuring, a constituent assembly, and the end of the domination of corrupt 
traditional parties, is marshalling another challenge to the political elite. It remains too early to predict the 
outcome. 
25
 Personal interviews PLN-2 (2006), German Rodas at Universidad Andino Simon Bolivar. 
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hundreds of mostly coastal enterprises in the fruit growing, food processing, exporting, 
transportation, media, chemical, retail, and financial sectors. Likewise, to name two more 
examples, the Malo Group operates in the southern highland province of Azuay centered on 
the city of Cuenca, and the Proinco Group operates in the capital province of Pichincha 
(CEDIS 1986).   
The flip side to this concentration of productive enterprises is a population that is 
overwhelmingly living in poverty, working in the informal sector, and living in urban 
centers. See Table 5.2 below. Over the last four decades, Ecuador has been transformed from 
a country where one-third of the population occupied the cities in 1960 to a country where 
two-thirds of its 13 million inhabitants occupies the cities today. While the rural population 
has increased by about 60% from 1960 to 2000, the urban population has increased 428% 
over the same period (Maldonado 1985). The masses in Ecuador have been largely 
marginalized from the benefits of the country’s economic growth over the last four decades. 
Labor unions have never been strong and social movements, until very recently, have never 
been sufficiently organized to effectively mobilized for their interests. According to Huber et 
al. (2006), during the 1990’s, 41% of households subsist at below the $2/day poverty line, the 
highest level on the continent. Additionally, considering that literacy restrictions were 
removed from the franchise beginning in 1978—coming into effect for legislative elections 
beginning in 1984—many have also been marginalized from the country’s political life until 
very recently. Prior to the 1979 presidential election, no more than 18% of the population had 
participated in a presidential election. 
Table 5.2:  
Population Demographics 
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Year Gini 
Informal (Non-
Agricultural) 
Labor Union 
Density Poverty Population 
Urban 
Population 
1960   57%     4,439,000 34% 
1970   65%     5,970,000 40% 
1980   63%     7,961,000 47% 
1990 .43 (1994) 53% 14% 63% 10,264,000 55% 
2000   52%     12,646,000 63% 
Source: Huber-Stephens dataset [Gini-WIDER; Informal-International Labor Organization 
(online); Poverty-ECLAC; Labor Union Density-Roberts (1997); Population-WDI] 
 
The Politicized State 
The state in Ecuador has traditionally been an instrument for the dominant economic 
groups to wield for material economic advantage. Though they have faced many challenges 
in the post-war era—and in particular the populist challenges of Velasco Ibarra and the brief 
reformist military tenure of General Rodriguez Lara—they have retained a large degree of 
control over the state. Four out of five of Velasco Ibarra’s terms as president and the tenure 
of Rodriguez Lara all ended prematurely and usually with a coup leading most reformist 
attempts, such as land reform, tax reform, and democratic openings, to be severely curtailed 
or reversed.  
During the 1978 transition to democracy, reformists played a formative role in 
crafting the new constitution and the laws on parties and electoral competition with the intent 
of opening the political arena and state to previously excluded sectors. The fortunes of the 
economic elites, however, were heavily dependent upon the state and foreign capital and 
were not tied to the opening of domestic markets and the gains of domestic consumers and 
they outmaneuvered reformers and undermined the spirit if not the letter of most proposals. 
(Schodt 1987, Conaghan 1988, Isaacs 1993, Conaghan and Malloy 1994).  
The Ecuadorian state is weak, fragmented, and politicized primarily because 
dominant economic groups are not unified, but highly competitive, and have contested each 
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other for control of the state seeking to extract particularistic benefits. The very legitimacy of 
the state is based upon its ability to subsidize the narrow interests of its most powerful 
economic interests and when it is unable to do so, or when reformist tendencies threaten this 
orientation, these dominant actors challenge the state and regime (Bonilla 2001). On the one 
hand, these competitors often unite to defend themselves from challenges from below; on the 
other hand, they often compete with each other given their distinctive sectoral interests which 
often, but not always, map onto the regional or sub-regional divides. Ecuador’s poor progress 
in liberalizing the economy (Bonilla 2001) and its relatively low scores on indices of 
economic liberalization (Lora 2001) reflect the degree to which business interests are 
entrenched in the state and protecting their ability to extract rents. In particular, Ecuador has 
lagged in its financial liberalization. On Lora’s index of financial liberalization (range 0-1), 
where a country like Argentina has nearly completely liberalized from .19 to .99 over the 
period 1985 to 2000, Ecuador has moved from .25 to .6 over the same period. Most 
disastrously, opposition to President Mahuad’s structural adjustment program in 1999 by the 
conservative Guayaquil-based PSC and the coastal finance interests they represent led 
ultimately to a financial collapse and state bailout that cost $5 billion. Until this crisis and the 
dollarization of the economy in 2000, interest rates were heavily controlled. In addition, then 
as now, bank lending retains heavy sectoral requirements. Apart from state intervention in 
finance, former IDB economist Francisco Thoumi finds the practice of earmarking of 
government funds towards thousands of autonomous governmental organizations (Hurtado 
1980) and the subsidization of energy consumption particularly distorting and 
disproportionately beneficial to the dominant economic groups and their income and wealth 
producing enterprises (Thoumi 1990).  
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In a 2006 study by Mejía et al, the authors use an expert survey conducted by the 
IPES for a 2006 report entitled “The Politics of Policies” to demonstrate that among a sample 
of 18 Latin American countries, Ecuador has the lowest quality on four of the five criteria 
measured, including “public-regardedness,” “enforcement,” and “efficiency” (Mejía et. al., 
2006a). In other words, Ecuador produces the least “public-regarded” policy in a region that 
overall produces policy of very low public regard. Furthermore, they argue that the process 
of executive-legislative coalition building and negotiation is conducted by party leaders and 
not individual legislators. In the context of executive-party boss negotiation, “the allocation 
of particularistic and discretionary currencies in the form of pork and patronage tend to 
prevail over the negotiation of programmatic and more transparent agreements around policy 
concessions or ministerial offices” (p. 34). 
The argument of this project is contextually circumscribed to electoral arenas where 
state autonomy is low and political participation is constrained. The economic and 
sociological patterns described above underpins the prevailing logic of competition in the 
party and state arenas, which is elitist and exclusionary. The discussion which follows 
elaborates on the condition of the Ecuadorian party system and its relationship with voters.  
Voter Mobilization and Fragmentation 
 This section describes the party system and the electorate, highlighting the extreme 
fragmentation and political exclusion. I focus on the franchise, voter attitudes and party 
affiliation. I argue that Ecuador is an environment which is general hostile for the 
mobilization of salient political issues and divides, including indigenous ethnicity. Overall, 
this profile indicates that the size of the voter information problem is enormous. In such an 
 126 
environment, it is far less costly for parties to establish and protect a core constituency with 
clientelistic modes of exchange than with their alternatives. 
 Scholars of Ecuadorian party politics have emphasized the breakdowns in 
representation that arise from non-programmatic strategies and governing practices of parties 
in the system, ranging from clientelism to policy particularism and populism (Menendez 
1996, Bustamante 1997, Burbano 1998, De la Torre 1996, Pachano 2006, Mejia et. al. 2006a) 
Party Formation and Party System Attributes 
During the most recent democratic episode until 1994, party formation in Ecuador 
rarely occurred as the emergence of a “genuinely new” organization (Hug 2001) or, in the 
terms of Laver (2005), as a citizen-turned-candidate. Rather, formation was most commonly 
the result of dissident party members leaving one party and starting a new party. Leading up 
to the 1978 transition, there had traditionally been five major political tendencies. First, there 
was the Liberal (PLRE) and Conservative PCE) parties with origins in the late 19th century. 
These parties dominated political contestation until the mid-20th century, when a Marxist left 
emerged beginning in 1926 and a populist coastal tradition emerged in 1946 which later 
became the CFP. Additionally, a populist highland tradition emerged surrounding the five-
time president Velasco Ibarra. Unlike it’s coastal populist counterpart, Velasco Ibarra 
eschewed organization and build instead a very poorly institutionalized personalist 
movement which projected only very weakly into the Third Wave party system .  
By the 1978 transition, four of the five traditions—Liberalism, Conservativism, 
coastal populism, and the traditional left—experienced considerable reorganization and 
fragmentation while Velasqismo disappeared soon after Velasco Ibarra’s death in 1979. Both 
Liberalism and Conservatism splintered as progressive factions from both formed new 
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parties, often rooted in opposition to the authoritarian rule of the 1970s and in support of the 
opening of the political system to the masses. The CFP entered the transition as the strongest 
and most cohesive of the party organizations, but fear of a presidential victory by its 
candidate, Asaad Bucaram, led the military and its allies to ban him from running by means 
of a rules technicality. Instead, the CFP placed a young lawyer named Jaime Roldos at the 
head of the ticket with the campaign slogan of “Roldos to the Presidency, Bucaram to 
Power.” The anti-CFP forces’ maneuvers were ultimately successful in undermining 
Bucaram’s organization. By the second round election, irreconcilable factions had arisen 
within the party, with Roldos behaving far more independently than Bucaram had imagined. 
By 1981, with the death of both Roldos in a plane accident and Bucaram, the CFP followed 
the course of the traditional tendencies and splintered into many competing parties. 
Overall, the Ecuadorian party system is poorly institutionalized (Mainwaring and 
Scully 1995, Bustamante 1999, Conaghan 1994), volatility is high (Arias 1995), and 
fragmentation is extreme (Conaghan 1995, Freidenberg 2000). Furthermore, party’s are 
decentralized to the extent that they incorporate outlying provincial political leaders with 
their own independent base of support, and party vote switching is high (Desposato 2006).  
Case Selection and Research Design 
The analysis of Chapter 2 yielded five trajectories for new parties in the four country 
cases. In Ecuador, the 26 new multi-province parties were spread across four of the trajectory 
groups, covering all but the “explosive” group. See Table 5.3 below.  
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Table 5.3:  
The Set of New Parties in Ecuador, 1979-2002 
 Vote Percentage 
Trajectory 
In Depth 
Analysis Party 
Year of 
Election 1 Election 1 Election 2 Election 3 Election 4 Election 5 
Yes ID 1979 14.8 20.0 14.5 22.6 13.0 
 PRE 1984 5.1 9.0 16.3 14.8 16.0 
Contenders 
Yes PRIAN 2002 13.8     
Yes FRA 1984 8.8 5.7 3.9 4.2 3.6 
 DP-UDC 1984 7.3 9.4 10.9 10.0 7.2 
 MPD 1979 4.9 6.5 7.3 5.8 5.0 
Flat 
Yes MUPP-NP 1996 7.1 2.1 4.2   
Yes PD 1984 8.0 4.7 2.0 0.0  Flash 
Yes PUR 1992 14.8 3.9 0.0   
Yes MCNP 1996 0.3 4.9 0.8   
 META 2002 0.8     
 MIAJ 1998 0.1 0.4    
 MIGN 1998 1.7 0.0    
 MIHE 1998 0.1 0.0    
 MIUN 1998 0.3 0.0    
 MPS 2002 2.0     
Yes PAB 1992 0.5 0.1 0.0   
 PCD 1984 2.7 2.3 1.2 0.9 0.5 
 PDP 1988 0.4 1.0 0.1 0.0  
 PLN 1990 1.8 1.0 0.9 0.0  
 PL 2002 2.8 0.0    
 PAN 1996 0.9 1.9 0.0   
 PSP 2002 4.0     
 TSI 2002 1.1     
Flop 
 UPL 1994 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.0  
 
In this chapter, I will draw on data from all parties as necessary, but focus in 
particular on eight of the parties. I will choose two parties from each trajectory group, as 
indicated in column one of Table 5.3. I select my cases for in-depth analysis according to two 
main criteria. First, in order to maximize the difficulty of confirming my linkage hypotheses; 
and second, in order to subject several of the principle institutional hypotheses to scrutiny. 
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Criterion 1: Linkage Strategy 
Because my hypotheses hold that in a country like Ecuador, programmatic strategies 
will have limited appeal, machine strategies constitute a more successful linkage mechanism, 
and that vote-buying and personalistic strategies are secondary strategies, I will select some 
of my cases of in-depth analysis in such a way as to challenge these hypotheses. Specifically, 
from among the three contender parties I will select what is widely considered to be the most 
programmatic party in the system, Izquirda Democratica (ID). ID is a social democratic party 
and member of Socialist International. Its founder, Rodrigo Borja, was a vice president and 
was appointed an honorary president during the 1980s and 1990s26 and is widely considered 
to have been a principled advocate of social democratic policies. If ID adopted a primarily 
programmatic linkage with its constituents, how did it enter the political arena as a 
contender? 
Second, one general characterization from a visual inspection of the “flat” trajectory 
parties is that they are all relatively programmatic, which is a regularity that would be 
consistent with my theoretical expectation. In order to raise the empirical hurdle, I will 
inspect the least programmatic of these four parties, the Frente Radical Alfarista (FRA). Like 
the ID, FRA was formed by a group of dissident Liberals during the military dictatorship of 
the 1970s and was an outspoken advocate of democracy. Its founder, Abdón Caldeón, was 
assassinated in 1978 just after finishing fifth in the first round presidential election of that 
year. Following his death, however, the party lost its principled ideological moorings though 
it maintained its ability to draw a small but consistent share of the national vote. How did it 
do so if its ideological standard-bearer was eliminated? 
                                                          
26
 Personal interview ID-2 (2006). 
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Third, I will use the only two “flash” parties in the sample. Both the Partido 
Democrata (PD) and the Partido Unidad Republicana (PUR) were founded after the transition 
by prominent dissident members of the traditional dominant parties from the two-party 
system of an earlier era—the Liberal Party and the Conservative Party. While the founder of 
PUR, Sixto Durán-Ballén, was a popular mayor of Quito, neither he nor any of the leaders of 
PD were charismatic personalities in the fashion of the earlier-era populist leaders, Asaad 
Bucaram or Velasco Ibarra. How did these parties capture such a high initial level of the vote 
only to see their support so rapidly disintegrate? 
Finally, from among the “flop” parties, I will analyze two parties that stood to inherit 
or build substantial electoral vehicles at the time of their founding. The first, Movimiento 
Ciudadano Nuevo Pais (MCNP), was founded by an outsider radio personality Freddy Ehlers 
who allied with the newly formed indigenous party, Pachakutik (MUPP) and who finished in 
third place in the first round presidential election of 1996 and in fourth place in 1998. The 
second, Partido Asaad Bucaram (PAB), was founded by a son of Asaad Bucaram, Avicena 
Bucaram, who hoped to capitalize on his dead father’s impressive former popularity and 
influence by reconstructing the coalition of popular sectors that once projected the father to 
the front of the electoral pack. These two parties seem to have at least the potential 
ingredients for better performance27. Though my hypotheses concerning “flop” parties, as a 
largely residual category, are a serious of negative statements concerning what these parties 
fail to do, does the story of their electoral failure lend support to the theory? 
                                                          
27
 Many of the flop parties, in terms of asset endowments of program, personality or neighborhood brokers, 
don’t have even a remote possibility of growing into prominence in the system. 
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Criterion 2: Institutional Rules 
My second selection criterion for case selection concerns institutional rules. From an 
institutional perspective, post-transition Ecuadorian partisan politics can be conceived of as 
having two phases. Two primary moments of institutional innovation were each followed by 
a period of relative stability in the patterns of inter-party competition (Mejía, Pérez and 
Saiegh 2006).28 Both episodes begin with moments of constitutional redesign, the first 
beginning in 1978 and the second in 1998. 
The 1978 transition to democracy represented a fundamentally new institutional 
environment. The constitutional and party law authors attempted to craft a system which 
created incentives for political entrepreneurs to build large, national and programmatic 
parties (Hurtado 1990, Nohlen and Pachano 2005, Mejía 2002). 
By the mid-1990s, the reforms of the transition were largely seen as failures and their 
credibility was exhausted. Over the course of nearly 20 years, new organizational actors had 
emerged and a vibrant if fragmented and disorganized civil society was asserting itself.  
Because institutional rules have conventionally been hypothesized to have decisive 
effects on the party system, and particularly on the ability of new parties to compete, where 
possible I will select cases of new party entry from both the pre-1998 and the post-1998 
                                                          
28
 This observation does not necessarily contradict the claim by Pachano (2006) that many elements of the 
institutional environment have been contested and subject to change throughout the period. Institutional reform 
has been nearly constant and used by political actors to solve “even small problems” (p. 104). He notes that no 
two elections have taken place under the same electoral rules. Still, the scale and type of changes that occurred 
in the mid-1990s significantly differentiates the two periods.  
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periods. For a summary of the party and electoral system rules of the two periods, see Table 
5.4 below.
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Table 5.4:  
Party and Electoral Rules in Ecuador 
 Phase 1: 1978 to about 1996 Phase 2: about 1996 to present 
Legislative Structure Summary Two-tier Unicameral with National and District Deputies One-tier Unicameral with Purely District Deputies 
Unicameral Structure (1978-1998) Two-tier (2002-present) One-tier 
-National Tier (1978-1996) 12 national deputies (1998) 20 national deputies 
    (2002-present) no national deputies 
-National Tier Term (1979-1984) 5 year term   
  (1984-1998) 4 year term (2002-present) no national deputies 
-Provincial Tier (1978-1996) variable 57-70 deputies (1998-present) variable 100-101 deputies 
-Provincial Tier Term (1979-1984) 5 year term   
  (1984-1996) 2 year term (1998-present) 4 year term 
Electoral System Summary Party Centered with high Malapportionment Candidate Centered with high Malapportionment 
-Electoral System (1979-1996) Closed list PR (1998-present) Open list PR 
-Electoral Formula (1979-1996) Combined Hare/d'Hondt (1998-present) d'Hondt 
-Midterm elections (1979-1984) none (1996-2006) none 
  (1984-1994) provincial deputies only   
-Provincial Tier Districts (1979-1988) 20 (2002-present) 22 
  (1990-1998) 21   
-Provincial Tier Average District 
Magnitude (1979-1996) 3.0 (1998-present) 4.6 
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Party Strength Summary Strong National Parties, undermined by reelection limits Weak National Parties 
Reelection (1983-1994) No immediate reelection (1996-present) No term limits 
Alliances (1979-1996) no electoral alliances (1998-present) province-level electoral alliances 
Ballot Access for New Parties:     
-Signatures to register a party (1978-1994) .5% per district (1996-1998) 1.5% of national movements and parties 
    (2002-present) 1% per district for independents 
-Geographic distribution (1979-1994) 10 provinces, including 3 largest (1996-present) none 
-Independent electoral movements (1979-1994) none 
(1996-present) independent provincial movements 
allowed 
Party Survival Threshold (1979) 5% of national vote in 2 consecutive 
(1998-present) 5% national vote in 2 consecutive, 
applicable to parties but not movements 
  (1983) no minimum threshold   
  (1994-1996) 4% of national vote in 2 consecutive   
  Penalty is loss of registration, but not seats Penalty is loss of registration, but not seats 
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In chapter III I argued that institutional variables which predict party entry, such as rules 
that raise the cost of party registration, and ones which influence party survival, such as rules 
which specify the conditions under which a party will be declared dead, are not germane to this 
project. The former institutions predict party entry but not party performance, while the latter 
could theoretically effect party performance, but only if one were seeking to discriminate among 
the many parties in what I term the “flop” category. I expect a third set of institutions which 
collectively determines the “threshold of representation,” however, to predict which type of new 
entrant will appear in a party system.  
I examine two elements of the threshold of representation in the quantitative cross 
national chapter: seat threshold and district magnitude. In Ecuador, the seat threshold is 
extremely low, which leaves only district magnitude as the driving force behind the effective 
threshold.  Over the period analyzed here, district magnitude has varied immensely across 
districts and elections, from one to 18. Representation in the national chamber is awarded in part 
by state and in part according to population. Each state has been guaranteed one seat in the 
national chamber before 1996 and at least two seats beginning in 1996. Additionally, beyond a 
certain population, additional seats are allocated for a specified population increment. However, 
seven of the 22 provinces are sparsely populated. As an example of the extreme differential, in 
1979 the smallest province of Galapagos contained 0.1% of the electorate and received 1.8% of 
the provincial tier seats, while the largest province of Guayas contained 25.7% of the electorate 
and received only 11.6 percent of the provincial tier seats. Consequently, Ecuador has one of the 
most highly malapportioned bodies in the region (Samuels and Snyder 2001).   
With respect to party performance, this huge variation in district magnitude means that 
between districts, party performance trajectories vary widely. In the single member provinces, 
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competition conforms to Duverger’s Law and two parties typically compete for the seat. In 
Figure 5.3 and Table 5.5 below, for example, party vote share is displayed in the Amazonian 
province of Pastaza, which was a single member district (SMD) from 1979 until 1994, after 
which the law changed and gave each province a minimum of two seats.  
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Table 5.5:  
Party Performance, Pastaza Province 
Party 1979 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2002 
AN  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
APRE 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0  
CFP 16.5 0.0 0.0 2.4 1.5 1.4 0.5 1.0 0.0 1.6
DP-UDC  0.0 19.5 11.2 3.8 6.9 4.4 6.5 13.6 5.8
FADI  36.0 38.7 18.8 32.4 12.1 11.8 0.0 0.0 0.0
ID 39.2 0.0 0.0 35.5 15.2 5.8 34.2 0.0 11.5 12.8
MPD 5.6 0.0 1.7 0.0 0.0 1.5 8.6 20.2 14.7 6.9
MPS          4.6
MUPP-NP        12.8 13.6 15.8
PAN        0.0 2.1  
PCD  20.4 0.0 5.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
PDP    0.0 0.0 0.2     
PL          6.9
PLN     2.7 7.4 0.0    
PLRE 0.0 36.8 34.2 3.4 11.6 26.8 24.9 10.8 0.0 0.0
PRE  6.8 0.6 2.1 6.0 2.5 0.9 5.2 0.0 1.5
PRIAN          6.4
PSC 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.9 1.9 6.1 6.3 11.1 0.0 7.4
PS-FA 0.0 0.0 0.0 15.6 23.0 12.9 6.8 9.8 7.3 1.6
PSP          15.8
PUR      14.9 1.7    
UN-UNO 38.7 0.0 5.4 0.0 1.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.7 7.4
UPL       0.0 11.8 7.3  
Parties which never competed in Pastaza are excluded; null values indicate that 
the party did not exist. 
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Figure 5.3:  
Party Performance, Pastaza Province 
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Note: Parties which never won more than 10% of the vote in the SMD years from 1979 to 1994 
have been excluded (AN, APRE, MPS, PAN, PDP, PLN, PRE, PRIAN, PSC, UPL). 
It is worth noting several points. First, in most elections while Pastaza was a single-
member district, there were two dominant parties. Both parties usually had above 20% of the 
vote. Beginning in 1996 when the district gains two seats, two-party competition ends.  
Second, many parties who participated in the election at the national level nonetheless 
chose to concede Pastaza. Concessions are evident in one of two ways. Either the party never 
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registered to compete in Pastaza and they did not appear on the ballot. These parties have 0% of 
the vote and appear along the x-axis in the figure. Otherwise, the party registered in the province 
and appeared on the ballot—usually because registration law had a geographic component which 
required participation in at least half of the provinces—but they did not exert any or much effort 
in the province. These parties won some votes, but usually not much more than 5% of the total. 
Note that parties which never exerted much effort in Pastaza have been excluded from the figure 
to simplify the presentation.  
Third, in all of the SMD elections, there was a third and sometimes a fourth party which 
each won between about 10% to 20% of the vote. These challengers were always of one of two 
types. Either they resembled “flash” trajectory within the province, challenging in one election 
but losing and then quickly disappeared. This was the case in 1979 with the CFP, in 1984 with 
PCD, in 1986 with DP-UDC, and in 1992 with PUR. In two cases, beginning in 1988 with the 
PS and in 1994 with the MPD, the parties were able to sustain a challenge over multiple 
elections, but otherwise conceded and soon disappeared in this district. It is not surprising that 
the Socialist PS and the Maoist MPD followed this pattern. They are both parties with  long 
organizational and ideological traditions and had the wherewithal to sustain an effort over 
multiple elections. Otherwise, parties in this moderate 10-20% range were previously dominant 
parties which suffered in the face of the challenge from a third party. This was the case with ID 
in 1990 and FADI in 1992.  
A fourth observation is that volatility is extremely high in Pastaza over the SMD period. 
While there is a consistent pattern of two party competition in the district, the performance and 
sometimes even the identity of those two competitors has changed dramatically from election to 
election. There is only one case of two consecutive elections, from 1984 to 1986, in which the 
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two main competitors did not change. As a province with a high indigenous population, it is 
likely that the explanation for this instability conforms to Madrid’s (2005) hypothesis that 
indigenous voters are very weakly attached to the traditional parties which compete for their 
votes, but that upon the emergence of an indigenous party, patterns of competition will stabilize 
as voters form more enduring and programmatic linkages with their legislative agents. From 
1996 and through the elections of 1998 and 2002, the new indigenous party, Pachakutik, 
appeared poised to confirm this conclusion. It entered with almost 13% of the vote and grew 
slightly. However, the results of the most recent election in 2006 (outside the timeframe of both 
this analysis and Madrid’s) show Pachakutik losing half its support to the upstart party PSP of 
recently disposed former president Lucio Gutiérrez, revealing the vulnerability of ethnic and 
programmatic linkages to machine and personalistic ones. Additional time points will be 
necessary to draw strong conclusions as to the ultimate status of this case with respect to the 
Madrid hypothesis.  
A fifth and final observation is that in spite of the presence of two strong parties in the 
district, the very small size of Pastaza’s electorate relative to the total electorate indicates that the 
big competitors in any given election may appear as a small player in national aggregations of 
the vote. From among the top two parties in each of the SMD elections, only ID and PUR were 
big players on the national scene during the same year they won big in Pastaza. The PCE (here 
identified as UN-UNO, following the naming convention of this project), the PLRE, FADI, and 
the PS-FA never won more than 9% of the national vote in the year they dominated Pastaza.  
These electoral dynamics combine with other features of the small provinces. First, these 
provinces generally have weak social and economic connections with the two main provinces, 
implying that parties that generate their strength from social and economic coalitions formed in 
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the main cities have little strength in the outlying areas. Second, several of the historical leftist 
parties, together with the traditional Conservative and Liberal parties from the preexisting two 
party system, have had a long history of organizing in the peripheral provinces. Thus, despite the 
emerge of new party actors in the two main provinces from the 1970s onwards, the parties of the 
previous era inherited some advantage in their old ties. In sum, the application of the predicted 
electoral system incentives not withstanding, these outlying provinces enabled small party 
competitors to remain relevant in national politics. 
On the opposite end of the district magnitude range, the provinces of Pichincha and 
Guayas have an effective threshold of representation which is extremely low, implying that the 
institutional rule will have very little effect on party performance there. 
This analysis of Pastaza and the very high district magnitude in the two most populous 
districts together reveals how very small parties can have a large role on the national political 
scene.  
This permissive system-level institutional configuration implies that the institutional 
nature of the parties themselves, over and above the effect of system-level institutions, will effect 
the degree to which parties will pursue particularistic rather than broad-based benefits and will 
achieve contender rather than other sorts of electoral trajectories. In fact, careful attention to the 
particular system-level institutional developments and changes leading up to and during 
Ecuador’s latest democratic episode lead strongly to the conclusion that these institutions and 
their implementation and enforcement are endogenous to the parties and specifically to their 
propensity to favor particularistic rather than broad-based goods. This is not to argue that 
system-level institutions don’t have the effect theory predicts, but that more fundamentally an 
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explanation of the party system or of the party system’s policy outputs (Mejía et al. 2006) is 
centered on the nature of the party actors themselves. 
Data and Analysis 
This analysis uses interviews with party leaders and founders from the first years of a 
party’s life and district-level electoral data over the entire period as well as parish-level electoral 
data for four elections.  
In the Spring of 2006 I conducted 38 interviews of party founders, national committee 
members, provincial committee members, and candidates from the early years in the life of 22 
parties. Several of the subjects were involved in the life of two or more parties. The interviews 
were semi-structured in that I had a series of questions on select topics, but posed follow-ups 
depending upon the profile and knowledge of the subject. My interviews focused on the origins, 
goals, organization, linkages and achievements of the party. My overarching goal in these 
interviews was to understand the strategic decisions and operations of the party as it projected 
itself into the national electoral arena. I was especially interested in the types of linkages the 
party established with local constituencies and organized elements of civil society and in the 
types of resources the parties had at their disposal.   
My research includes the analysis of highly disaggregated electoral data for four 
elections: 1992, 1996, 1998 and 2002. Using these data, I am able to explore the spatial and 
temporal distribution of a party’s support. I am particularly interested in a party’s support across 
time and two geographical levels. First, parties in Ecuador typically have high levels of electoral 
volatility. Second, I expect variation operating at the province level to be important, especially 
because the provinces serve as the electoral districts. Third, I expect to find variation operating at 
the sub-province level which arises from the particular linkage strategy a party adopts. 
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Specifically, for parties that adopt programmatic or personalistic linkages, I expect their level of 
support to be more evenly distributed across parishes than parties that adopt a machine or vote-
buying strategy. The latter two approaches will generally lead parties to be highly selective as to 
where the invest within a district. They will attempt to harvest a large percentage of the votes in 
relatively few of the district’s parishes. In order to measure these effects, I will estimate 
“components of variance” models, following Morgenstern and Potthoff (2005) in their study of 
party nationalization. In their approach, they use district-level data to estimate random effects 
models across two levels: time and district. I, however, am interested in slightly different 
concepts with respect to the spatial distribution of the vote, and so adapt their approach by 
analyzing geographical units that do not correspond to electoral districts. My approach yields 
expectations that there will be important variance also within districts and across parishes. 
Therefore, I estimate these models on parish-level vote returns for each party across time, 
district, and parish. I first present comparative results in the following section, and then discuss 
the result party-by-party as I analyze each of the eight parties in the subsequent sections. 
The dependent variable in this project is trajectory group and each party has been 
classified according to the posterior probabilities, as described in chapter 2. As a five-group 
categorical variable—each of the five trajectory groups are qualitatively distinctive—the 
explanatory task can be framed quite expansively, hypothesizing as to the predictors that 
distinguish each of the 10 possible pairs. However, Ecuador lacks parties of the “explosive” type, 
thereby eliminating four pairs. Furthermore, following the large-N analysis of Chapter 3, I will 
focus the analysis here on explaining why each party is or is not a “contender,” thereby 
constraining the explanatory task to three pairs: differentiating contenders from flops, from flat, 
and from flash trajectories. 
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If the data from both sources support the hypotheses of this project, I can have strong 
confidence in the findings. For each party, I will begin with a background of the origins and 
initial performance of the party. Then, I will review the evidence from the interviews and from 
other primary and secondary sources. Third, I will present the results of the analysis of the 
electoral data.  
Components of Variance of Parish-Level Electoral Support 
Morgenstern and Potthoff (2005) apply a components of variance model to district-level 
electoral data in order to distinguish three elements of the variance in a party’s electoral support: 
electoral volatility (the variance in a party’s support between elections), district heterogeneity 
(the variance in a party’s support within elections but between districts), and a residual “district 
time effect” (the residual variance in a party’s support which cannot be accounted for by either 
time or district).  They estimate random effects for both election and district.  
I suspect that parties with machine and vote-buying linkages—more so than parties with 
programmatic and personalistic linkages—will focus their electoral effort on very concentrated 
geographic units within the district, and in particular on select parishes. Parishes normally 
overlay neighborhoods in large and medium sized urban areas and they overlay small rural 
communities. Parishes are the electoral unit within the district which are commonly controlled by 
caciques, or brokers, though as Burgwal (1995) has shown, it is not unusual to have brokers for 
smaller organizational units—such as communes—or to have competing brokers within a 
neighborhood. These brokers are normally able to deliver a large share of a parish’s vote to a 
given party. If votes are won in this manner, I expect that the variance within an election and 
within a district, but between parishes will be a relatively high share of the total variance in a 
party’s parish-level vote share. In sum, this analysis modifies Morgenstern and Potthoff’s 
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approach because it estimates a components of variance model to parish-level rather than 
district-level data. It retains their approach of estimating a random effect for both election and 
district.  
I conduct this analysis on the elections for which I have parish-level data: 1992, 1996, 
1998 and 2002. The analysis takes place in three steps. First, I illustrate the strategy (Figure 5.4 
below) with a map of the canton of Cotacachi and the vote share of the party PRE in each parish 
of the canton. Second, I estimate a components of variance model (Table 5.7 below) which in 
addition to election and province includes a parameter estimate for region. I incorporate region 
because nearly all analyses of Ecuadorian politics highlights the regional divide. The result 
shows that for the most part, region does not explain much of the parish-level variance. Finally, I 
estimate a components of variance model as described above (Table 5.8 below). 
Illustrating the Parish-Level Strategy 
The map below illustrates the logic of the broker-mediated strategy. In the highland 
province of Imbabura, the coastal party, PRE, won one of the three seats in 1992. The map 
shows the canton of Cotacachi, one of six cantons of the province which contains 9% of the 
province votes. The canton of Cotacachi has 10 parishes, three of which are quite large and all 
part of the main city, also called Cotacachi, which lies along the main road (shown in grey) and 
is known for its leather artisans and market. The map shows PRE’s share of the vote in each 
parish of the canton, represented by a square shaded light to dark red. The 10 parishes are 
identified by a smaller colored circle within the square according to the map legend. The map 
reveals that the party concentrated its efforts on the three largest parishes—Sagrario, San 
Francisco, and Quiroga—where it won overall 27.5% of the vote. All three of these parishes are 
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part of the city of Cotacachi. In the other seven parishes, all isolated and far from the main road, 
it won overall only 11.9% of the total vote. 
This result is suggestive that PRE, in deciding to compete for a seat in the province of 
Imbabura, focused its effort on select parishes within the province. My field research in 
Imbabura province confirmed that machine-based parties from the center (either Guayquil or 
Quito) seek out brokers in the periphery to mediate the exchange between the party and voters. 
One way to increase our confidence in this pattern would be to repeat the analysis for each party 
across the roughly 50 parishes in Imbabura Province. Alternatively, one can estimate the 
components of variance in parish-level results as I do below. 
Figure 5.4:  
PRE’s Vote Share by Parish, Canton of Cotacachi, Province of Imbabura 
 
Components of Variance-A Test For a Regional Effect 
In Ecuador, region is often considered to be a primary divide. In this first preliminary 
model, I estimated the portion of the variance in parish-level results that we can account for at 
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the regional level for five relatively successful parties. Considering the primacy of region in 
nearly all discussions of Ecuadorian life, it has surprisingly little effect. It accounts for a large 
percentage of the variance for only one party: the PRE. The PRE is the only party with very 
pronounced regional patterns. Its mean province-level vote share (and standard deviation) over 
the four elections of this analysis for the coast, highland and jungle regions are 29.0% (8.6), 
10.9% (6.1) and 7.4% (8.1), respectively. For all other main parties, region accounts for a 
relatively small part of the variance. There are generally two reasons for this. First, contrary to 
conventional wisdom, relatively successful parties based in one region usually compete 
successfully in the other regions. Second, relatively unsuccessful parties are often based in one 
provincial or sub-provincial stronghold and do equally poorly in other parts of its region as in 
other regions. It will be excluded from the model because this extra parameter often leads to 
difficulty for model convergence for smaller parties.  
Table 5.6:  
Components of Variance Across Election, Region, Province and Parish 
      % variance   
Party Mean Vote S.D. election region province parish Dominant Strategy 
PRIAN 10.1% 6.5% - 13% 28% 59% parish dominant 
PSC 18.1% 13.6% 4% 17% 26% 53% parish dominant 
ID 11.3% 10.7% 0% 5% 42% 52% parish dominant 
MUPP 9.2% 13.4% 0% 15% 35% 50% parish dominant 
PRE 15.8% 14.8% 0% 51% 14% 34% region dominant 
 
Components of Variance-Across Time, Province, and Parish 
Table 5.8 below reports the result of a components of variance model for seven of the 
eight parties examined closely in this chapter (the other party, PD, had died by 1992) as well as 
for several other parties. It reveals that eight of the 13 parties adopt a parish-dominant strategy, 
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which indicates that they have parish strongholds within provinces and between elections. The 
exceptions are as follows:  
1) PRE has a majority of its variance between provinces which we can account for by its 
strong regional patterns of support as shown above;  
2) FRA has a majority of its variance between provinces, which we can account for by its 
shift from coastal leadership under Cecilia Calderón to highland leadership under Fabián 
Alarcón. Also, it has some between election volatility which we can account for by its 2002 
decline following corruption charges against Alarcón.  
3) The DP-UDC has a larger than typical electoral volatility because of the popularity of 
its 1998 winning presidential candidate, Jamil Mahuad, and its subsequent plummeting 
popularity following his corruption charges, coup, and flight into exile. 
4) The PUR has as relatively large Provincial variance because the party divided up 
districts with its electoral ally, the Conservative Party (PCE) 
5) MCNP was the party of two highlanders—one a Quito radio personality and the other 
from Cuenca. They mobilized some support in the highland provinces, and very little in the coast 
and jungle. 
6) META was unusual for a small party in that it had very even and very low support 
within the four provinces in which it competed. In fact, it was led by a woman living in exile, 
Ivonne Bakki, who did very little to mobilize support anywhere. This distribution of the variance 
reveals that after it registered, it failed to exert any effort in any parish. 
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Table 5.7:  
Components of Variance Estimates 
    
Mean 
      Within Elections,   
    
Vote 
    Within Elections,  Within Provinces,   
Party Elections Share S.D. Between Elections between Provinces Between Parishes Dominant Strategy 
PSC (Legacy) 92, 96, 98, 02 18.1% 13.6% 9% 37% 54% Parish Dominant 
PRIAN (Contender) 02 10.1% 6.5% na 39% 61% Parish Dominant 
ID (Contender) 92, 96, 98, 02 11.3% 10.7% 1% 47% 52% Parish Dominant 
PRE (Contender) 92, 96, 98, 02 15.8% 14.8% 3% 59% 38% Province Dominant 
MUPP (Flat) 96, 98, 02 9.2% 13.4% 0% 49% 51% Parish Dominant 
FRA (Flat) 92,  96, 98, 02 3.4% 6.5% 8% 54% 37% Province Dominant 
DP  (Flat) 92,  96, 98, 02 11.7% 12.0% 15% 38% 47% Parish Dominant 
PUR (Flash) 92 11.8% 11.1% na 56% 44% Province Dominant 
MCNP (Flop) 98, 02 2.7% 4.5% 4% 59% 38% Province Dominant 
PAB (Flop) 92 0.7% 2.1% na 33% 67% Parish Dominant 
META (Flop) 02 0.2% 0.4% na 79% 21% Province Dominant 
TSI (Flop) 02 0.5% 0.7% na 48% 52% Parish Dominant 
PLN (Flop) 92 1.5% 5.3% na 48% 52% Parish Dominant 
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Flat Parties 
 The latent trajectory model of Chapter 2 produced the predicted “flat” trajectory 
which appears bolded in Figure 5.5 below. The four Ecuadorian cases which were classified 
into this group also appear in the figure. I have adjusted the scale of the vertical axis from a 
range of -10 to 60 (from Figure 2.7) to a range of 0 to 12 in order to make the individual 
trajectories distinguishable. Though in this perspective they appear to be a heterogeneous 
group, when plotted with the other parties on a –10 to 60 scale they appear as a distinct and 
homogeneous group. The analysis here will focus on one party from prior to the 1998 
electoral reforms, the Frente Radical Alfarista (FRA), and one part that emerged after the 
electoral reforms, the Movimiento Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik-Nuevo Pais 
(Pachakutik). The analytic question which will frame the analysis is: why are FRA and 
Pachakutik “flat” parties rather than “contenders”? 
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Figure 5.5:  
The “Flat” Trajectory in Ecuador 
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Frente Radical Alfarista (FRA)-The Radical Alfarista Front 
 The FRA is a party which has always had weak voter-party linkages, first in the 
1980s based upon a personalistic linkage with its founder, and later in the 1990s based upon 
the a single political machine of a later leader. To the extent that it had any deep and 
enduring linkages, it was the machine-based strategy of the later generation leader, whose 
machine existed independent of and prior to its incorporation into the party. While the 
general tendency in Ecuador is that a “flat” party trajectory consists of parties using a 
programmatic linkage with small but loyal constituencies, in the case of the FRA, an 
alternative mechanism is operating to sustain it over the long-run. Its appearance as having 
lived a long life is misleading in that it has had discontinuities in its leadership and a fluid 
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identity. It technically meets the criteria I have used to decide whether a party over its 
lifetime is a single entity because of periods of coexistence of its multiple factions. 
Nevertheless, it has been factionalized with the balance of power shifting among the factions 
over time. The factionalization has not been deeply organizationally embedded, but operates 
mostly as divisions in the leadership. As a party which secured and defended its legal 
registration with electoral authorities from the time of the transition democracy, it has been 
an attractive target for independent politicians seeking an electoral vehicle.  
Origins and Initial Electoral Performance 
The FRA emerged during the transition to democracy under the leadership of Abdón 
Calderón. Calderón was a former Liberal Party (PLRE) member—and National Director in 
the mid 1960s29—from Guayaquil. He was a prominent and outspoken critic of the military 
regime during the years leading up to the presidential election in 1978. He was an “authentic 
liberal” and attempted first to create a faction within the PLRE and thereby shift that party’s 
direction into opposition of the regime,30 but ultimately split with the PLRE over their 
cooperation with the military regime.31 Calderón was jailed several times for his activism 
against the dictatorship and the corruption of the regime and its collaborators. He ran for 
president in 1978, finishing in fifth place with about 9% of the vote. Calderón was 
assassinated on November 29, 1978 as he prepared for the 1979 congressional elections. An 
investigation concluded that the assassination was ordered by the Minister of Government of 
the regime, Jarrín Cahueñas, and he was convicted and served time. 
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 Personal interview FRA-2 (2006). 
30
 Personal interview FRA-2 (2006). 
31
 Personal interview FRA-1 (2006). 
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After Calderón’s death, the party leadership was taken over by his daughter, Cecilia 
Calderón de Castro. She had not previously been involved with the party, but was brought 
in—together with her husband, Ivan Castro—after her father’s death. Under her leadership, 
the FRA first contested legislative elections in 1984 at both the provincial and national tiers 
because the dictatorship had stripped the party of its registration for the 1979 elections.32 The 
results for the provincial tier appear in Table 5.9 below. In addition to the five provincial 
seats won in 1984, the party won a national tier seat for Edgar Molina Montalvo of the 
capital province, Pichincha. Ivan Castro, won a provincial seat from Guayas, a seat won by 
Cecilia two years later in 1986. During this era, there was a struggle for control of the party 
between Edgar Molina, who had been Calderón’s vice-presidential candidate in 1978, and 
Cecilia Calderón, with Calderón and her clique triumphing. But the party was on the decline. 
By 1988, the party won only a national tier seat occupied by Calderón and a provincial tier 
seat occupied by a newcomer from Pichincha, Fabian Alarcón.  
Alarcón was a politician with a base of support in Quito, and especially in certain 
sections. He received his political start in the Quito mayor’s office under conservative Sixto 
Durán Ballén. He was a leader of the Partido Democrata (PD) in the early and mid 1980s. 
When the PD was declared extinct by the electoral authorities, Alarcón and othehad r 
aspiring politicians went in search of an alternative, and settle upon the FRA because like the 
PD, the FRA a common liberal (PLRE) heritage.33 He began as a legislative candidate in 
FRA, but by 1991 he had worked his way into the executive council of the party, and by 
1993 into the position of National Director. The party by this time had surrendered most of 
its support in the coastal region as well as the last remnants of the national appeal it had 
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 TSE archives 
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previously channeled towards the national-tier seat. By the mid-1990s it had narrowed itself 
to a party centered on Alarcón and a single seat in the large MMD province of Pichincha. He 
participated in the presidential administration of President Durán Ballén from 1992 to 1995. 
FRA won the Pichincha seat in 1992, 1994, and in 1996 through an electoral alliance with the 
Liberal party from which FRA founder Abdón Calderón had split. The principled liberal and 
democratic positions which propelled the party into national prominence at the transition to 
democracy had been surrendered and political opportunism now ruled. Furthermore, through 
an alliance with the party of Abdalá Bucaram, the leader of the populist party PRE, Alarcón 
leveraged his seat in the chamber into the presidency of congress in 1995 and 1996. The PRE 
was a “traditional enemy” of the FRA, and this alliance provoked a disagreement between 
Cecilia Calderón and Alarcón which ended with Calderón’s expulsion from the party.34 
When president Bucarám fell from office in 1997 after congress declared him mentally 
incapacitated, Alarcón negotiated an ascent to the presidency of the republic. In 1999, 
following a corruption investigation into Alarcón by the Supreme Court of Justice triggered 
by a complaint by Cecilia Calderón, among others, he spent four months in jail and his 
reputation was severely damaged. By 2002, when he ran for legislative office as a provincial 
deputy from Pichincha, he lost and the party was declared extinct. In sum, the party had three 
phases: a initial principled though personalistic phase in opposition to the dictatorship which 
was prematurely ended with the assassination of founder/leader Abdón Calderón before the 
first legislative elections; a second phase under the leadership of his daughter, during which 
the party leveraged the residual connections of the party, the reputation of the dead founder 
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 Personal interview FRA-3 (2006). 
34
 Personal interview FRA-1 (2006). 
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and the sympathies towards his daughter into a moderate electoral showing35; and a third 
phase under the leadership of a cohort of orphaned politicians from the recently eliminated 
PD. 
                                                          
35
 Universidad Andino Simon Bolivar’s German Rodas made this point. 
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Table 5.8:  
FRA Election Results, Provincial Deputies 
    1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2002 
Region Province %V Seats %V Seats %V Seats %V Seats %V Seats %V Seats %V Seats %V Seats %V Seats 
Amazon Morona Santiago 17.1   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   1.1   12.3   0.0   
Amazon Napo 9.6   3.2   0.0   0.0   0.0   1.2   0.8   30.5 2 7.0   
Amazon Orellana na   na   na   na   na   na   na   na   5.6   
Amazon Pastaza 0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   1.4   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   
Amazon Sucumbios na   na   na   0.0   0.8   11.1   2.4   3.9   9.4   
Amazon Zamora Chinchipe 8.6   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.7   0.3   0.6   19.6 1 3.5   
Andes Azuay 3.9   0.0   1.2   1.3   3.8   1.0   0.6   1.6   0.0   
Andes Bolivar 0.0   22.2 1 12.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   5.1   0.4   
Andes Canar 6.9   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   9.0   1.9   0.0   
Andes Carchi 0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   1.4   0.7   2.1   3.3   2.5   
Andes Chimborazo 6.0   2.9   3.7   2.2   2.4   2.6   1.8   7.0   0.0   
Andes Cotopaxi 15.8 1 8.2   7.2   2.8   0.0   1.7   0.8   9.3   4.7   
Andes Imbabura 2.9   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.9   2.6   16.9 1* 8.8   
Andes Loja 3.6   1.6   1.3   7.5   6.0   0.4   1.6   3.2   0.0   
Andes Pichincha 5.3   1.5   2.6   11.0 1 7.3 1 12.0 1 3.8   3.4   3.1   
Andes Tungurahua 5.5   2.3   0.0   1.7   1.2   1.2   1.8   6.3 1* 7.3   
Coast El Oro 9.8   13.4 1 7.2   5.0   2.1   1.1   0.0   5.4   0.4   
Coast Esmeraldas 3.4   1.2   1.9   2.5   0.0   14.3   10.8   5.0   9.1   
Coast Guayas 14.9 2 9.3 1 5.8 1 1.6   3.7   1.8   1.4   1.0   0.4   
Coast Los Rios 14.2 1 12.1   8.7   6.1   3.1   4.0   1.3   2.7   1.0   
Coast Manabi 10.0 1 8.3   4.5   3.9   2.0   7.8   3.2   2.6   1.0   
Other Galapagos 26.7   19.5   0.0   0.9   2.9   0.0   2.1   8.2   0.0   
  Overall 8.8 5 5.7 3 3.9 1 4.2 1 3.6 1 4.7 1 2.4 2*# 2.7 5 1.6 0 
* Alliance seats; # Province level details not available 
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Linkage Strategy 
The FRA’s linkage strategy varied over its lifetime and depended upon the 
leadership. The initial phase under Abdón Calderón was principled and around the issue of 
opposition to the authoritarian regime36, but not organizationally and institutionally 
articulated, thus inconsistent with the concept of a programmatic voter-party linkage. One ID 
leader, contrasting the leadership style and political project of Calderón and Borja, noted that 
Calderón was brave and honorable in confronting the dictatorship, but he was not a political 
talent like Borja and he did not build an organization, city by city, like the one build by ID.37 
There is no evidence that Calderón invested his time in building an organization with 
linkages to non-elite sectors. While he had prior political experience within the PLRE, of the 
other 13 founders of the party, only César Ballentini had experience. They others were 
former PLRE members “without any importance.” “They were friends of his, nothing more 
than friends, his 13 friends” from Guayaquil who “didn’t represent anything”.38 In his split 
with the PLRE, he didn’t bring with him any of the party resources and networks. His 
strategy relied primarily on the mass media and his critique of the regime, which were 
“endorsed by public opinion and by the mass media.”39 Though a respected economist in 
elite circles, his “folkloric” style and ability to translate his advocacy of liberal economic and 
political principles into “common language” generated popular appeal.40 In preparation for 
the presidential election the candidate traveled the country building relationships in 
                                                          
36
 Personal interview FRA-2 (2006). 
37
 Personal interview ID-3 (2006). 
38
 Personal interview FRA-2 (2006). 
39
 Personal interview FRA-1 (2006). 
40
 Personal interview FRA-2 (2006). 
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peripheral provinces, but there is no evidence that these relationships were anything but 
agreements between Calderón and the local elites. In the second phase, under the leadership 
of his daughter, the party continued to rely on the legacy of the founder and Cecilia’s 
prominent national role, which she generated in the struggle for justice for her father’s death. 
Together with Molina based in Quito, they re-registered the party and began preparations for 
the 1984 elections. But divisions emerged between the new leadership in Guayaquil and 
Molina’s base in the Andes, largely over control of state campaign allocations and candidate 
lists. Though Molina secured a place on the list and a seat in the national-tier of the 
legislature over opposition from the Guayaquil leadership, he left the party the day before his 
inauguration,41 and the ambition of constructing a national party all but ended. An early 
leader described the party in this stage as a “family thing; less than family, husband and 
wife.”42 
The entry of Alarcón marked a further deterioration for the principled life of the 
party. A party leader from Calderón’s day noted that, “if Abdón Calderón, who was a radical, 
or I had been in the FRA, Alarcón would never have entered.”43 Alarcón and several other 
orphaned politicians of the PD were in search of a party and settled on the FRA. They 
considered and rejected the social democratic ID because of its membership in the Socialist 
International.44 They saw the FRA, on the other hand, as nationalist, independent and under 
weak leadership. It was ripe for a takeover. One leader of ID explained bluntly, “Alarcón 
robbed the party from Calderón; he seized the party and Alarcón didn’t represent anything or 
                                                          
41
 Under Ecuadorian party law, legislators that disaffiliate are not required to surrender their seat. 
42
 Personal interview FRA-2 (2006). 
43
 Personal interview FRA-2 (2006). 
44
 Personal interview FRA-3 (2006). 
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anybody in the country.” Upon their entry, the center of gravity began to move towards 
Pichincha and Alarcón’s base. Alarcón is considered a skilled political operative. Pachano 
(2006 note 12) notes that FRA was a small party which had influence beyond its numbers. 
During Alarcón’s leadership, it never had more than three deputies, though it gained the 
presidency of congress twice and an interim presidency of the republic once. It’s base was 
concentrated in a section of Quito in which Alarcón had an organization. One leader 
commenting on the transition between Calderón and Alarcón noted, “the party was wiped 
out, and so [Cecilia Calderón and her husband] served it to him in Quito because he needed a 
party and he had his own structure.”45  
Electoral Institutions 
Electoral rules had a strong effect on the electoral performance of the FRA, but not in 
the way I had expected. In chapter 3, I hypothesize that party entry rules would not have an 
effect of party performance. However, in a political system where many politicians operate 
from extremely small territorially-based constituencies according to a machine or vote-
buying strategy, and where the electoral rules require that a party compete in a wide range of 
constituencies distributed across the country, the system generates incentives for local 
machine bosses to build coalitions with other machines in order to get on the ballot. Once on 
the ballot, the party need not maintain its geographic distribution as long as it is able to 
sustain the minimum national vote threshold required by law for continued existence. This 
configuration of entry and survival rules generates incentives for the behavior we saw from 
Fabián Alarcón. He had a constituency large enough to compete and win on his own without 
threat to his party’s survival, but not territorially distributed enough to found his own party. 
                                                          
45
 Personal interview FRA-2 (2006). 
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Thus, rather than registering a new party, it was far less costly to occupy an existing party 
and take it over. The geographic requirement of the entry rule, therefore, effectively 
elongated what would have been the natural life of the FRA. It would have died in the late 
1980s or early 1990s as the support, first generated by its founder, declined along what 
would likely have been classified as a “flash” trajectory.  
The district magnitude, which grew more permissive over time, was never a problem 
for the FRA because during its two phases of life it was always based in one of the two 
provinces with a large district magnitude and able to easily surpass the threshold of 
representation. Furthermore, in the low district magnitude provinces, and in a highly 
fragmented system which lacks nationalized parties, it was periodically able to win one of 
these peripheral provinces, most likely by allying with a prominent local broker and 
channeling its resources very selectively. 
Contender Possibilities 
From the start, the FRA had little prospect of becoming a contender party. Its first 
generation of leaders had the ambition to build a strong national party. They began to 
assemble a coalition of provincial politicians with their own local bases of support, and they 
mobilized support with a well articulated program of primarily political, but also economic, 
liberalization around a partisan divide that cleaved the electorate at the time of transition. 
Indeed, the democratic opening that evolved out of opposition to the military regime in 
particular and to the long tradition of political exclusion in general provided the opportunity 
for at least two other new parties, ID and DP-UDC, to successfully enter the political arena, 
the former as a contender and the latter as a “flat” party with a programmatic strategy as its 
primary linkage mechanism. FRA’s message together with the prominence of its leader 
 161 
provided the brand name that programmatic and personalistic strategies rely upon to simplify 
the information burden for voters. However, unlike its other principled competitors, FRA 
never had the opportunity build a dense organization. Its founder’s early death and his 
successor’s more parochial concerns ended the possibility of transferring the initial success 
into either an enduring programmatic party along the “flat” trajectory or an enduring machine 
party along the “contender” path. Additionally, while the FRA was hard-hitting critic of the 
regime and kept out of the transition negotiations, ID and DP-UDC had a more measured 
opposition to the military regime and both, but especially the DP-UDC, reaped the benefits of 
being participants in the transition negotiations. 
The party never inherited or stood a chance for assembling the types of resources 
necessary for building a contender. Calderón himself didn’t have an obvious independent 
source of party-building capital, and wasn’t himself connected with any of the powerful 
economic interests. The fact that the PLRE continued to exist and compete at the transition 
combined with the pittance of support he brought with him when he left that party meant that 
he didn’t gain any organizational inheritance in the departure.  
Finally, in the larger scheme of the fracturing of the Liberal tendency in the years 
leading up to the transition (see appendix x), the FRA was a late-comer and thus at a 
disadvantage, especially relative to Rodrigo Borja’s ID which by 1978 had a far more 
developed party-building project underway. 
Movimiento Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik-Nuevo País (Pachakutik) 
The Pachakutik Plurinacional Unity Movement-New Country 
Pachakutik is Ecuador’s primary indigenous party, formed in 1996. Until Bolivia’s 
Evo Morales and his MAS party captured the presidency in 2005, Pachakutik was the most 
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successful indigenous party ever in the Americas. It is the political arm of a dense national 
social movement organization which itself has a collegial leadership that emphasizes internal 
democracy and consensus—though not without tensions and failures in this regard. The 
party’s linkage strategy is almost purely programmatic, without substantial personalistic, 
machine or vote-buying components. It is a case, however, that offers some of the most 
compelling evidence against the efficacy of a programmatic strategy as a way to achieve the 
“contender” trajectory in Ecuador. Despite high levels of social mobilization in the 1990s, 
despite a broad spectrum of non-indigenous allies, and despite a prominent role and 
important victories in the 1997-1998 constituent assembly which was intended to 
fundamentally alter the openness of the political system and thereby reform the state, the 
underlying sub-provincial territorial logic of the political system and entrenchment of the 
particularistic interests in the state was not changed, leaving Pachakutik’s programmatic 
platforms with respect to policy and governance lacking in credibility. In terms of the 
calculus of voting model, without credibility, a programmatic party’s ability to alter a voter’s 
“benefit” term is undermined. 
Origins and Initial Electoral Performance 
Pachakutik was formed and competed for the first time in national elections in 1996. 
The party emerged as the electoral arm of the indigenous social movement, CONAIE. In a 
comparison group with other indigenous political parties of the America’s, Pachakutik’s 
electoral performance is impressive, and its trajectory can legitimately be described as a 
“meteoric rise” (Van Cott, 2005, p 99). Its successes have received considerable attention 
from scholars. However, in a broader comparative framework reaching beyond the 
indigenous party family, it’s electoral successes are extremely modest. As time passes and 
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election cycles accumulate, its status as a “flat” party, rather than a “contender” or an 
“explosive” party, hardens. If we add the just-complete December 2006 election result of 
5.6% as the fourth in Pachakutik’s national legislative series, it confirms Barrera’s 
conclusion—one of the few early dissents from the fanfare that surrounded the emergence of 
Pachakutik—that its level of support has been relatively modest and constant since its 
founding through all types of elections, national, constituent assembly, and local (Barrera 
2001).46 Province-level legislative results appear in Table 5.10 below. 
                                                          
46
 Personal interview Pachakutik-1 (2006). 
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Table 5.9:  
Pachakutik Election Results, Provincial Deputies. 
    1996 1998 2002 
Region Province % Vote Seats % Vote Seats % Vote Seats 
Amazon Morona Santiago 19.3   30.4 1 23.0 1 
Amazon Napo 25.7 1 26.8 1 21.9 1 
Amazon Orellana na   na   14.2   
Amazon Pastaza 12.8 1 13.6 1* 15.8   
Amazon Sucumbios 18.8   0.0   7.3 1* 
Amazon Zamora Chinchipe 0.0   4.2   18.4 2* 
Andes Azuay 28.5 2 6.7 1* 5.5 1* 
Andes Bolivar 9.7   21.6 1 15.3 1 
Andes Canar 13.9   10.1   13.0   
Andes Carchi 0.0   2.2   1.7   
Andes Chimborazo 18.8 1 4.4   11.4 1* 
Andes Cotopaxi 15.7 1 11.2 1 14.9 1 
Andes Imbabura 16.0   6.2 1* 16.8 1 
Andes Loja 0.0   3.1   3.7   
Andes Pichincha 13.5 1 3.7   5.9 1* 
Andes Tungurahua 11.9   5.3   5.4   
Coast El Oro 0.0   1.7   3.0   
Coast Esmeraldas 0.0   0.0   2.9   
Coast Guayas 0.0   0.0   2.7   
Coast Los Rios 1.7   1.2   4.4   
Coast Manabi 0.0   1.5   1.0   
Other Galapagos 0.0   0.0   0.0   
  Overall 7.1 7 2.1 7 4.2 11 
* Alliance seats. 
Pachakutik’s strength is in the indigenous provinces of the Andes and Amazon 
regions, though their strength does not extend evenly through those regions. For example, at 
the outset the party did not even contest the northernmost and southernmost Andean 
provinces of Carchi and Loja. By the time of the party’s founding, CONAIE didn’t operate in 
much of the coastal region, and the party didn’t register to compete in any but one of its five 
provinces in 1996.  
Despite this regional differential, the geographical distribution of its support is 
consistent with a programmatic strategy in one important respect: its support has been 
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relatively stable over time within district. In the provinces where fluctuations appear high, as 
in Imbabura, this is most often the result of the way in which vote share is computed for a 
party which participates in an alliance. For example, in the Andean province of Imbabura, in 
1996 and 2002 Pachakutik participated on its own. In 1998 they participated in a three-way 
alliance and the alliance drew 18.6% of the vote. Its alliance partners, PS-FA and MCNP, 
were weak in Imbabura in the elections prior to and after the 1996 election. MCNP did not 
contest the 1996 and 2002 elections, and the PS-FA drew 3.3% and 5.3% respectively. We 
can conclude, therefore, that Pachakutik is responsible for the lions share of the alliance’s 
total votes in 1998, and that the apparent dip is an artifact of the way I distribute alliance 
votes equally among alliance partners.  
In the components of variance analysis of parish-level election results on Pachakutik, 
volatility accounts for almost none of the variance, with variance within election but between 
provinces accounting for 49% of the total variance, and residual variance within elections 
and provinces but between parishes accounts for 51% of the total variance. See Table 5.11 
below. Overall, Pachakutik has a very high level of variance, equivalent to a standard 
deviation of 13.4% on its mean of 9.2%. This result is somewhat surprising. For an 
indigenous and programmatic party, we would expect that its appeal would vary primarily 
between provinces, especially to the extent that provinces overlay ethnicity, as they largely 
do in Ecuador. On the contrary, Pachakutik’s support is distributed quite unevenly within 
provinces. One possible cause for this result may be that indigenous peoples are more 
commonly found in rural parishes than in urban ones, leading to heterogeneity of party 
support within the province.  
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Table 5.10:  
Components of Variance, Pachakutik, 1996-2002 
Component Variance % of Total 
Time 0.4 0.2% 
Province 87.3 48.9% 
Parish 90.8 50.9% 
Total 178.5 100.0% 
Mean % Vote 9.2%   
 
Linkage Strategy 
Pachakutik has consistently adopted a programmatic strategy to link with its voters. 
At its origins, it was able to build a fairly broad based social coalition, with the indigenous 
movement at its heart, but also including a wide range of other social movements (under the 
umbrella organization of the Coordinatora de Movimientos Sociales) and prominent 
progressive politicians (Andolina 2003). For example, Julie Cesar Trujillo was an early non-
indigenous member of its National Committee. Trujillo is a veteran politician who—together 
with Osvaldo Hurtado—helped form the transition-era party, DP-UDC. DP-UDC at its 
founding was a Christian democratic party modeled roughly on the Chilean PDC and formed 
when Trujillo led the progressive wing of the PCE to join forces with a struggling PDC under 
Hurtado’s leadership. Yet, even with many impressive members and allies, Pachakutik has 
languished.   
The indigenous population of Ecuador ranges from 8% to 40%, depending upon the 
measure employed and the source of the estimate.47 Adding to that the non-indigenous 
members of its social coalition, it should have had sufficient support to mount a stronger 
challenge to the traditional parties, especially if, as Van Cott (2005) claims, their rise came in 
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 Census figures, CONAIE publications, and survey self-reporting reach different conclusions. See Yashar 
(2005) for discussion on estimates of the indigenous population of Ecuador. 
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the face of the decline of the other parties on the left and if, as Madrid (2005) argues, 
indigenous peoples were only very weakly incorporated into prior non-indigenous party 
organizations.  
Prior to and just after the formation of the party, the indigenous movement 
experienced significant electoral victories. They first mobilization came in opposition to 
various liberalizing economic reforms proposed via referendum by the government of the 
Durán Ballén. Their success in defeating these efforts generated confidence in their ability to 
mobilize electorally for reform of the state. Unlike participation in the normal legislative 
process, which in the 1990s was largely locked up by a traditional political establishment, 
contestation over issues related to regime and state spill beyond the executive and legislative 
arenas and into civil society and politics in the streets. Indeed, Pachano (2006) notes the 
tremendous instability of electoral and institutional rules over the entire democratic episode. 
The indigenous movement mobilized politically in 1996 over an agenda whose principle 
component was state institutional reform and openness. Despite the successful campaign to 
hold a constitutional assembly and their prominent role in the body, they did not 
institutionalize norms which would generate credible programmatic policy pledges in 
distributional politics. 
In this project, I argue that a programmatic strategy is not a winning strategy in 
Ecuador. In order to succeed on the pledge to deliver broad public goods, it is necessary that 
the pledges be credible. The system-level logic of politics and governance in Ecuador 
undermines this credibility. According to Chandra (2005), political entrepreneurs will be 
successful in mobilizing social cleavages when those cleavages are institutionalized, as for 
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example is the case with caste and tribe, but not religion, in India under their post-colonial 
affirmative action policies.  
One reason for Pachakutik’s languishing electoral performance may be that it failed 
to achieve reforms in the 1997-98 assembly of the type that incentivized credible contestation 
on the basis of ethnicity. As in India, the Ecuadorian state is a large player in the economy 
and a important element in the fortunes of any group hoping for political, social and 
economic advancement; however, unlike India, where access to the state is institutionalized 
through affirmative action programs among other things, Ecuador provides no such benefits 
either before or as a result of the constitutional reforms. On the contrary, the constitutional 
reform process granted only symbolic ethnic victories, and not material ones. The victories 
were important, to be sure. Andolina (2003 p 722) characterizes them as “new indigenous 
rights, citizen rights and constitutive principles.”  Nevertheless, they only amounted to 
abstract acknowledgements of the status of indigenous peoples with a nod to their legitimate 
role in the state, but without enacting particular benefits.48 
In sum, though the indigenous movement generated initially strong support in 
contesting various elements of state reform, it failed to translate ethnicity into a political 
issue over which the party could credibly contest access to the state and other material 
benefits.  
Electoral Institutions 
The institutional environment had little effect on Pachakutik’s performance profile. 
There is a large debate in the literature about the effect of party registration rules on 
Pachakutic’s entry. Van Cott (2005) and Birnir (2004) argue that the 1994 reforms to party 
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 For review and analysis of Pachakutik’s role in the constituent assembly see Van Cott (2005, 2003), Andolina 
(2003), Lucero (2003). 
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registration rules—and in particular the changes allowing 1) the registration of political 
“movements” in addition to political “parties;” 2) the formation of electoral alliances; and 3) 
the relaxation of the provincial distribution component which dropped the provision that a 
party register in at least two of the coastal provinces (Acosta, et al 2006, Birnir 2004)—were 
decisive in Pachakutik’s decision to enter. Andolina (1999) and Collins (2001), on the other 
hand find that these barriers were merely “psychological” and not material barriers to entry. 
Though this important question is beyond the scope of this project, the electoral profile of the 
cross-party family cases presented here suggests that Pachakutik could have managed to 
register to complete in the coast in accordance with the pre-reform rules. In particular, the 
very low intercept of many of the trajectory groups and the highly selective province-by-
province registration strategies pursued by some of the pre-reform parties raises doubts about 
the rigor of the registration rules to block any party’s entry, but especially a party that is 
widely supported in much of the country. The party needed only to gather the requisite 
signatures in the coastal province, not marshal a credible challenge for one of the seats. Much 
smaller parties with far fewer resources have managed to do so over the years. 
The influence of district magnitude and electoral thresholds, which I argue could 
effect electoral performance if a party’s expected support were well below the threshold, is 
largely irrelevant to Pachakutik. There was little doubt that Pachakutik could generate 
support in the districts—even the single member districts—in which the indigenous 
movement was large and organized. Additionally, the effective threshold in larger districts, 
such as Pichincha, was so low that it wouldn’t prevent voters from supporting the party.  
Contender Possibilities 
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Pachano argues, “Pachakutik has adopted the same logic as the system as a whole, 
forced to take refuge in local bastions in order to build up its electoral strength at the cost of 
not having a presence in other regions” (2006 p. 126). Indeed, the party’s strength is 
conventionally seen as more formidable in elections for local and provincial positions where 
its constituents are concentrated. But the party is limited in the extent that it can expand the 
breadth of its coalition beyond indigenous voters precisely because state fragmentation and 
politicization prohibits policy formulation around a logic of broad club goods. The breadth of 
their coalition, in fact, has atrophied as non-indigenous leaders and organizations have left or 
been expelled from the party. In this respect, it is evolving in the opposite direction as the 
MAS in Bolivia.  
It remains possible that a change of strategy to a more pragmatic one, which 
incorporates less principled elements such as vote buying and machine strategies, could alter 
the trajectory of the party, in much the same way as the PT in Brazil altered strategy. If 
Pachakutik’s politicians gain experience and credibility in governance at lower levels they 
may retain the possibility of winning programmatic support beyond a narrow indigenous 
base, but there is little hope that the system will sustain such a party without a larger project 
to organize and broaden the social base. In fact, this very strategy, of dual electoral and social 
initiatives, has in fact generated tensions within movement and between the social 
organization and the electoral arm (Van Cott 2005, Yashar 2005, Beck and Mijelski 2001). 
To the extent that the elected politicians engaged in the give and take of negotiation and 
coalition building, the social organization grew disenchanted with what it perceived as sell-
outs of the core principles. Furthermore, Ecuadorian executives have often effectively used 
the electoral vehicle to drive wedges between the otherwise remarkable unified federation of 
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regional and provincial indigenous organizations by manipulating alliances through offers of 
positions and perks to its leaders. These dynamics illustrate the inherent tension involved in 
an effort to combine programmatic strategies with machine and clientelistic ones. 
Flash Parties 
 The latent trajectory model of Chapter 2 produced the predicted “flash” trajectory 
which appears bolded in Figure 5.6 below. The two Ecuadorian cases which were classified 
into this group also appear in the figure. I have adjusted the scale of the vertical axis from a 
range of -10 to 60 (from Figure 2.7) to a range of -5 to 25 in order to make the individual 
trajectories distinguishable. Though in this perspective they appear to be a heterogeneous 
group, when plotted with the other parties on a –10 to 60 scale they appear as a distinct and 
homogeneous group.  
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Figure 5.6:  
The “Flash” Trajectory in Ecuador 
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Partido Unidad Republicana (PUR)-United Republic Party 
 The PUR’s voter-party linkage was a combination of machine and personalist 
strategies designed to put the party founder, Sixto Durán Ballén, into the presidency, and a 
web of other veteran politicians into the prominent posts and elected office. Despite the 
ultimate collapse of the party, early party founders insist that they had long-term ambitions 
for the party.49 It was, on the one hand, a party of the right in its predispositions, having 
origins in the PCE and PSC. But its initial electoral success was built around the reputation 
of the party founder and his ability to bring together a relatively large group of experienced 
politicians and economic elites in select pockets around the country seeking particularistic 
                                                          
49
 Personal interviews TSI-1 (2006), PUR-1 (2006). 
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benefit for their narrow interests. Coordination at the elite level quickly broke down, even 
before the first round of the presidential election, leaving the party weak. Furthermore, the 
very reputational capital that made Durán a focal point for other provincial politicians in 
outlaying areas was damaged when his vice-president was charged with corruption, resigned, 
and fled into exile. Durán, too, faced suspicion and by the end of his term the party disbanded 
and many of its remaining leaders folded into the Conservative Party (PCE). 
Origins and Initial Electoral Performance 
 The conventional understanding on the PUR is that the party formed as a split by 
Sixto Durán with the PSC in a nomination battle between himself and the ultimate nominee, 
Jaime Nebot. Certainly, the trajectory of the party, combined with the accompanying 
narrative, conforms to this account. Durán, having lost the nomination and challenged its 
legitimacy, withdrew from the PSC with the support of others who objected to the firm grip 
on leadership by León Febres-Cordero. At its origins, the PSC was a highland party of 
reformist dissidents from the Conservative Party (PCE). But with the transition to 
democracy, coastal businessman Febres-Cordero used the fledgling party as his platform to 
contest a 1978 national-tier seat in the legislature from his base in Guayaquil. Durán was its 
presidential candidate. But Febres-Cordero was the party’s most prominent and outspoken 
member and is credited with resurrecting the party (Hurtado 1990). In preparation for 1992’s 
election, Durán recreated himself as an independent candidate and won the election in the 
second round against PSC candidate Nebot.  
 This styled narrative, however, overlooks what some founding members of the PUR 
indicate was a more ambitious effort. In fact, though Durán was their marquee personality, 
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several suggest that he was not among the instigators of the party.50 Instead, he was brought 
in by the founders to head the list. Two more substantial calculations (beyond the electoral 
ambitions of a single personality) were allegedly involved. First, Durán Ballén was involved 
in a fundamental challenge with Febres-Cordero, attempting to redirect the party into genuine 
political organization rooted in its founding Christian Democratic philosophy rather than as a 
party in close alignment with Guayaquil business sectors (Hammond 2004). Having lost this 
battle, Durán and other elements saw the creation of a new party as a chance to embark on 
such a project. Furthermore, in the twilight of the troubled presidential administration of the 
chief social democratic party, ID, the founders saw an opening to create a party which 
included center-left support in the coalition. On top of the weakness in ID, the traditional left 
in general was in disarray following the crumbling of the Soviet Union.51 The PUR was 
courting probably support from one moderate leftist faction, led by Alfredo Castillo, which 
had formed the PLN. One founding member argued, “I wanted to make a party not only out 
of the circumstances, but for the long-term.”52 Whatever their intentions, the tactical decision 
over choice of a vice-presidential running mate for Durán rent the party in two. Durán was 
favoring an alliance with the Conservative Party (PCE), placing hard-line liberal economist 
Alberto Dahik on the ticket. PUR director, Mauricio Gándara, opposed a joint ticket with the 
Conservative Party because it would alienate support on the left. Furthermore, Dahik wanted 
the ticket to support PCE candidates in the legislative elections rather than the affiliates that 
                                                          
50
 Personal interview TSI-1 (2006) indicates that there were five founders: Quito-based Mauricio Gándara, 
Marcelo Fernández Sánchez, Francisco Acosta Yëpez, Alfredo Lasso Freire and Guayaquil-based Jacinto 
Valesquez. 
51
 Personal interview, PLN-1 (2006). 
52
 Personal interview PUR-1 (2006). 
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Gándara and his clique had been cultivating in the provinces.53 In the end, the alliance with 
the PCE was cemented, Gándara was expelled and many of his followers left the PUR. Durán 
had lost his core political operatives, and some argue that Ecuador under Durán Ballén was 
actually ruled by his Vice President, Dahik (Bonilla 2001). 
 Like so many new parties in Ecuador, the initial electoral effort is concentrated in a 
few provinces. The PUR, unlike most other new parties prior to the electoral reforms of the 
late 1990s, not only registered candidates in the number of provinces sufficient to secure the 
geographical distribution requirement, but competed very well in all those provinces. In four 
of the six provinces where it failed to win a seat, it was one or two positions out of 
qualifying. In the two-seat district of Bolivar, for example, it finished third. Furthermore, a 
comparison with the returns of the PCE, there is evidence that terms of the final deal between 
the two parties was that the PUR would support PCE candidates in select districts. With the 
exception of Pichincha, where both parties competed well and won two seats each, PUR 
never competed opposite a PCE candidate. The PCE won one seat each in Carchi and 
Tungurahua. See Table 5.12 below.  
                                                          
53
 Personal interview TSI-1 (2006). 
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Table 5.11:  
PUR Election Results, Provincial Deputies. 
     1992 1994 
Region DM Province % Vote Seats % Vote Seats 
Amazon 1 Morona Santiago 16.7   0.0   
Amazon 2 Napo 8.6   0.0   
Amazon na Orellana na   na    
Amazon 1 Pastaza 14.9   1.7   
Amazon 1 Sucumbios 15.7   0.5   
Amazon 1 Zamora Chinchipe 0.0   0.0   
Andes 4 Azuay 19.5 1 0.0   
Andes 2 Bolivar 21.6   11.5   
Andes 2 Canar 0.0   0.0   
Andes 2 Carchi 0.0   0.0   
Andes 3 Chimborazo 22.4 1 7.9   
Andes 3 Cotopaxi 0.0   6.6   
Andes 3 Imbabura 16.1 1 3.6   
Andes 3 Loja 0.0   0.0   
Andes 8 Pichincha 19.1 2 1.7   
Andes 3 Tungurahua 0.0   3.3   
Coast 3 El Oro 16.2 1 16.5   
Coast 3 Esmeraldas 8.8   3.7   
Coast 10 Guayas 17.1 2 0.0   
Coast 4 Los Rios 14.0 1 10.7   
Coast 5 Manabi 15.8 1 14.2 1 
Other 1 Galapagos 0.0   0.0   
   Overall 14.8 10 3.9 1 
 
The components of variance analysis on PUR’s parish-level vote percentage reveals 
that the party’s high variance—equivalent to a standard deviation of 11.2%, which is nearly 
as high as its mean vote percentage across all parishes—is somewhat higher between 
provinces than it is within provinces but between parishes. See Table 5.13 below. This result 
is consistent with the party’s strategy of not contesting seats in provinces in which its alliance 
partner, the PCE, was competing. Still, the high variance between parishes is consistent with 
a strategy in which the party selectively targets parishes in which to compete.   
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Table 5.12:  
Components of Variance, PUR, 1992 
Component Variance 
% of 
Total 
Time na na 
Province 69.1 56.1% 
Parish 54.1 43.9% 
Total 123.2 100.0% 
Mean % Vote 11.8%   
 
Linkage Strategy 
Whatever the original intent of the five founders of the party, PUR failed to build an 
organization with deep linkages throughout the country. Its very electoral strategy in alliance 
with the PCE was built upon pragmatism rather than principle. We cannot determine whether 
the alternative strategy of a long-term centrist alliance, as espoused by Gándara, would have 
been principled or simply an alternative pragmatic approach. But having lost his principle 
party-building cohort, Durán had little alternative but to lean on the PCE and a right-wing 
political agenda to solicit support, thereby alienating the left from his presidency. Indeed, one 
member of the Imbabura provincial party leadership –where the PUR competed and the PCE 
did not in 1992—described the origins of the PUR in the province as having formed out of 
the PCE, rather than out of the PSC, as most describe it.54 
The party’s principle linkage strategy was personalistic around Durán. As one of the 
founder’s noted, they recruited him because he was “a well-known personality, a well-known 
man.”55  A provincial leader in Imbabura stated that prior to the 1992 campaign, she was not 
affiliated with any party and that she joined the effort because she liked Durán himself. In 
                                                          
54
 Personal interview PUR-2 (2006). In fact, Durán was a member of the PCE before joining with the PSC. 
55
 Personal interview PUR-1 (2006). 
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this remote province, he had assembled a party based upon linkages with prominent local 
politicians rather than by building an independent organization of his own linked. The 
linkages were elitist and not built upon any social or community organizational base. In the 
end, she indicated that it was the corruption scandals—not only of Durán’s vice-president, 
but also involving his daughter—that cost the party its support in Imbabura province. 56  
Electoral Institutions 
For the PUR, the threshold of representation—and principally the district 
magnitude—effected the electoral fortunes in that it set a target vote share that the party 
needed to win in order to secure a seat. In all but the two largest provinces, where the PUR 
competed, it’s vote share was very close to the minimum needed to win one seat. This 
reflects the tactical calculations the party made as it recruited provincial politicians to its 
cause and candidate lists.  
In its initial 1992 election, it competed and exerted considerable effort in five of the 
nine single-member and two-member districts, but failed to win any seats. It competed and 
exerted considerable effort in six of the nine moderately sized districts of three or four seats 
and won a seat in five of them. In the three large districts of five to 10 seats, it won at least 
one seat in each and five overall.  
By the 1994 election, as the party’s future was in doubt, most local politicians 
abandoned the party. Only in Manabi, Los Rios, and El Oro did the party perform at a level 
where winning a seat was possible. This is consistent with what one would expect in districts 
with few seats—two or a few parties have competitive vote returns, and all other parties have 
little. 
                                                          
56
 Personal interview PUR-2 (2006). 
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In sum, despite the relatively low average district magnitude that existed in the early 
1990’s, the electoral system offered little obstacle to PUR’s initial high entry. On the one 
hand, it took advantage of the high district magnitude provinces  was able to win five seats; 
on the other hand, in the low and moderate district magnitude provinces, given the highly 
fragmented party system and the absence of nationalized parties, it was able to very 
selectively channel its resources and win a few seats. By 1994, the incentives generated by 
small districts made its support evaporate quickly in those places and, consequently, overall 
its decline was sharp. 
Contender Possibilities 
 In winning the presidency at the time of party formation, the PUR secured access to 
the resources of the state. These resources could have been used, as they have by so many 
other Ecuadorian politicians, to build a party organization. However, with the party’s linkage 
resting almost entirely on Durán’s reputation, following scandal, the party had little 
opportunity to strengthen ties with the provincial affiliates it had secured at the outset. 
Building an organizational network with deep and disciplined ties takes substantial time, and 
Durán’s governing problems interrupted the process. Additionally, Durán was in his 
seventies and the party had not established a cohort of potential leaders that could have taken 
his place in the leadership. In short, the party was not consolidated as a machine organization 
with the procedures, hierarchy, and national reach needed to project it onto a contender 
trajectory. 
Partido Demócrata (PD)-Democratic Party 
Origins and Initial Electoral Performance 
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The PD was founded by Francisco Huerta Montalvo, and other dissidents of the 
PLRE, at the time of transition to democracy. Though at times identified as “center-left,” as 
for example by Coppedge (1997) and in the party’s own proceedings from their convention 
in 1984,57 the party behaved as a network of provincial and pragmatic politicians around 
Huerta’s leadership.  
After Huerta left the party before the 1986 elections, it lost most of its support. Many 
of its leaders defected from the party in search of other affiliations. Among them was Fabián 
Alarcón who moved to the FRA, as analyzed above.  
                                                          
57
 Proceedings of the PD 10th convention in the city of Ibarra, 1984. 
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Table 5.13:  
PD Election Results, Provincial Deputies. 
     1984 1986 1988 
Region DM Province % Vote Seats % Vote Seats % Vote Seats 
Amazon 1 Morona Santiago 0.0   0.0   0.0   
Amazon 2 Napo 0.0   0.0   0.0   
Amazon na Orellana na   na  na   
Amazon 1 Pastaza 0.0   0.0   0.0   
Amazon na Sucumbios na   na   na   
Amazon 1 Zamora Chinchipe 25.6 1 0.0   0.0   
Andes 3 Azuay 14.0 1 6.9   4.9   
Andes 2 Bolivar 7.3   0.0   2.2   
Andes 2 Canar 6.7   0.0   0.0   
Andes 2 Carchi 0.0   0.0   0.0   
Andes 3 Chimborazo 0.0   6.7   7.6   
Andes 3 Cotopaxi 7.1   4.6   0.0   
Andes 3 Imbabura 15.0 1 7.9   0.0   
Andes 3 Loja 11.5   4.3   0.0   
Andes 6 Pichincha 15.4 1 6.4   4.7   
Andes 3 Tungurahua 11.5   17.1 1 3.1   
Coast 3 El Oro 0.0   2.0   0.0   
Coast 3 Esmeraldas 4.2   1.1   1.5   
Coast 9 Guayas 3.7   2.5   0.6   
Coast 3 Los Rios 2.9   7.9   0.0   
Coast 5 Manabi 6.6 1 3.1   1.3   
Other 1 Galapagos 0.0   3.4   0.0   
  
 Overall 8.0 5 4.7 1 2.0 0 
 
Linkage Strategy 
 The party deployed a primarily personalist strategy in two respects. First, the party 
relied upon the leadership of Huerta. He was a prominent leader of the PLRE who was a very 
promising and charismatic potential candidate for the presidency in 1978. He would have 
been chosen at the head of the ticket were it not for a technicality which disqualified him that 
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year.58 Later, the old-guard leadership of the PLRE was resistant to Huerta and the new 
cohort of leadership around him, so Huerta and his colleagues left and formed the PD.59   
 Second, the PD attempted to present itself as the authentic, if reformist, branch of the 
old time PLRE. The PLRE at this time had few organized roots in the widely expanded 
electorate of the early 1980s. Still, it had a residual reputation, especially in the coastal 
region, as a defender of traditional liberal values which invoked the personalities of Eloy 
Alfaro and other liberal heroes of the Ecuadorian nation. Huerta and his followers attempted 
to capitalize on this brand by co-opting symbolic elements of the party. For example, they 
originally registered their party as “Partido Radical Democrata,” meant to suggest continuity 
with the “Partido Liberal Radical Ecuatoriano.” The old-guard PLRE challenged this 
registration with the electoral authorities, who decided in the PLRE’s favor. The party had to 
drop “Radical” from its name and call itself the “Partido Democrata.”60 Nevertheless, the 
new group cultivated this image of itself and benefited as a result. The effort is in some ways 
programmatic, in that it attempts to solve the voter information problem by providing simple 
cues around an ideology. Nevertheless, a programmatic linkage implies deeper and more 
enduring ties to organized and enduring ethnic, social or economic constituents. The PD 
lacked these ties and was simply leveraging the reputational capital of its lineage.  
Electoral Institutions 
 As with the PUR, the PD’s tactical electoral decisions were shaped by the district 
magnitude. In most districts, where the magnitude was very low, the party was forced to 
decide whether or not to compete. We see in the district results evidence that party leaders 
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 Personal interview FRA-2 (2006). 
59
 Personal interview PD-1 (2006). 
60
 See PD-TSE correspondence of 1983. 
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made a discrete decision about whether to register, to register but not compete, or to register 
and compete. In 1984 it registered to compete in 13 districts, only three more than the 10 
required by law for that election. All seven districts in which it did not compete had a low 
district magnitude of three or less. Among those in which it registered, in the two seat 
districts of Bolivar and Canar, it didn’t come close to winning a seat. In the three-seat 
districts in which it competed, it won a seat in three, came close in two more, and it didn’t 
come close in three others. Finally, it took advantage of the high district magnitude in 
Manabí, Pichincha, and Guayas and won a seat in the two former and came close in Guayas. 
By the second election, the low magnitude of most of the districts contributed to the fast 
decline of the party. The logic of the effect of district magnitude when it is low is that if a 
party doesn’t expect to be competitive at a very high level, then it is not worth competing at 
all in a district. The district level results suggest that local politicians which had supported 
the party in 1984 had begun defecting. This happened in Zamora Chinchipe, Azuay, Bolivar, 
Canar, Cotopaxi, Imbabura, Loja, and Manabi. Only in Tungurahua did the party’s support 
sustain itself for one more election. 
In sum, despite the relatively low average district magnitude that existed in the mid 
1980’s, the electoral system offered little obstacle to PD’s entry with a high intercept. In the 
three high district magnitude provinces the party was able to win one seat with a low vote 
share, In the other low district magnitude provinces, given the highly fragmented party 
system and the absence of nationalized parties, it was able to very selectively channel its 
resources and win a few seats. By 1986, the incentives of the small districts made its support 
evaporate in those places, hastening its overall decline. 
Contender Possibilities 
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 PD never managed to secure access to state or private resources sufficient to project 
itself onto a contender trajectory. One of the factors which undermined its prospects was that 
it failed to gain access to resources of the state. After losing the 1984 presidential election, it 
supported the center-left ID in the second round as party of the “bloque progresista” and 
would have gained access to patronage via the Borja administration had ID won the election. 
However, ID lost and PD ended up in opposition. Furthermore, the PD did not win executive 
office in either of the two major cities, which has often been the way in which parties have 
secured access to party-building resources. 
Additionally, in the course of splitting with the PLRE following the transitional 
elections, the PD did not inherit any substantial machine network, and in particular not in one 
of the two primary provinces. Lacking such resources, by the 1986 mid-term elections, 
members of the party coalition from outlying provinces had begun to defect to other party 
competitors.  
In 1985, the party was disrupted by major organizational battles. Two rival factions 
each held national meetings in June and July of that year, both claiming to be the legitimate 
forum. The matter was adjudicated in front of the electoral authorities, the TSE, and decided 
in favor of the dominant faction of followers of Huerta.61 However, by 1988 the founder had 
left, and other important members were finding other partisan homes.  
The PD entered at a disadvantage in that it was one of the latter defectors from the 
PLRE. Potential liberal allies of the party had already been incorporated into earlier 
defectors, especially into ID, but also into FRA. This is consistent with the finding in Chapter 
III that early movers have an advantage over late-comers. In Appendix 4, one can see from 
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 See correspondence in TSE archives. 
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its origins in 1978 as a split from the PLRE that PD is located within the general Liberal 
tradition. Like all parties within the tradition that began after ID, it lived only a few electoral 
cycles before dying.62 
The party never managed to build a clientelistic organization with national reach. In 
the national legislature, it won five seats in provinces of all three regions of the country 
during its first year out in 1984. However, the party focused its attention at the national level 
and did not build an organization rooted in local constituencies with candidates for city and 
provincial level offices.  
I hypothesize that contenders in the Ecuadorian system must be weakly constrained 
by ideological and social structural ties. The PD meets this requirement. First, as party 
leaders left the party over the course of about four years, they joined parties which are widely 
varied on the ideological spectrum.63 For example, prominent leaders joined the following 
parties, coded according to Coppedge (1997): Heinz Moeller Freile  and Nicolás Lapentti 
joined the far right PSC; Fabián Alarcón joined the center-right FRA; Javier Munoz, 
Washington Bonilla joined center-left DP-UDC; Marco Poaño Maya joined personalist PRE; 
and Cesár Alarcón ultimately joined the center-left Partido Alianza Nacional which he 
renamed Partido Libertad. Second, the party adopted some formal positions that conformed 
with liberalism of Ecuador in the 1980s—opposition to the dictatorship, economic openness, 
etc.64—but the key attribute of this feature is that the party be constrained to uphold those 
                                                          
62
 CID was a party from within the liberal tradition that predated ID. It was born in 1965 to sustain its leader, 
Otto Arosemena, in his candidacy for the presidency. In November of 1966, a constituent assembly choose him 
as president and he served until 1968. Though it lived into the 1978 democratic transition, and Arosemena won 
a national deputy seat at that time, it was a personalist vehicle that never aspired to build a national political 
organization. It, too, soon died. 
63
 Personal interview PD-1 (2006). 
64
 See “Plan of Government” and “Declaration of Principles” 
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positions via its linkages with groups in civil society. As described earlier in this chapter, 
civil society is generally weak in Ecuador and consequently does not serve as a strong 
constraint on any party. In the case of the PD, the party had no substantial linkages with even 
the weak groups that did exist in Ecuadorian society, and so it had considerable room to 
maneuver and compromise on its declared principles. 
Overall, while the PD was generally weakly constrained by a strong programmatic 
orientation and social linkages, it lacked access to resources and it lacked the constituency-
based network with national reach which is needed to achieve contender status in Ecuador.  
Contenders 
 The latent trajectory model of Chapter 2 produced the predicted “contender” 
trajectory which appears bolded in Figure 5.7 below. The three Ecuadorian cases which were 
classified into this group also appear in the figure. I have adjusted the scale of the vertical 
axis from a range of -10 to 60 (from Figure 2.7) to a range of 0 to 25 in order to make the 
individual trajectories distinguishable. Though in this perspective they appear to be a 
heterogeneous group, when plotted with the other parties on a –10 to 60 scale they appear as 
a distinct and homogeneous group. 
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Figure 5.7:  
The “Contender” Trajectory in Ecuador 
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 Izquierda Democratica (ID)-Democratic Left 
 ID was formed in the 1970s by a group of dissidents from the PLRE. Leadership was 
collegial and the platform was social democratic and principled. Despite the fact the ID is 
widely considered the most institutionalized party in the country, the absence of a strong 
underlying organized social base made the party vulnerable to the same clientelistic 
incentives that shape other parties in the system. By 1984, when the conservative 
administration of PSC president León Febres-Cordero was in office, the cohesion of the party 
was easily weakened. Febres-Cordero directed a concerted effort to build a majority 
congressional alliance by soliciting defectors from ID and other parties of the opposition 
“bloque progressista” (Conaghan 1988). His success in picking off ID legislators is reflected 
in the results from the 1986 mid-term elections in Table 5.15 below, when ID lost a third of 
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its seats. By the end of his term, however, Febres-Cordero’s agenda had mostly collapsed and 
the campaign for the 1988 election, in which Borja was considered a favorite to win, enabled 
ID to woo back support from its fickle provincial allies. Borja won the 1988 election, but 
executive office has never been kind to Ecuadorian parties. His administration was hampered 
by economic crisis, governance crisis, and what many on the left felt to be Borja’s sell-out to 
a program of soft liberalizing economic reforms. These problems ultimately undermined ID’s 
credibility as a principled programmatic party. One party leader from this period emphasized 
that the great weakness of ID arose following Borja’s presidency because, even though it was 
“one of the respectable governments that this country has had, it didn’t satisfy everybody and 
it left things undone.”65  From there, ID largely retreated from its national social democratic 
strategy with a broad-based platform and devolved to a political machine delivering 
particularistic goods to narrow geographically defined constituencies, primarily within 
provinces of the Andes, but also in provinces in other regions. 
Origins and Initial Electoral Performance 
ID entered the national political arena in 1979 with 14.8% of the national vote, the 
highest intercept of any new party since Ecuador’s transition. It contested national legislative, 
presidential and sub-national elections during each election since then. The interruptions in 
the generally upward trajectory over the first five elections arose as a result of its overall 
success. The drop in 1986 was the result of efforts of the governing PSC party to build a 
legislative majority by wooing members of ID and the wider opposition to switch parties. 
Conaghan (1988) recounts specific and brazen efforts by president León Febres-Cordero to 
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 Personal interview ID-1 (2006). 
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this end. The second drop in 1990 was during the mid-term elections following ID 
president’s 1988 election and reflected discontent with the president’s tenure.  
Rodrigo Borja is widely considered the principle party leader, though he is rarely 
consider to be a leader of the charismatic type nor one who maintained his leadership through 
a personalist style (Freidenberg 2001). He served as one of the party’s founding members, 
president of the country from 1988 until 1992, and leader of the party for many years. Party 
leadership has been fairly collegial and ID is the only main party to hold a primary election 
to choose its presidential candidate, though it did so only once in advance of the 1988 
presidential elections.66 One party founder described the party as being initiated and 
organized collectively by “a small group of young people” on the one hand, and by “poor 
neighborhood leaders” on the other.67 In this founder’s account, there was a notable omission 
of any mention of labor leaders or leaders of other organized sectors, though upon my 
specific inquiry he indicated that the party was forming organizational linkages with labor 
and artisan unions.  
The party was born following the 1968 election of Jose Maria Velasco Ibarra to the 
presidency. Velasco Ibarra, a highland populist caudillo who had been elected to his fifth 
term of office in June, arranged a congressional pact with the PLRE after he defeated them in 
the elections. This alliance, known as the “Pacto Mordoré,” caused considerable dissention 
within the PLRE ranks and contributed to the departure of Borja, Manuel Córdova, and other 
more principled members of the PLRE.68 
                                                          
66
 Under the leadership of Raul Baca, there was a movement to implement primaries for all candidacies in the 
party, but this effort ultimately failed. See Personal interview ID-1 (2006). 
67
 Personal interview ID-2 (2006). 
68
 ID is sometimes erroneously thought to have started in 1968. In that year, a coalition of mostly center-left 
parties—including PSE, CFP, PLRE and other small parties—joined in what was called the “Frente de 
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The party is social democratic and a member of Socialist International. Still, one of 
the big questions with respect to ID is whether or not it is truly a “modern” party. In an 
interview with a party leader from 1976 until around 1993 when renounced his membership, 
the subject discusses his disenchantment with ID and with the programmatic potential for the 
entire party system in Ecuador. He believes that “countries like Ecuador aren’t prepared for a 
party regime”; that in order for them to “operate under a party mentality, under a party 
structure, they will need…fifty or sixty years.”69  
Prior to participating at the national level in the 1978 presidential elections, the party 
fielded candidates in the 1970 elections for municipal, provincial, and national legislative 
posts. The relatively strong results propelled the party’s ambitions for national office. 
beginning in 1978.70 Despite winning two national congressional seats in the June 1970 
election—including one for Borja in the province of Pichincha and one in Azuay—Velasco 
Ibarra staged a self-coup on June 22 when he dismissed congress and the Supreme Court. 
The elected deputies never took their seats.
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Izquierda Democratica” to support the candidacy of Andrés Córdova for the presidential election. See Personal 
interview ID-2 (2006). 
69
 Personal interview ID-3 (2006). 
70
 Personal interview ID-2 (2006). 
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Table 5.14:  
ID Election Results, Provincial Deputies. 
    1979 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2002 
Region Province %V Seats %V Seats %V Seats %V Seats %V Seats %V Seats %V Seats %V Seats %V Seats %V Seats 
Amazon Morona Santiago 50.8 1 41.1 1 0.0   45.1 1 30.4   24.7 1 23.1   22.9   11.9 2* 9.5 1 
Amazon Napo 21.8   33.1 1 18.8 1 25.0 2 25.2 1 17.7 1 16.0   7.4   3.9   6.6   
Amazon Orellana                                     8.7 1 
Amazon Pastaza 39.2 1 0.0   0.0   35.5 1 15.2   5.8   34.2 1 0.0   11.5   12.8   
Amazon Sucumbios                 18.4   11.8   7.5   0.0   5.1   2.4   
Amazon Zamora Chinchipe 0.0   25.3   22.6   35.7 1 21.7   0.0   4.0   0.0   4.2   3.5   
Andes Azuay 18.4 1 25.6 1 29.1 2 39.3 2 16.2 1 0.0   20.1 1 12.1   6.7 1* 33.3 3 
Andes Bolivar 13.0   27.9 1 19.6   28.2 1 23.4 1 25.8 1 19.5   11.7   16.1 1 12.2 1 
Andes Canar 22.6   38.8 2 20.3   35.9 1 22.8 1 21.3 1 10.6   10.3   15.8 1 12.4   
Andes Carchi 22.5 1 38.8 1 28.8 1 32.8 1 17.7   17.0   24.4 1 17.7   17.9 1 18.1 1 
Andes Chimborazo 18.3 1 26.5 1 12.8   22.6 2 12.8   22.0 1 14.6 1 5.5   16.6 1 7.6 1 
Andes Cotopaxi 6.2   19.9 1 15.0 1 19.6 1 11.2   10.5   8.3   5.2   6.1 1* 9.4   
Andes Imbabura 33.4 2 37.0 2 17.5 1 29.9 2 31.8 2 19.9 1 12.0   15.3   13.9   13.0   
Andes Loja 2.2   19.6 1 14.7   25.2 1 13.8 1 10.9   12.9   4.2   9.1   7.0 1 
Andes Pichincha 21.5 2 23.8 2 19.2 2 29.1 3 15.8 1 11.2 1 12.7 1 10.2   27.5 7 28.4 6 
Andes Tungurahua 19.3 1 23.6 1 17.7 2 28.2 2 12.0   9.4   12.3   10.6   16.7 1 8.2   
Coast El Oro 15.8 1 27.2 1 16.5 1 30.1 1 15.1   11.3   17.6 1 24.0   6.9   10.5 1 
Coast Esmeraldas 13.5   14.4 1 7.0   17.1 1 15.6 2 12.8   9.8   2.0   10.4   6.1   
Coast Guayas 8.8 1 8.5 1 7.1 1 11.6 1 5.7 1 3.4   4.4   2.2   4.0   3.5   
Coast Los Rios 12.0   15.9 1 12.2   16.4 1 6.8   3.1   4.0   1.1   2.8   5.9   
Coast Manabi 6.6   17.0 1 13.7 1 19.8 2 16.1 1 9.9   4.8   4.8   3.4   6.8   
Other Galapagos 64.6 1 35.9 1 31.2 1 17.4   26.7   19.7   7.9   0.0   8.2   8.9   
  Overall 14.8 13 20.0 21 14.5 14 22.6 27 13.0 12 9.0 7 10.0 6 7.2 3# 12.2 16* 12.1 16 
*Alliance seats; # Province level details not available. 
Table 5.15:  
Components of Variance, ID, 1992, 1996, 1998, 2002 
Component Variance % of Total 
Time 1.1 1.0% 
Province 53.2 46.7% 
Parish 59.6 52.3% 
Total 113.9 100.0% 
Mean % Vote 11.3%   
 
Linkage Strategy 
ID’s strategic linkages are somewhat ambiguous and mixed. I argue below that the 
programmatic content of the party is largely rhetorical; therefore, it is largely absent. The 
principle reason for this is that the party is not strongly linked with any social, economic, or 
ethnic group that is able to enforce the party’s programmatic platform and constrain its non-
programmatic linkage strategy. Despite the emergence of Borja as the key leader in the party, 
especially following the 1980 death of Manuel Córdova,71 the party isn’t strongly 
personalistic. Personalism has played the role one would expect in a presidential system and 
the fortunes of ID have undoubtedly risen and fallen with the popularity of Borja. 
Personalism is used as a supplemental linkage strategy. He ran for president five times—
1978, 1984, 1988, 1998 and 2002. Term limits prevented his run in 1992, and in both 1996 
and 2006 ID supported an outsider on the presidential ticket. Nevertheless, there is a certain 
significant amount of political support that does not rise and fall with the popularity of Borja. 
The key linkage mechanism for ID is the machine type and there is likely to be some 
supplemental vote-buying that occurs. 
                                                          
71
 Personal interview ID-3 (2006). 
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The key to the organization, according to one founder, is the neighborhood cells. 
“There is an enormous multitude of cells.”72 He continue, “these cells answer to the 
leadership of the parish because the neighborhoods together form the parish; the group of 
parishes form the canton; the group of cantons form the province; and the group of 22 
provinces form the national structure, in the form of a pyramid.” As the response to question 
concerning the organizational footing of the party, this conception of the party as operating 
under a fundamentally geographic logic is revealing. Alternatively, he might have offered a 
organizing logic that mapped onto functional or sectoral locations. The pyramid metaphor is 
consistent with an organization adopting machine-based linkage strategy. 
The social democratic programmatic rhetoric has always been strong from ID. One 
leader is quoted in 2006 as saying, “Ecuadorian social democracy has something in common 
with European social democracy, except that European social democracy is less radical, less 
ambitious…They have many accomplishments and little left to conquer and so they dedicate 
themselves to defend their achievements…We have little to defend and much to 
accomplish.” 73 Nevertheless, the formal organizational articulation of the programmatic 
linkage is weak. In the interviews I conducted, the description of the founding years lacks a 
strong emphasis on organizationally articulated social-political linkages. One founder notes 
that the initial organizational effort involved “many years of my life traveling the country 
leading conferences about the ideology of our party and to organize the membership and the 
leadership bodies around the country.”74 When asked specifically whether this work 
including building linkages with organized civil society, and unions in particular, he agreed 
                                                          
72
 Personal interview ID-2 (2006). 
73
 Personal interview ID-2 (2006). 
74
 Personal interview ID-2 (2006). 
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but did not elaborate. Instead, he proceeded immediately to reemphasize the conferences, and 
in particular efforts at universities and high schools in order to “attract the youth.” 
Independently, a different subject confirmed that ID “did not have a real link with the 
unions” and that it “gave much more emphasis to the intellectual sector,” by which he meant 
professors, students and a middle class sympathetic to social democratic rhetoric.75 A third 
subject, who was a leader based in Guayaquil and has since left the party, emphasized that 
during the time when ID was seeking to build a party that stretched outside of Quito and the 
highlands, they operated by reaching out to prominent individuals in provincial cities around 
the country. “We went from city to city, from province to province, looking for men that we 
had heard were men of stature, that were young professionals, successful businessmen, 
people of progressive ideas.” This account of party-building was indistinguishable from those 
I heard in interview from provincial capitals about the party building efforts of other plainly 
pragmatic parties, such as PRIAN and PUR. Importantly, this subject also failed to identify 
any social organizational basis for the construction of the party. In fact, he lamented, “there 
are no group, class or social organizations” in Ecuador. 
One subject emphasized that the party is distinct from all others in that it has never 
defended the economic interests of any group. “We serve what we consider the national 
interest.” I followed up by asking, “Then how would you describe your base of support and 
the nature of the linkages with your base?” In response, he began a description of the sources 
of the party’s financial resources and included 1) party funding resources from the state; 2) 
membership dues; and 3) interest on the parties investments. This response is again notable 
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 Personal interview ID-1 (2006). 
 195 
for what it omits; namely, the subject confirms that the base of the support for the party was 
not organized segments of civil society.  
In one interview with an early party leader, the subject observes that the early 1980s 
were a difficult time for ID and other parties of the left in Latin America. The emergence of 
an agenda of liberalizing economic reforms and the debt crisis “martyred the party 
ideologies.”76 He continued, these underlying currents “gave rise to our entry into a new 
phase in which the political wasn’t dominant, but they were purely electoral periods. The 
party began to change, it began to live the electoral process, though we wanted to be 
different.” The Borja presidency represented a turning point for the party because it led to “a 
discontent in a large part of the masses of the party because the process that had already 
played out via the presidency and in government didn’t necessarily attend to their aspirations 
which they show through their groups, clienteles, and  ideological expectations.” The 
difficulties of the Borja presidency were concurrent with the rise of the debt crisis and the 
Washington Consensus and together undermined the credibility of ID’s programmatic 
appeal.  
I argue in this project that the basis for social and civic organization in Ecuador is not 
primarily social and economic location, but rather geographical location. Consequently, 
constituencies for a party are geographic. As ID emerged, it seems to have attempted to 
project a rhetoric and programmatic agenda onto this underlying organizational logic, as 
when it speaks of feeding poor children and struggles for social justice. But a society that is 
not socially and economically structured, but only geographically structured does not 
generate broad-based demands. It is organized to produce particularistic demands and a 
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principled programmatic social democratic party will struggle to avoid devolving into a 
particularistic patronage machine. The anthropological study by Burgwal (1995) of a land 
invasion on the outskirts of Quito and the subsequent evolution of a relationship of 
particularistic exchange between the community leaders and leftist party brokers—including 
FADI, ID, DP and others—uses fascinating ethnographic detail to show how clientelism can 
coexist with a social democratic, socialist, or Marxist worldview when social fragmentation 
is extreme. In his study, electoral support was exchanged for only narrow club goods: state 
protection following the illegal land invasion, neighborhood food kitchens, etc. 
These conclusions are consistent with other accounts of ID.  Friedenberg (2001) 
argues that ID is simultaneously center-left and clientelistically rooted to its voters. Jones 
(2005), using Latinobarometer data, shows that ID supporters are simultaneously more leftist 
and higher income than three other important parties in the system (PRE, PSC and PSP).77 
This profile is consistent with a party base that consists of a middle class which is linked 
programmatically. It would reflect a payoff to the effort described by two of the party 
founders of their tours of the country spreading the social democratic ideology to more 
educated sectors at universities and high schools. Many Ecuadorians, however, express no 
affiliation with political parties, and so voters who end up voting with ID may do so because 
they are incorporated via brokers into local machine networks that are ultimately loyal to ID 
but not strongly partisan. 
Electoral Institutions 
Until the end of Borja’s presidential term in 1992, ID seemed well on its way to 
building a nationalized political party, although it did so primarily constituency-by-
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 It is also higher income than PRIAN, though not significantly more leftist. 
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constituency with machine strategies rather than with broad-based programmatic strategies. 
Its support, in any case, was high enough that district magnitude did not influence its 
trajectory. In the small district magnitude districts it was almost always competitive. There 
are only four occasions during its first five elections where the party did not compete for a 
district seat, and each occasion was in one of the  small Amazon districts. As a share of the 
national vote, however, these concessions have a trivial impact on its vote share.  
Beginning in 1992, we can see that ID began its retreat to the highland districts where 
it is based. Many of the outlying provincial brokers that had supported ID during its accent to 
power defected to other parties. Having lost popular support from the difficult Borja 
presidency, and having faced challenges on the coast from the competing parties based in 
that region, the districts where magnitude was low or moderate most likely led ID to concede 
them to the coastal parties, which in turn likely had an effect on its trajectory, which was 
declining by this time. The retreat from the Amazon districts was similar, though slightly 
later, and coincided with the rise of indigenous mobilization and the rise of Pachakutik. Also, 
the relaxation of the electoral rules—and especially party registration rules—beginning in the 
mid 1990s altered ID’s performance indirectly by weakening the ability of the party to retain 
the working partnerships with outlying provincial brokers who were freed up to pursue 
political careers independent of the main parties.  
Contender Possibilities 
ID meets all the conditions to be a contender. First, it gained access to resources 
necessary to feed a machine strategy. Prior to winning the presidency in 1988, it won many 
provincial and municipal positions. Second, it spent many years prior to the 1978 transition 
constructing a network of affiliates around the country. The network operated according to a 
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geographic logic and consisted of a complex network of brokers between the central party 
leaders and the neighborhood operatives. Furthermore, the network incorporated allies in all 
regions of the country. Finally, although the party adopted a social democratic rhetoric, it did 
not have linkages with social and economic organizations that forced it to both a) invest 
heavily in broad-based programmatic policy and b) refrain from sullying itself in the 
sometimes ideologically distasteful business of particularistic exchange.  
 Partido Renovador Institucional Acción Nacional (PRIAN)- 
Institutional Renewal Party of National Action 
PRIAN is a contender party built upon the national corporate network owned by its 
founder, Alvaro Noboa. The party uses machine and vote-buying strategies to link with 
voters. It is notorious in its lack of programmatic content, and for using the resources of the 
Noboa Group to both buy and coerce electoral support. As Ecuador’s richest man and at the 
helm of extremely diversified business ventures, PRIAN has considerable leverage in most 
provinces of the country. 
Origins and Initial Electoral Performance 
In 1994, Alvaro Noboa and his step mother inherited personal fortunes and business 
enterprises from Luis Noboa, the family patriarch. Alvaro acquired control of the bulk of the 
businesses in a subsequent legal battle. The Noboa Group is known as a major banana 
exporting enterprise, though its business interests include banking, transportation, the media, 
construction, and many other sectors. In 1996, Alvaro Noboa was given the cabinet-level 
post of President of the Monetary Board by president Abdalá Bucarám, his old friend and the 
leader of the populist PRE party. Many accuse Noboa of using his position and the resources 
of the state to influence the legal proceedings on his father’s estate, which ruled in his favor. 
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Upon the premature  fall from office and exile of Bucarám in 1997, the PRE—together with 
CFP, APRE and UPL—supported Noboa in a 1998 run for the presidency. While the PRE 
was Noboa’s principle party supporter, he is widely seen as being independent of both 
Bucarám and the PRE. Noboa reached the second round, but lost. For the 2000 local 
elections, Noboa had organized an independent movement, MIAN (Movimiento 
Independiente Alvaro Noboa), but the party fared poorly. 
By the 2002 election, Noboa had organized a full-blown political party, PRIAN. 
Unlike the previous MIAN, which in 2000 was only registered in the provinces in which it 
competed, PRIAN was registered as a national party with the national electoral authorities. 
He contested the presidency and legislative seats that year. The party entered with 13.8% of 
the vote—only one point below the post-transition high for Ecuador. From the model 
estimated in Chapter II, PRIAN is classified as a contender, but with only a 56% probability. 
There is a 44% chance that the party is a “flash” party. This uncertainty arises for two 
reasons. First,  PRIAN’s data series includes only one time-point. Second, the flash and 
contender trajectories originate at nearly identical intercepts, just above 12%. Though I use 
five time points when possible in this project, even one additional time point would be 
sufficient to classify a party as being in one group or another with much more than 56% 
probability. Although the 2006 elections were excluded from this project, PRIAN’s lower 
house vote percentage of 27.7% that year would place it very squarely in the contender 
group. In fact, with a vote gain between election 1 and election 2 of nearly 14%, it far 
exceeds the estimated slope of just 1% point per election. Nevertheless, one other party used 
in the sample had a similar level of growth between the first two elections and was classified 
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as a contender: Bolivia’s MIR won just over 10% of the vote in its first election and just 
under 22% in its second. Therefore, I am highly confident in treating PRIAN as a contender. 
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Table 5.16:  
PRIAN Election Results, Provincial Deputies. 
  
  
  2002 2006* 
Region DM Province % Vote Seats % Vote Seats 
Amazon 2 Morona Santiago 6.9   7.5   
Amazon 2 Napo 2.4   2.0   
Amazon 2 Orellana 13.5   7.0 1 
Amazon 2 Pastaza 6.4   8.5   
Amazon 2 Sucumbios 8.2   21.4 1 
Amazon 2 Zamora Chinchipe 3.4   6.5   
Andes 5 Azuay 8.2   16.2 1 
Andes 3 Bolivar 5.1   7.1   
Andes 3 Canar 15.0   0    
Andes 3 Carchi 14.0 1 31.0 2 
Andes 4 Chimborazo 7.6   15.9 1 
Andes 4 Cotopaxi 9.8 1 11.6   
Andes 4 Imbabura 14.7   29.9 1 
Andes 4 Loja 7.2   17.5 1 
Andes 14 Pichincha 8.3 1 23.9 4 
Andes 4 Tungurahua 8.1   25.4 1 
Coast 4 El Oro 7.3   22.2 1 
Coast 4 Esmeraldas 6.6   36.2 2 
Coast 18 Guayas 18.3 4 36.2 7 
Coast 5 Los Rios 12.2 1 18.9 1 
Coast 8 Manabi 15.1 2 40.0 4 
Other 2 Galapagos 5.8   2.7   
  
  Overall 13.8 10 27.7 28 
*2006 were excluded from Chapter II analysis. 
   
Table 5.17:  
Components of Variance, PRIAN, 2002 
Component Variance % of Total 
Time na   
Province 16.9 39.5% 
Parish 25.9 60.5% 
Total 42.8 100.0% 
Mean % Vote 10.1%   
 
Linkage Strategy 
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PRIAN follows a machine linkage strategy, supplemented by vote buying and 
personalism. Programmatic content is almost completely absent. The components of variance 
analysis shows that the party followed a highly parish-based strategy, more so than most 
other parties. To so degree this results from the fact that the party completely rather strongly 
across all provinces. Still, the parish level results reveal that the party was highly selective in 
choosing parishes with provinces in which to invest.  
One party leader who helped shepherd the party from movement to party described 
how he traveled the country and made contact with people he knew in order to form 
provincial chapters of the party and to get registered across the country. The work was solely 
about making contacts and building an organization sufficient to mount a campaign. Unlike 
ID’s effort, PRIAN’s party building years around the country did not include any effort to 
communicate the ideology of the party and create allegiance to a national project. In fact, this 
leader, when describing how PRIAN just barely registered with the electoral authorities by 
the deadline, noted that if they failed, “we would have had to look for another party.”78 
Beyond the national leadership of the party, it was nothing more than a series of weak 
connections with prominent provincial brokers.  
These provincial brokers were expected to contribute their own resources to the 
electoral effort.79 The party machine, therefore, had two networks. One network was under 
the direct control of Noboa via the business enterprises he runs. Through this network he was 
able to use employees of the firms, down to the plantation and shop managers, to enlist 
employees as party members. The other network was a series of looser connections with 
provincial elites who were often in one way or another associated with Noboa’s businesses, 
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 Personal interview PRIAN-2 (2006). 
 203 
but not under his direct influence and who brought their own local influence to bare in order 
to deliver votes. One 2002 legislative candidate from Ibarra province, for example, was a 
business person associated with the Quaker Oatmeal company in the province and described 
a loose business relationship with Noboa. 80 
Electoral Institutions 
PRIAN entered into an electoral system environment that had grown more 
permissive, with the average district magnitude having risen to 4.5. Half the provinces still 
had fairly low magnitude of two or three, but eight had a magnitude of four or five and three 
had a magnitude of between eight and 18. PRIAN had a strong start with victories primarily 
in the coast and in the large districts. But by 2006, it was the largest party in congress with 
28% of the seats and had won in districts of all sizes, though it exerted very little effort in all 
but Sucumbios among the 2-seat districts that year. The electoral system had little effect on 
the performance of PRIAN except at the margins and primarily to the extent that it conceded 
in some of the small districts. 
Contender Possibilities 
 PRIAN fits the profile of a party likely to be a contender. First, it had at its disposal 
the personal fortune of its party founder, the richest man in Ecuador, and he proved willing to 
spend it lavishly on his bid for the presidency and his bid to build an organization. Second, 
the party was built upon the preexisting national business networks of the Noboa Group. In 
this respect the party was unusual. There are very few organizations in Ecuador with a 
national scope. Many account for the limited success of the indigenous Pachakutik by citing 
the preexisting national indigenous social movement. In a similar way, though obviously 
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with a network of substantively different content, PRIAN was able to mobilize this business 
network to get out the vote and secure the loyalty of provincial politicians. Third, the party 
was not ideologically constrained by any organizational base from pursuing a pragmatic 
course of action, and especially from making pledges to geographically rather than socially 
oriented constituencies. Though the party contributed a considerable amount of resources to a 
personalist strategy, promoting the ability of its leader to run the country with the same 
degree of success as he runs his business, he is not a popular figure. The parties success came 
despite his personality, not because of it. 
Flop Parties 
 The latent trajectory model of Chapter 2 produced the predicted “flop” trajectory 
which appears bolded in Figure 5.8 below. The 15 Ecuadorian cases which were classified 
into this group also appear in the figure. I have adjusted the scale of the vertical axis from a 
range of -10 to 60 (from Figure 2.7) to a range of -1 to 5 in order to make the individual 
trajectories distinguishable. Though in this perspective they appear to be a heterogeneous 
group, when plotted with the other parties on a –10 to 60 scale they appear as a distinct and 
homogeneous group. 
Figure 5.8:  
The “Flop” Trajectory in Ecuador 
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 Movimiento Ciudadanos Nuevo País (MCNP) 
New Country Citizens Movement 
Origins and Initial Electoral Performance 
 MCNP is an electoral movement formed by the radio personality, Freddy Ehlers. Its 
birth cannot be separated from the origins of Pachakutik, which by deciding to support him in 
1996 rather than field its own presidential candidate propelled him to national prominence. 
Ehlers was a leader and vocal supporter of political reform and the political incorporation of 
a wide array of social sectors who felt excluded from national political life. He took 
advantage of the window of opportunity for political reform generated by the indigenous 
mobilizations, the institutional reform proposals by then president Durán-Ballén, and the 
political and economic crises of the late 1990s to craft himself as a consensus candidate for a 
wide array of social movements, and most prominently of the indigenous movement. He 
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rejected efforts to build a party organization preferring instead the vague rhetoric of a 
political movement.   
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Table 5.18:  
MCNP Election Results, Provincial Deputies. 
    1996 1998 2002 
Region Province % Vote Seats % Vote Seats % Vote Seats 
Amazon Morona Santiago 0.0   0.0   0.0   
Amazon Napo 0.0   0.0   0.0   
Amazon Orellana         8.7   
Amazon Pastaza 0.0   0.0   0.0   
Amazon Sucumbios 0.0   9.7   7.3   
Amazon Zamora Chinchipe 0.0   0.0   0.0   
Andes Azuay 0.0   14.9   5.5   
Andes Bolivar 0.0   1.0   0.0   
Andes Canar 0.0   9.5 1* 0.0   
Andes Carchi 0.0   2.2   0.0   
Andes Chimborazo 0.0   8.2   1.6   
Andes Cotopaxi 1.5   0.0   1.6   
Andes Imbabura 0.0   6.2 1* 0.0   
Andes Loja 1.2   3.1   0.0   
Andes Pichincha 0.0   3.7   1.8   
Andes Tungurahua 2.1   5.4   3.5   
Coast El Oro 0.0   1.7   0.0   
Coast Esmeraldas 0.0   2.6   0.0   
Coast Guayas 0.3   6.1   0.0   
Coast Los Rios 0.0   2.2   0.8   
Coast Manabi 0.0   1.5   0.0   
Other Galapagos 0.0   5.7   0.0   
  National 0.3 0 4.9 2* 0.8 0 
*Alliance Seats 
Table 5.19:  
Components of Variance, MCNP, 1996, 1998, 2002 
Component Variance % of Total 
Time 0.7 3.5% 
Province 11.7 58.8% 
Parish 7.5 37.7% 
Total 19.9 100.0% 
Mean % Vote 2.7%   
 
Linkage Strategy 
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MCNP’s primary linkage strategy was personalistic. Ehlers’ and his base of support 
was strongly in favor of a program of political reform, so it included programmatic elements. 
But a crucial ingredient of a programmatic party is that it have well formed and 
organizationally articulated relationships with social, ethnic, or economic groups in society. 
Ehlers’ eschewed party building efforts and especially efforts to create a strong 
organization.81 This aversion to organized party life was consistent with their rhetoric 
proclaiming disgust with traditional political life as it is known in Ecuador and with their 
advocacy of a new political order built upon new but unspecified methods of social solidarity 
and citizen participation. In addition, and with the exception of the indigenous movement, the 
coalition of social organizations which supported the party were themselves very fluid in 
identity and organization. Rather than register as a political party—which would have 
required the drafting of party statutes, a plan of government, and other formalized elements 
of party life—Ehlers insisted that the organization register as a “national political movement” 
and thus obviate the need for traditional elements of party life.  
While only weakly programmatic in the full sense of the concept, Ehlers and leaders 
of MCNP were highly principled. There is no evidence that they engaged in either vote-
buying or machine strategies in forging linkages with the citizenry. 
Electoral Institutions 
MCNP entered at a time when entry barriers were reduced and when district 
magnitude began climbing. Nevertheless, district magnitude remained low or moderate in 
large parts of the country and may have influenced the party trajectory. When the party was 
potentially nationally prominent, and especially in 1998, brokers from several small and 
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 Personal interview MCNP-1 (2006). 
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medium sized districts cast their fortunes with Ehlers leading to a temporary spike in the 
national vote shares. When the party focused on the presidency at the expense of its own 
slate of legislative candidates in 1996, or when the party was not potentially nationally 
prominent in 2002 and beyond, it only rarely generated support in the small and medium 
districts. 
In its first election of 1996 the party was primarily focused on the presidential 
candidacy of Freddy Ehlers and on the alliance with Pachakutik for the legislative slate. 
Beginning in 1998 when it began running legislative candidates, it behaved like most other 
parties. In districts with low magnitude the party the party often conceded. However, in 
districts in which it had secured the commitment of local notables, it performed well. In 
particular, it did well in Azuay, which is Ehler’s home province, and in Guayas, where León 
Roldos—former vice-president under Hurtado and brother of former president Jaime 
Roldos—was on the national legislative ticket. There was a significant amount of optimism 
for the Ehler’s presidential ticket in both 1996 and in 1998 and in both years Pachakutik 
offered him its official support.82 Therefore, MCNP was able to secure some support from 
peripheral provincial politicians and we see a spike in the 1998 electoral support; however, in 
2002 and especially 2006 (not reported) the party retreats to the home province of its founder 
and begins conceding most other districts. By 2002 the party was operating completely 
independently of the indigenous movement and without the support of León Roldos, who had 
launched his own promising electoral platform to compete for the presidency. By 2006 the 
party only competed in four provinces, and only successfully in Azuay. 
Contender Possibilities 
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 In 1998, the indigenous movement’s support was divided, as reported by Beck and Mijelski (2001). 
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Without the low result for 1996, the party may have been classified as a “flash” 
trajectory. Such a result might be more intuitively consistent with its actual performance than 
“flop.” Still, the primary efforts of the party were focused on the presidency for Ehlers and in 
this respect the legislative results which yield the flop classification underscore the lack of 
depth in the party’s organization. Beyond Ehlers, there was not much of a party.  
The prospects of a contender trajectory are hard to imagine. If Ehlers had won the 
presidential election of either 1996 or 1998, he would have governed without any or much of 
a legislative contingent of his own. He may have been able to use the discretion and 
resources of executive office to build a party, but he had no ambition to do so. Though 
Pachakutik would have been a legislative ally, support from any other parties would have 
been at best unreliable and at worst unlikely. Most critically, contender possibilities for 
MCNP were forgone by Ehlers rejection of the corrupt tradition of politics in Ecuador, and in 
particular of what I term “machine” strategies. His social base of support is simply not large 
and organized enough to build a credible programmatic alternative to the clientelistic realities 
found in Ecuador. At best, MCNP would have been a “flash” party, in which Ehlers and 
allies come to office based upon the euphoria of disenchanted voters for an outsider 
alternative. Then, lacking the political style and networks to govern with any degree of 
success, the party would have quickly disappeared.  
 Partido Asaad Bucaram (PAB) 
Origins and Initial Electoral Performance 
PAB was founded by Avicena Bucaram, one of Asaad Bucaram’s sons. In the early 
1980s, when the father died, his CFP party was divided into three groups: the Roldos faction, 
which ultimately became PCD; a second Roldos faction called the PRE that formed under the 
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leadership of Abdalá Bucaram upon President Roldos’ death; and the loyalists to the father 
led by his son Averroes, who led the remnants of the CFP. There was a rift between Asaad’s 
two son’s, Averroes and Avicena, and with Averroes in firm control of the CFP, Avicena 
launched a new party beginning in the late 1980s. The party never gathered much support 
and quickly disappeared. 
Very few of the members of the CFP followed Avicena into the new PAB. Thus, the 
party didn’t inherit any of the substantial local networks, which either remained with the CFP 
or joined with Abdalá Bucaram’s newly created PRE. Key members of PAB were Bolívar 
González, its 1992 presidential candidate and Wilson de la Cadena, the leader of the 
Pichincha cell.83  
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Table 5.20:  
PAB Election Results, Provincial Deputies. 
    1992 1994 
Region Province % Vote Seats % Vote Seats 
Amazon Morona Santiago 0.0   0.0   
Amazon Napo 7.6   0.0   
Amazon Orellana na    na   
Amazon Pastaza 0.0   0.0   
Amazon Sucumbios 0.6   0.0   
Amazon Zamora Chinchipe 0.0   0.0   
Andes Azuay 0.0   0.0   
Andes Bolivar 1.0   0.9   
Andes Canar 0.0   0.0   
Andes Carchi 0.4   0.0   
Andes Chimborazo 1.1   0.0   
Andes Cotopaxi 1.5   0.0   
Andes Imbabura 0.0   0.0   
Andes Loja 0.0   0.0   
Andes Pichincha 0.4   0.3   
Andes Tungurahua 0.6   0.0   
Coast El Oro 0.6   0.4   
Coast Esmeraldas 0.7   0.0   
Coast Guayas 0.3   0.0   
Coast Los Rios 0.3   0.0   
Coast Manabi 0.5   0.0   
Other Galapagos 0.0   0.0   
  National 0.5 0 0.1 0 
 
Table 5.21:  
Components of Variance, PAB, 1992 
Component Variance % of Total 
Time Na   
Province 1.5 32.6% 
Parish 3.1 67.4% 
Total 4.6 100.0% 
Mean % Vote 0.7%   
 
Linkage Strategy 
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PAB had no natural constituents or preexisting organizational base on which to build 
either a machine or a programmatic linkage. Furthermore, it lacked the resources, local 
brokers and networks to implement a robust vote-buying strategy. Instead, the party relied 
upon personalist appeals invoking the values, style and persona of the deceased Asaad 
Bucaram.84 This strategy is also evident in the symbols, Declaration of Principles, and Plan 
of Governance of the party. The party’s leadership attempted to bring together local leaders 
to deliver votes to the party, but with few excepts—and notably in the parish of Tena in the 
province of Napo, which I discuss below—local leaders with large followings were mostly 
unavailable, having already been incorporated into other more promising and productive 
party machines.  
Electoral Institutions 
As I argue in Chapter III above, the threshold of representation will only effect 
electoral performance for office-seeking parties who don’t expect to win anywhere near the 
threshold. Only in this circumstance will a party fail to win seats in the mechanical votes-to 
seats computation and therefore fail to win votes as voters contemplate whether voting for a 
party would amount to wasting a vote. When a party and voters expect a party to compete at 
or near the threshold of representation, that party becomes a reasonable choice for all voters 
to consider and the party has reason to invest resources in contestation for a seat. Otherwise, 
both party and voters will fail to invest and participate in the voter mobilization efforts. In 
this way, the electoral system seems to have eliminated PAB from consideration in any 
electoral contest, with the possible exception of Napo province in 1992 where it won 7.6% of 
the vote. Of the 1,986 votes it won out the province’s nearly 30,000 votes, 839 (42%) came 
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from the capital parish of Tena (one of the provinces 40 parishes), and most of the rest came 
from the canton of the same name.  
Contender Possibilities 
PAB had no possibility of growing into a contender. It lacked access to resources and 
it lacked a national coalition of local political machines.  
Comparative Summary of Party Analyses 
In this section I summarize the findings of the eight party case studies above. Table 
5.22 below summarizes key predictors of the contender trajectory. I argue in this project that 
for a party to become a contender, they must have access to substantial resources, they must 
build a national political machine which often will incorporate local political machines, and 
they must be unfettered by programmatic positions derived from relationships with external 
social or economic organizations. From among these eight parties, only PRIAN and ID meet 
all the conditions.  
Several new parties in the system have branded themselves as principled 
programmatic parties, including FRA, ID, Pachakutik, PD, and MCNP. However, only 
Pachakutik is constrained to adhering strictly to its rhetoric by pressure from an organized 
social organization, CONAIE. It is this constraint that prohibits Pachakutik’s electoral 
growth. As I argue above, lower social and economic groups are not organized into large and 
formally organized organizations with national reach, and CONAIE is no exception. With no 
organization in any provinces of the coastal region, and with ideological principles which 
prevent it from making alternative and non-programmatic appeals in that area, the party will 
never grow to be a strong contender in the national political arena without making strategic 
adaptations.  
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A new party must gain access to substantial discretionary party building resources. 
Given the nature of the Ecuadorian state described earlier, ID was able to use municipal, 
provincial, and national office to secure discretionary resources. PRIAN was able to deploy 
the enormous personal fortune of its founder, Alvaro Noboa. None of the other parties had or 
gained access to those resources, though Pachakutik inherited the substantial human 
resources from its allied social organization. With the exception of MCNP and Pachakutik, 
the other four parties—FRA, PUR, PD, and PAB—all attempted to build networks of local 
machines. In effect, they attempted to mimic the strategy that ID and PRE, another 
contender, followed in Ecuador. For various reasons, they all failed to build a coordinated 
and sustained coalition. FRA and PD both formed as schisms of the old Liberal Party and 
attempted to claim some of the same ideological ground as ID, which had the same origin. 
But ID, having formed earlier than both, may have secured the local alliances and thus 
prevented any consolidation of FRA and PD, who would have appealed to similar local 
leaders. This is not to say that the linkages that any of these three parties sought were 
programmatic in the deeply organizationally articulated sense, but only that these three 
parties, coming from the same tradition, had certain natural potential allies who they targeted. 
Similarly, both PUR and PAB attempted relatively late in the electoral game to build 
networks of local politicians amongst their natural constituencies, the conservatives whose 
lineage lies with the old PCE and the populists whose lineage lies with the old CFP, 
respectively. See Appendix 4. Those natural allies were already incorporated into other 
newly formed parties. Within the conservative lineage the PSC was dominant and with the 
populist lineage the PRE was dominant. PRIAN seems to have secured support from within 
both of these general tendencies, but it entered with instant credibility, a preexisting network, 
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and substantial leverage against local party leaders by virtue of the Noboa Group’s business 
enterprises. 
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Table 5.22:  
 Summary of Key Predictors of Contender Parties 
    
Substantial Party 
Building Resources 
Ideological 
Constraints Network 
First 
Mover 
Contenders ID 
Yes-local and 
provincial government No National 1979 
  PRIAN Yes-personal fortune No National 2002 
Flat Pachakutik Yes-social movement Yes Regional 1996 
  FRA (1984-1988) No No Provincial 1984 
  FRA (1990-2002) No No Provincial 1984 
Flash PUR No No National 1992 
  PD No No Regional 1984 
Flop PAB No No None 1992 
  MCNP No No None 1996 
 
 
Linkage Strategy 
The attributes of a contender party map onto the machine strategy because they 
reflect the organizational articulation of a successfully deployed political machine. This 
conclusion is consistent with Pachano (2006) who notes, “Both large and small parties, 
whether rooted in a certain sector or a certain ideology, must adapt to the provincial or local 
orientation of politics” (p. 112).  Table 5.23 below summarizes the linkage strategies 
deployed by the eight parties of the case study. The evidence of this analysis supports the 
assertion that in order for a party to reach national prominence as a “contender,” it must 
adopt a machine party strategy and build an organization oriented towards that end.  
From a normative perspective, this is indeed bad news for the future of representative 
democracy in Ecuador. It suggests that, at least through the medium term or until Ecuador 
passes through fundamental social and/or economic transformations that generate organized 
groups capable of collective action in support of broad club goods—as I describe them in 
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Chapter IV—new party actors which conform to the highest ideals of democratic theory will 
not be among the main actors in politics and governance.  
Table 5.23: 
Summary of Primary and Secondary Linkage Strategies 
    
Personalist 
Strategy 
Machine 
Strategy 
Vote-Buying 
Strategy 
Programmatic 
Strategy 
Contenders ID No Strong Likely Weak 
  PRIAN Weak Strong Likely No 
Flat Pachakutik No No Unlikely Strong 
  FRA (1984-1988) Strong Weak Unlikely Weak 
  FRA (1990-2002) Strong Weak Likely No 
Flash PUR Strong Weak Likely Weak 
  PD Weak Strong Likely Weak 
Flop PAB Strong Weak Unlikely No 
  MCNP Strong Weak Unlikely No 
 
Electoral Institutions 
Several patterns are visible in the analyses of the effect of electoral institutions on 
performance trajectories. First, in districts with a low magnitude it is clear that all parties 
make decisions about whether to compete or not. The psychological and mechanical effects 
of district magnitude encourage these choices. Before 1996, because party registration laws 
required that parties register to compete in at least half the districts include the three largest 
of Guayas, Pichincha and Manabi, we often see very low vote shares in at least some of these 
small districts. This suggests that a party registered but failed to exert effort. Nevertheless, 
comparisons within a district show that it is rare that results defy the expectation that in 
single member districts we find no more than two or three competitive parties and in two 
member districts we find no more than three or four competitive parties. The analysis of 
Pastaza district earlier in this chapter, for example, confirmed this result.  
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Small district size combines with the overall fragmentation of the party system, the 
lack of nationalized parties and the tendency towards machine party-voter linkages (mediated 
by local brokers) to create surprising opportunities for parties in these mostly peripheral 
provinces. These provinces were not usually programmatically allied with any particular 
party and had a tendency to shift allegiance between parties from election to election. This is 
in contrast to a political system with nationalized parties and low average district magnitude 
where the same few political parties will be competitive in each district and overall. Small 
district magnitude is usually associated with a restricted population of performance 
trajectories, but Ecuador reveals that this outcome is contingent upon the existence of a 
nationalized party system. Where party systems are highly localized, it appears that even 
though the district-level dynamics of competition will be consistent with Duverger’s Law, 
overall the party system can be allow for a diversity of performance trajectories as parties 
compete for the loyalty of local brokers who can deliver the votes in local constituencies. The 
electoral system is not a great obstacle to any particular trajectory group since a party can 
compete and win in one or very few districts with low magnitude, and these results will only 
have a very small effect on nationally aggregated election results. In other words, in this 
configuration we can expect to see not only “contender” and “flop” trajectories, but also the 
“flat” and “flash” trajectories which would normally be culled in systems with many small 
district.. In Ecuador, this situation was especially the case beginning in 1996 when parties 
were no longer required to register in multiple provinces in order to compete at all. 
Second, the three large districts of Guayas, Pichincha and Manabi offered 
opportunities for parties to compete for a seat even with a small share of the vote. A party 
with even a small source of resources would be able to woo support from a group a voters 
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sufficient to win a seat. The FRA’s Fabian Alarcón, for example, used his position within the 
municipality of Quito and later from within the national legislature to secure support from a 
few parishes in Pichincha and enable a relatively long political career. 
There was one surprising outcome which resulted from the electoral system. Until 
about 1996 there were incentives for politicians across the country to cohere into a coalition. 
These were institutional incentives rather than programmatic ones. So, for example, above 
we saw that the requirement that parties register in at least half the districts served as an 
impediment (though not a large one) for new parties to enter. This led potential new entrants 
to enter via an existing party in either an enduring alliance or by taking over a small party 
which had not yet lost its registration with the electoral authorities. The indirect consequence 
of this incentive on electoral trajectories was a higher vote share for some parties, and 
especially for the contenders, as they allied with local politicians in the peripheral provinces. 
Also, in several cases it led to the appearance of a prolonged life (a “flat” trajectory) for some 
smaller parties that might otherwise have disappeared. We saw this in the case of the FRA 
and I indicated that had these laws not existed, FRA would likely have been classified as two 
instances of “flash” and/or “flop” parties rather than a single instance of a “flat” party. When 
electoral laws changed beginning in 1996, major parties of the two urban centers (Quito in 
Pichincha province and Guayaquil in Guayas province) lost control of brokers from the 
periphery and suffered an overall decline in their trajectory, though this occurred mostly 
beyond the first five elections I analyze in this project. Also, party’s of the “flat” type became 
more purely populated by those with programmatic linkages with the electorate. Pragmatic 
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politicians like Fabian Alarcón would no longer have an incentive to hijack a fledgling party 
and instead could start an independent political movement.85  
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 The incidence of “flop” parties greatly increased at this time. This suggests that entry rules have an effect on 
the entry decision, which is a different issue from the one I study here.  
  
 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
Summary of Main Findings 
Most broadly, this project seeks first to model the relevant variation in new party 
performance and second to explain that performance in political arenas where party 
competition is volatile and weakly formally institutionalized. Many of the literatures on 
parties and party systems arose from the study of advanced democracies, and the study of 
new party performance is no exception. It is common among scholars of Latin America and 
the rest of the developing world to observe that the literatures which formed to explain the 
advanced party systems do not always travel well (Levistsky 2003, Morgenstern and Nacif 
2002, Huber, Mustillo and Stephens under review). This observation justifies theoretical 
modifications to the existing models or the development of new models in order to extend 
our ability to explain outcomes of important political phenomena. In the treatment of parties 
and party systems, party system instability has often been the reason extant explanations 
don’t work well. We have many indicators to measure variation on the levels of stability in 
parties and party systems. For example, volatility, fragmentation, and institutionalization are 
just a few of the concepts which enable us to identify the variation in stability across regions 
and between countries or parties within a region.  
In Chapter II, I used measures of institutionalization and representation to show the 
degree of variation in party and system stability among Latin American countries. On the one 
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hand, scholars of the developing world have made great progress in our ability to simply 
identify and measure this variation. We have established, for example, some particular ways 
in which Latin America differs from European party systems. However, the state of 
knowledge with respect to explaining this variation or with respect to explaining particular 
phenomena in a different range of these measures—and especially lower in the range—
remains incomplete and generally less sophisticated than the state of knowledge in the 
developed contexts. We seem to know much more about Europe than Latin America, and 
about Chile than Ecuador.  
One of the motives for this project has been the lack of attention to parties and party 
systems which appear at the low end of the scale of our measures of institutionalization and 
representation. For example, a country like Ecuador has often been identified for what it is 
not. Ecuador is not institutionalized, but “inchoate;” its parties lack elite-mass congruence in 
political beliefs; its party system is not stable, but fluid and its voters are not loyal, but 
“floating.” Yet it must be the case that for all or most questions which are important in stable 
systems—What explains party birth and death? What structures party competition? How is 
policy made? What enables parties to cohere? How are voters and parties linked?—they are 
important in unstable systems, and these systems must operate under some logic, if not the 
same logic of stable systems. Some of the most exciting and innovative work in Latin 
American politics is designed to formulate theory which specifies the logic under which 
these systems operate. It may be that Ecuador’s party system is only weakly 
programmatically structured, but how does personalism and clientelism structure party 
competition? It may be that its parties are barely formally institutionalized, but are there 
ways in which they might be informally institutionalized? In this project, I look at one 
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particular attribute of party systems—new party performance—and develop a model to 
explain it for systems at the low range of representation and formal party system 
institutionalization, where extant models seem to fail. 
Chapter II was motivated by the question: Is there a diversity in new party 
performance that is wider than the tendency of political scientists to classify new parties as 
either successful or failed? My expectation was that in weakly institutionalized systems and 
where parties perform their representative function poorly, there is wider variation. I noted 
that scholars of an earlier day and in another context had documented the observation and 
given it some theoretical consideration—namely, Converse and Dupeux (1962) had 
identified “flash” parties during the French 4th Republic—despite the fact that the literature 
otherwise mostly set aside this episode as anomalous.  
I went on to use latent trajectory modeling to show that in fact there are five 
distinctive performance trajectories for new parties: there are “flop,” “flat,” “flash,” 
“contender,” and “explosive” types. Some of these types conform to our notions of the 
dichotomous success v. failure. For example, “flop” parties are clearly failures and the 
“contender” and “explosive” types are clearly successful. Nevertheless, two of these 
groups—“flat” and “flash”—are ambiguous. Depending upon how the analyst defines 
success, these parties could fall into either category. Furthermore, there is a clear substantive 
difference between “contender” parties which enter with moderate levels of support and 
slowly grow and “explosive” parties which enter with extremely high levels of support and 
quickly consolidate their level of voter support. Rather than lumping this diversity into two 
groups, there are theoretically sensible reasons to retain the distinctions. 
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I was interested in evaluating whether there is, in fact, a distinction between the 
variation we observe in institutionalized party systems and in poorly institutionalized party 
systems. Therefore, I included cases throughout the range of the institutionalization index. 
Chile is highly institutionalized, Venezuela has historically been treated as highly 
institutionalized (from the 1958 transition through the 1980s) but recently has declined, and 
Bolivia and Ecuador are poorly institutionalized. I found that in the institutionalized case of 
Chile, there are parties of only two types: “contenders” and “flops.” This suggests that under 
the domain restriction of institutionalized and programmatically representative cases, it is 
sufficient to dichotomize new party performance into success and failure. That is, the 
practice of dichotomizing into success and failure in advanced democracies may not be 
problematic; furthermore, it may not be problematic to export that approach to a country like 
Chile which resembles the general tendency of an advanced industrial party system. 
However, the other cases were populated with parties of either four or all five of the 
trajectory types. This confirms that the dichotomous classification of new parties into success 
and failure is not sufficient for the study of new party performance in poorly institutionalized 
party systems.  Bolivia has parties of all five types, Ecuador has parties of all but the 
“explosive” type, and Venezuela has parties of all but the “contender” type. The intermittent 
appearance of the “explosive” type and its extremely rare occurrence seems to suggest that it 
deserves special treatment, though I set this issue aside for this project.  
As a final step in Chapter II, I use the estimates of the model and the observed vote 
shares of the 297 parties in the analysis to classify each party into one of the five groups. The 
overwhelming majority of the parties are “flops.” This distribution, however, is not troubling 
because the estimation technique I use here is specifically designed for populations that are 
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discretely—rather than normally or continuously—distributed. Nearly all parties are 
classified into one of the categories with an extremely high probability. Furthermore, when I 
encounter difficulty in classifying a party, it is always because the party has only been 
observed for less than five elections. Increasing the number of observations will always 
improve our ability to classify a party.  
The approach of Chapter II advances work on new party performance in several 
ways. First, it uses a statistical technique—called both semi-parametric mixture models or 
latent trajectory models—specifically designed for longitudinal data we assume is discretely 
distributed. The technique fits the data and the research question. Second and related, the 
technique generates categories and classifies cases with rigorous and testable criteria, 
including an estimate of the error in the shape parameters and a level of confidence in the 
classifications of parties into groups. This represents an improvement over the conventional 
approach whereby scholars take the set of new parties and devise ad hoc criteria to sort them 
into successful and failed parties. Third, it incorporates all new parties into the analysis. 
Nearly all previous studies, with one notable exception being Hug (2001), study new party 
performance with a research design that looks either at a single party, a single party family, 
or a single national context. A generalized look across all parties is particularly well advised 
when party competition is not structured by programmatic politics. In such cases, the 
determinants of success and failure are likely to be independent of the particular bundle of 
issues unique to a country or a party family. For example, organizational features of the 
parties themselves, the nature of the relationship between parties and the state or between 
party and voters, or institutionalized rules of party entry and competition will determine 
winners and losers.  
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In Chapter III, I used the classifications of parties in Chapter II as the dependent 
variable and sought to explain a subset of these classifications. Specifically, I sought to 
predict whether a new party would be of the “contender” type rather than one of the other 
types.  
This study is motivated by the observation that poorly institutionalized and 
representative party systems seem to operate under an alternative to the programmatic logic 
of competition. Therefore, I exclude parties from institutionalized party systems. 
Specifically, I exclude the parties from Chile. I could have included the Chilean case and/or 
incorporated other parties from institutionalized and programmatically representative systems 
and tested predictors by using a series of interaction terms. In such a research design, I would 
expect the interaction term to be significant. That is, certain predictors would function in 
institutionalized and programmatic contexts but not in the others, while other predictors 
would function in the latter but not in the former. However, with my relatively small sample, 
this approach would be difficult to sustain. Instead, I test a model using only the cases which 
conform to the non-programmatic conditions.  
In order to do so, I gathered data on variables that have been conventionally used to 
predict party performance. These variables came from various schools of thought, but shared 
the assumption that party competition is programmatic. Specifically, I tested for the impact 
of predictors derived from the spatial model of competition and from social structural 
explanations. Also, I tested for the effect of an institutional variable—district magnitude—
and for two economic control variables. The effect of the institutional environment is not 
hypothesized to be conditional upon the nature of party competition, and I would expect an 
effect whether or not party competition is institutionalized and representation is 
 228 
programmatic. Additionally, I incorporated some gross measurements of variables that might 
predict party performance in an environment of non-programmatic party competition. I called 
these variables “organizational” variables because they are attributes of a party and the way it 
which it links with voters across the country and secures access to government. They are 
neutral with respect to a party’s program.  
This analysis of Chapter III forms the large-N stage of a model building nested 
research design. Party is the unit of analysis and I use the party classifications of Chapter III 
as the dependent variable. I test the effects of the predictors with a multinomial logit model. 
The analysis led to the conclusion that the theoretical schools which operate under the 
assumptions of programmatic party competition do not explain the distinction between 
“contender” parties and any of the other types.  
The effect of district magnitude was significant, but substantively rather trivial. That 
is, as district magnitude increases, new parties are significantly more likely to be of the 
“flop” sort than of the “contender” sort. The converse would also be true: when district 
magnitude decreases, new parties are more likely to be contenders than flops. This finding 
suggests that voters behave strategically when districts are small. In that circumstance, they 
don’t want to waste their vote on a small party. Despite this conclusion, we don’t get any 
traction from this feature of the institutional environment in distinguishing between 
contenders and any of the other types of parties. That is, we must draw upon other attributes 
of the system or of the parties themselves in order to distinguish between the substantively 
interesting alternatives. Additionally, one of the control variables was significant. Under 
highly inflationary conditions, new parties that enter are more likely to be of the “contender” 
type rather than of the “flat” or “flash” types.  
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The set of variables which I use to test the impact of party organization yield partly 
supportive results. Alone, they would not satisfy many readers, but recall that the function of 
this large-N analysis in a nested research design is mostly exploratory and designed to 
determine whether more careful theory development is justified. The variables are derived 
from hypotheses mostly adapted from the work on the strategic adaptation of existing parties 
and on work related to clientelism. The results are not conclusive—mostly because the 
availability of data at the level of parties and organizations for all but major parties is 
sparse—but they are sufficient to justify the conclusion that this line of argument deserves 
more careful theoretical development and analytic attention. Therefore, in Chapters IV and 
V, I develop these features of the project.  
Chapter III’s results were sufficient to warrant a theory-building effort designed to 
formulate an alternative to conventional predictors of new party performance which are 
rooted in programmatic patterns of party competition. Specifically, I sought a general 
theoretical framework that would accommodate the diversity of ways in which parties are 
linked with voters, including programmatic linkage, but not limited to it. Select authors in 
diverse literatures—especially the ones on the strategic adaptation of parties, on non-
programmatic linkages, and in the spatial tradition—have looked to the calculus of voting 
model to construct theories which concern the relationship of voters to parties and the 
specific behavior of parties. At first glance, this is a rather peculiar way to use the calculus of 
voting model because the model is primarily concerned with explaining a voter’s choice of 
whether or not to vote; it does not address the voter’s partisan vote choice and it does not 
address the behavior of parties. Yet, at the heart of the model is the existence of a collective 
action problem among the electorate. That is, given the various incentives and costs that a 
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voter confronts as election day approaches, the voter is unlikely to vote even if they have a 
strong partisan preference. Given a collective action problem, one might wonder whether 
and/or which solutions exist to solve it. Aldrich (1995) addresses this specific question and 
proposes that political parties can function to solve a voter’s collective action problem. They 
do so by operating on the various cost and benefit elements that a voter takes into 
consideration in the course of deciding whether or not to vote. In the course of doing so, the 
party is not only concerned with the narrow issue of getting voters to the polls, but also with 
having voters cast a ballot for them. Therefore, they will attempt to operate on the voter’s 
decision making process in a way that rigs the outcome to their advantage. They do so, for 
example, by simplifying the information burden for voters, who are “information misers” 
attempting to make a vote choice with as little information as possible.86 Alternatively, they 
might do so by rewarding voters who incur the cost of getting to the polls with a material 
payoff or punishing voters who fail to go to the polls. In sum, if parties function as a solution 
to the voter’s collective action problem, and they will adopt diverse strategies to solve the 
problem, then the terms in the calculus of voting model are a very useful heuristic for 
thinking about the alternative strategies a party will use to get voters to the poll and casting a 
ballot in their favor. 
In Chapter IV, I use the terms of the model to identify four distinctive party linkage 
strategies—the programmatic linkage, the personalistic linkage, the machine linkage and the 
vote-buying linkage. The strategies are distinguished by which term they operate on and by 
the way in which they operate on the term. The vote-buying strategy is the simplest, and I 
conceive of it very narrowly. I define vote-buying as an election day activity (or very nearly 
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 Kitschelt is fond of referring to voters in the way. 
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so) designed to offset the cost of voting by providing a payoff and/or service. The other three 
strategies operate on the cost of voting term also, but through three distinct ways of altering 
the complex information environment. Furthermore, each of the three tackle the other two 
terms of the equation—the duty term and the benefit term—distinctly in the extent to which 
they pledge to deliver broad or narrow club goods, in the types of goods they pledge, and in 
the nature of the allegiance they attempt to create between the party and the voter. The first 
main conclusion of Chapter IV is that parties, as collective action solutions, will adopt one or 
more of the four strategies to secure a vote.  
The next task of the chapter was to show that the four distinctive strategies are 
compatible with distinctive organizational attributes. If a party aims to secure votes with a 
vote-buying strategy it will build a different sort of organization than a party which aims to 
secure votes with a programmatic, machine or personalist strategy. The party as organization 
will be differently oriented to accomplishing many tasks including developing and promoting 
its reputation, relating to voters inside of and outside of election seasons, selecting and 
retaining the loyalty of core constituencies, and operating while in government or opposition.  
The final goal of Chapter IV was to hypothesize about how each organizational 
articulated linkage strategy would perform in a party system which is not well 
institutionalized and poorly representative. I conclude that the machine strategy will have 
substantial advantages for medium-term electoral success in such a party system over the 
programmatic strategy. I predict that programmatically oriented parties will endure, but with 
low levels of electoral support. The vote-buying and personalist strategies are often 
supplemental strategies rather than primary strategies. Nevertheless, when party leaders build 
exclusively personalist organizations, we would expect them to be highly volatile. That is, 
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when they succeed initially, they have organizational attributes that make them vulnerable to 
eventual extinction unless they adapt with alternative strategies. 
As a nested research design, the final stage of this analysis is to test and refine the 
theoretical expectations I develop in Chapter IV in a small-N qualitative context. I do so in 
Chapter V, which is a comparative analysis of eight new parties that have emerged in 
Ecuador since its transition to democracy in 1978.  
 
 
An Agenda for Future Research 
One of the principle findings of this study is that there exists in the population of new 
parties a distinctive group which follows what I have called an “explosive” performance 
trajectory. I set aside treatment of this group for several reasons. First, it appears to be 
relatively new, with the first case only appearing in the late 1990s. Second, it is estimated to 
be extremely rare, at only 1% of the population. In this sample, there are only three cases. 
Finally—and not unrelated to the first two issues—it lies beyond the scope of my principle 
purpose, which is to understand what distinguishes conventionally successful parties from the 
other trajectories. Explosive parties seem to be a special and unconventional case of success, 
and in any case they don’t appear in Ecuador where I conducted the in depth qualitative 
comparisons. Explosive parties, nevertheless, raise fascinating questions about party 
emergence and consolidation.  
Several issue deserve further consideration. First, it would be useful to confirm their 
low frequency and recent vintage on a larger sample. Additionally, in the case of a rare event, 
larger samples are needed to develop explanatory models. Second, explosive parties in this 
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sample have emerged only at times when contender parties were not also emerging. The fact 
that explosive and contender parties do not emerge concurrently supports the claim that they 
are qualitatively distinctive types. Third, the emergence of explosive parties seems related to 
the collapse of party systems. On the one hand, explosive parties are distinctive for their very 
high intercept. Therefore, careful treatment of this trajectory must explain why so many 
voters suddenly change their preferences to a single newcomer. Volatility is not unusual in 
many countries of the developing world, but volatility of this scale for a single party at a 
single point in time is rare. Additionally, explosive parties are distinctive because repeated 
measurements of their vote share at the second and subsequent elections indicate a quick 
consolidation of voter support. It may be necessary to explain this feature with a different 
line of reasoning than we find either in conventional explanations of party success or in the 
organizations-based explanation I develop in this project. In Venezuela, immediately 
following the first victory of Hugo Chavez’ MVR, the party embarked on a successful 
project of major reform of the state, including many efforts of dubious constitutional 
legitimacy. It is likely that the party of former Peruvian president Alberto Fujimori would 
have also been classified as an explosive party. Like Chavez, Fujimori consolidated control 
through unconstitutional means. In Bolivia, where the other two cases of “explosive” parties 
have appeared, there is an effort underway by one of the explosive parties, Evo Morales’ 
MAS, to reform the state. It may be the case that the future of MAS will depend upon his 
ability to successfully exert control over the state. Likewise, the other party, PODEMOS, is 
the voice of the opposition and its future may depend upon similar factors. Unlike MAS, 
PODEMOS has only been observed at one time point. It’s vote gain was so high that it was 
classified as an explosive party with near certainly, but this classification has been made 
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without consideration of a slope and is therefore sensitive to what happens in the next 
election. 
This study uses a generalized sample of parties across many countries and party 
families. As I argue above, such an approach is justifiable in cases where party competition is 
not programmatic. However, in Chapter III in the course of testing whether or not predictions 
derived from models of programmatic competition offer predictive power, I confronted the 
fact that there is no satisfactory way to measure these features on generalized samples and in 
a large-N analysis. One reason for this is that the study of party politics in advanced party 
systems often and for good reason focuses on a single party family or country; therefore, they 
can deploy measures of competition which are distinctive to that party family. For example, 
Kitschelt (1988) can use the strength of opposition to nuclear power as a proxy for the 
salience of left-libertarianism. However, were one to incorporate, for example, radical right 
parties and left libertarian parties into the same analysis, one would need to find a single 
indicator that could indicate salience and strength of issues on different axes. In this study, I 
used the Cross National Time Series dataset to code a variable for different forms of social 
protest under the assumption that parties will emerge when demand for new issue 
representation is high. But if programmatic politics is operating, more precision is necessary 
to pick up its presence. Particular demands will generate particular types of parties, and 
neither my approach, nor Hug’s (2001), nor Harmel and Robertson’s (1985) will allow for 
this type of precision. The work that is now becoming possible with cross-national 
comparative expert, elite and mass surveys—for example, by Kitschelt and his associates at 
Duke, by Alcántara and his associates at Salamanca, and the LAPOP and Latínbaromter 
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surveys, respectively—may enable us to begin devising measures up to this task, but to date I 
have not found an approach, and devising one was beyond the scope of this project. 
In the course of conducting this research, I concluded that it would be helpful for the 
discipline to develop formal measurement instruments which allow a researcher to evaluate a 
party on a given attribute with relative ease. There are many conceptual schema according to 
which we could conceivably classify a party, yet on the whole there is an absence of easily 
deployable criteria for doing so. For example, upon arriving in Ecuador, it would have been 
helpful if I had been able to classify all the new parties with respect to “informal 
institutionalization,” a concept developed by Freidenberg and Levitsky.  The authors 
“conceptualize and operationalize” the concept and purport to “offer indicators of formality 
and informality in eight areas of party life” (forthcoming). Yet, the process by which they 
proceed is theoretically rather than empirically driven, it lacks the use of conventional 
techniques for testing the reliability and validating of their indicators, and it lacks a simple 
and reproducible formal measurement instrument for use by other scholars.  
In thinking about an alternative approach, it is helpful to consider the discipline of 
psychology and its use of psychometric instruments for measuring and quantifying 
psychological phenomena. Often these phenomena are latent traits, such as antisocial 
behavior, which are not directly observable. They must be inferred by observing some 
behavior that is observable. In that field, scholars commonly adopt the following procedure: 
1) identify a theoretically relevant psychological phenomena; 2) develop and validate an 
instrument for measuring the presence or level of the condition or disorder in a process that 
may, for example, use principle components analysis or factor analysis to translate a large 
number of observable items into the underlying latent trait; 3) publish the instrument in a 
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scholarly journal for use by other researchers. For example, the Developmental Behavioral 
Checklist is an instrument to assess behavioral and emotional disturbance in children and 
adolescents with mental retardation (Einfelt and Tonge 1995).87  After undergoing the 
conventional scholarly review process, this instrument in now available for use in either 
clinical settings or in the course of conducting other research in which the psychological 
phenomena will enter the analysis as either dependent or independent variable. In all 
subsequent use, the instrument does not need to be defended and the analyst need not use a 
representative sample. In fact, it can be used on a single case to show the presence or absence 
of the trait. In this way, the discipline accumulates knowledge.  
There is precedent for the use of formal measurement instruments in the study of 
organizations. Typically, this application takes place in the subfield of organizations in 
sociology or business schools. For example, Li et. al. published an instrument for the study of 
supply chain management in the Journal of Operations Management (2005). For a discussion 
on political science’s use of such instruments, on why we have generally failed to develop 
them, and an argument advocating their use, see Heath and Martin (1997).  
Shifting back to party politics, this discussion suggests an alternative to the 
Freidenberg and Levitsky approach. Borrowing the model of the Developmental Behavioral 
Checklist, one would: 1) develop a list of observable items that the analyst, via the literature, 
believes are related to formality or informality of party organization; 2) gather data on a large 
set of parties for each of these items; 3) use some technique, such factor analysis, to 
determine the underlying factors and identify the best items for measuring them (would this 
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 My use of this particular instrument is for expository purposes and otherwise completely arbitrary. I don’t 
know if it has been widely accepted in the field or whether or not it has been replaced by a newer instrument 
which takes into account an additional decades worth of research. 
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empirical approach confirm the presence of the eight factors developed by Freidenberg and 
Levitsky?); 4) name the factors and devise a way to compute a score (either by adding items 
up, averaging them, etc.) and devise a way to compute an overall “formal organization” 
score; 5) conduct a reliability and validity test of the instrument. It is important to emphasize 
that an instrument be relatively easy to administer by incorporating items that are precise, 
observable, and easily accessible.  
In sum, parties, as complex organizations, would benefit from the existence of more 
precise and concise ways of measuring them and the discipline would benefit from 
considering the techniques of psychometric theory. This project hypothesizes that the key 
determinant of new party performance are rooted in organizational attributes. In Chapter V, I 
developed qualitative and sometimes ad hoc approaches to identify the dominant and 
supplemental strategies adopted by political parties in Ecuador and to show how they relate 
to each party’s electoral performance. Yet the conclusions would be greatly strengthened 
with a more formalized and empirical approach to the conceptual development of the various 
linkage strategies. 
As a final avenue of further research, this project reveals the need to approach the 
study of parties with detailed and disaggregated data, especially electoral data, constituency 
level party data, and individual level voter data. As a discipline, we lack ready and easy 
access to all three, though efforts are underway to improve that state of affairs. With regard 
to electoral data, I was largely successful in gathering district and sub-district level data 
about all parties, small and large, in Ecuador since 1979, with the exception of 1996. This 
was an enormous task which in the era of such high digital capacity is surprising. Electoral 
and institutional data should be publicly available over all countries throughout their 
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democratic experiences. Furthermore, given their systematic nature, they should be archived 
and organized using advanced relational database techniques which would enable us to 
model the natural and complex relationships that exist between the various types of data. The 
norm is to archive and distribute electoral and institutional data using printed volumes, 
spreadsheets, or html websites, all of which make their acquisition and analysis extremely 
cumbersome. In the course of this project I developed a district level electoral database for 
Chile and Ecuador using relational database techniques and those databases are available at 
my web page or upon request. Additionally, I envision a database of a much larger scope 
both in terms of country and election coverage and in terms of the data elements in could 
include.  
With regard to the constituency level party data and individual level voter data, a 
shortcoming of this project is that it was build upon only very little constituency level data 
and not at all upon indicators derived from voters and their opinions about issues and 
politicians. This yielded many substantive obstacles, especially in the case study of Ecuador. 
I interviewed early party leaders and candidates in order to study how parties built their 
organizations and linked with voters. This approach was feasible and up to the task of 
understanding the goals and strategies of party leaders from past decades. However, there are 
at least two shortcomings to this approach. First, I found that many politicians, and especially 
the ones from successful parties, to be biased or misleading with respect to the goals and 
strategies of the party. There was a tendency, for example, to speak nobly about the party’s 
program and internal democratic practices. Second, these data are insufficient to the extent 
that what central leaders intend to do and what they actually do may be different. This is 
especially the case when party systems are localized and party leaders from the center may 
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not even be aware of what the party does at the local level. The party may not operate at the 
local level in the same way that it operates at the elite level. In Ecuador, it is common to 
think of parties as being political machines run by party bosses. My research revealed, 
however, that the machine environment is far more complex than this. There are weak and 
shifting relationships between some local bosses and party leaders at the center, as Figure 
5.3, which shows party support in Pastaza Province, suggests. This suggests that an 
additional cause of a party’s electoral success may be the way in which parties solve other 
collective actions problems besides the voter’s calculus of voting, and in particular the 
politician’s social choice and ambition problems (Aldrich, 1995). 
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APPENDIX 1. EXCLUDED ONE-DISTRICT PARTIES 
Table A1.1: Profile of Excluded One-District Parties 
One-District Parties 
Country Count 
Max 
Vote 
Share 
Mean 
Vote 
Share Count VS >1%  
Bolivia 0 na na na
Chile 2 0.15 0.045 0
Ecuador 73 3.48 0.068 1
Venezuela 574 2.47 0.022 4
 
Table A1.2: Profile of Excluded One-District Parties, by Election* 
Country Election 
Count of 
Parties 
Combined Vote 
Precentage 
Mean Vote 
Percentage 
Chile 1989 1 0.15% 0.15%
Chile 1993 2 0.03% 0.02%
Ecuador 1996 22 5.08% 0.23%
Ecuador 1998 24 1.67% 0.07%
Ecuador 2002 29 1.58% 0.05%
Venezuela 1968 9 0.31% 0.03%
Venezuela 1973 8 0.13% 0.02%
Venezuela 1983 11 0.09% 0.01%
Venezuela 1988 26 0.42% 0.02%
Venezuela 1993 93 1.10% 0.01%
Venezuela 1998 206 4.29% 0.02%
Venezuela 2000 117 7.87% 0.07%
Venezuela 2005 230 8.86% 0.04%
*If an election is not listed, there were no one-district parties 
 
 
Table A1.3: Time Until Death of 1-District Parties* 
# of Elections Before Death # of Parties 
1 386
2 56
3 4
4 1
5 0
*202 parties are still competing, so we haven't yet 
observed their death. All are 3 cycles old or less. 
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APPENDIX 2. VOTE PERCENTAGE, BY PARTY, SORTED BY COUNTRY AND 
MODAL TRAJECTORY 
Vote Percentage in Election... 
Country Party 
Modal 
Trajectory 
Year of 
Election 1 1 2 3 4 5 
Bolivia MAS Explosive 2002 20.94 53.74    
Bolivia PODEMOS Explosive 2005 28.59     
Bolivia MIR Contender 1985 10.17 21.88 16.77 16.32 0.00
Bolivia UN Flat 2005 7.80     
Bolivia CONDEPA Flash 1989 12.22 14.27 17.16 0.37 0.00
Bolivia NFR Flash 2002 20.91 0.68    
Bolivia UCS Flash 1993 13.74 16.11 5.51 0.00  
Bolivia ACP Flop 1985 0.88 0.00    
Bolivia ARBOL Flop 1993 1.87 0.00    
Bolivia ARENA Flop 1985 0.58 0.00    
Bolivia ASD Flop 1993 1.84 0.00    
Bolivia AUR Flop 1985 0.64 0.00    
Bolivia EJE Flop 1993 1.09 0.84 0.00   
Bolivia FNP Flop 1985 0.67 0.00    
Bolivia FPU Flop 1985 2.54 0.00    
Bolivia FREPAB Flop 2005 0.30     
Bolivia FULKA Flop 1989 1.17 0.00    
Bolivia IU Flop 1985 0.73 8.10 0.97 3.71 0.00
Bolivia MBL Flop 1993 5.35 3.09 0.00   
Bolivia MCC Flop 2002 0.63 0.00    
Bolivia MFD Flop 1993 0.38 0.00    
Bolivia MIN Flop 1989 0.69 0.00    
Bolivia MIP Flop 2002 6.09 2.16    
Bolivia MKN Flop 1993 0.75 0.00    
Bolivia MNRI Flop 1985 5.53 0.00    
Bolivia MNRI-1 Flop 1985 0.81 0.00    
Bolivia MNRV Flop 1985 5.01 0.00    
Bolivia MRTK Flop 1985 0.87 0.00    
Bolivia MRTKL Flop 1985 2.22 1.63 0.00   
Bolivia PDB Flop 1997 0.48 0.00    
Bolivia PDC Flop 1985 1.62 0.00    
Bolivia PLJ Flop 2002 2.72 0.00    
Bolivia POR Flop 1985 0.92 0.00    
Bolivia USTB Flop 2005 0.26     
Bolivia VR-9 Flop 1993 1.28 0.00    
Bolivia VSB Flop 1997 1.39 0.00    
Chile PPD Contender 1989 11.45 11.84 12.55 12.73 15.42
Chile PSCH Contender 1993 11.93 11.05 10.00 10.05  
Chile RN Contender 1989 18.28 16.31 16.77 13.77 14.12
Chile UDI Contender 1989 9.42 12.11 14.45 25.18 22.36
Chile ANI Flop 2005 0.31     
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Chile LV Flop 1989 0.22 0.00    
Chile NAP Flop 1997 0.15 0.00    
Chile PAIS Flop 1989 4.38 0.00    
Chile PAN Flop 1989 0.85 0.00    
Chile PAR Flop 2005 0.40     
Chile PDR Flop 1989 0.42 0.00    
Chile PH Flop 1989 0.77 1.01 2.91 1.13 1.56
Chile PL (1989) Flop 1989 0.69 0.00    
Chile PL (2001) Flop 2001 0.06 0.00    
Chile PRSD Flop 1989 0.02 0.00    
Chile PSD Flop 1993 0.79 0.00    
Chile PSUR Flop 1989 0.70 0.20 0.36 0.00  
Chile UCC Flop 1993 3.21 1.19 0.00   
Ecuador ID Contender 1979 14.80 20.01 14.48 22.62 13.04
Ecuador PRE Contender 1984 5.06 9.04 16.33 14.81 16.03
Ecuador PRIAN Contender 2002 13.84     
Ecuador AN Flat 1984 8.81 5.65 3.94 4.19 3.59
Ecuador DP-UDC Flat 1984 7.32 9.37 10.88 10.05 7.22
Ecuador MPD Flat 1979 4.92 6.53 7.31 5.85 4.97
Ecuador MUPP-NP Flat 1996 7.13 2.14 4.22   
Ecuador PD Flash 1984 8.03 4.65 1.99 0.00  
Ecuador PUR Flash 1992 14.76 3.90 0.00   
Ecuador MCNP Flop 1996 0.25 4.95 0.77   
Ecuador META Flop 2002 0.75     
Ecuador MIAJ Flop 1998 0.06 0.42    
Ecuador MIGN Flop 1998 1.67 0.00    
Ecuador MIHE Flop 1998 0.11 0.00    
Ecuador MIUN Flop 1998 0.26 0.00    
Ecuador MPS Flop 2002 2.05     
Ecuador PAB Flop 1992 0.45 0.08 0.00   
Ecuador PCD Flop 1984 2.70 2.30 1.16 0.88 0.46
Ecuador PDP Flop 1988 0.42 0.99 0.08 0.00  
Ecuador PL Flop 1990 1.78 0.99 0.88 0.85 1.87
Ecuador PSP Flop 2002 3.95     
Ecuador TSI Flop 2002 1.13     
Ecuador UPL Flop 1994 0.57 0.50 0.58 0.00  
Venezuela MVR Explosive 1998 20.01 44.38 55.08   
Venezuela LCR Flat 1978 0.24 0.54 1.65 20.68 2.93
Venezuela MAS Flat 1973 5.29 6.16 5.75 10.15 10.81
Venezuela PPT Flat 1998 3.40 2.27 5.81   
Venezuela CCN(1) Flash 1968 10.96 4.31 0.21 0.00  
Venezuela CONVERGENCIA Flash 1993 13.84 2.51 1.07 0.00  
Venezuela FDP(1) Flash 1963 9.58 5.31 1.25 0.26 0.00
Venezuela FND(1) Flash 1963 13.33 2.57 0.26 0.00  
Venezuela MEP Flash 1968 12.94 4.96 2.22 1.97 1.61
Venezuela PODEMOS Flash 2005 8.16     
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Venezuela PRVZL Flash 1998 10.52 6.94 0.17   
Venezuela AA Flop 1993 0.02 0.11 0.23   
Venezuela ABP Flop 2000 1.10 0.00    
Venezuela ACTIVE Flop 1998 0.01 0.01 0.02   
Venezuela AFIN Flop 1978 0.00 0.00    
Venezuela AIR Flop 1968 0.25 0.00    
Venezuela ALCINA Flop 1973 0.03 0.00    
Venezuela ALVE(2) Flop 1998 0.01 0.00    
Venezuela AM(1) Flop 1968 0.06 0.00    
Venezuela AMI Flop 1983 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00  
Venezuela AMOR Flop 1988 0.00 0.02 0.00   
Venezuela ANDI Flop 1998 0.01 0.00    
Venezuela ANPRI Flop 1998 0.01 0.00    
Venezuela AP Flop 1993 0.16 0.10 0.00   
Venezuela APERTURA Flop 1998 1.56 0.01 0.00   
Venezuela API(1) Flop 1968 0.51 0.00    
Venezuela API(2) Flop 1988 0.00 0.00    
Venezuela APRO Flop 2000 0.02 0.00    
Venezuela ARPA(1) Flop 1973 0.04 0.00    
Venezuela ARPA(2) Flop 1988 0.00 0.00    
Venezuela ASD Flop 2000 0.07 0.00    
Venezuela BR Flop 2000 0.32 0.08    
Venezuela CADECIDE Flop 2000 0.20 0.01    
Venezuela CC Flop 1978 1.62 0.00    
Venezuela CCN(2) Flop 1988 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.01  
Venezuela CD(2) Flop 1993 0.02 0.01 0.03   
Venezuela CEM Flop 1993 0.08 0.00    
Venezuela CEPAS Flop 1963 0.15 0.00    
Venezuela CIMA(1) Flop 1983 0.29 0.00    
Venezuela CON Flop 1998 0.06 0.01 0.00   
Venezuela CON LA VIDA Flop 1998 0.04 0.00    
Venezuela CONFE Flop 1983 0.07 0.00    
Venezuela CONSTRUCTORES Flop 2000 0.14 0.00    
Venezuela CRV Flop 2005 0.04     
Venezuela DC(1) Flop 1973 0.17 0.00    
Venezuela DC(2) Flop 1993 0.22 0.00    
Venezuela DP(1) Flop 1973 0.01 0.00    
Venezuela DR Flop 1998 0.14 0.00 0.10   
Venezuela EEF 94 Flop 1993 0.01 0.00    
Venezuela EI Flop 1983 0.02 0.00    
Venezuela EL Flop 1998 0.02 0.01 0.11   
Venezuela ENCUENTRO Flop 2000 0.83 0.00    
Venezuela EPAP Flop 1993 0.05 0.00    
Venezuela EPI Flop 1993 0.00 0.00    
Venezuela F1 Flop 1988 1.30 0.28 0.03 0.23 0.00
Venezuela FACTOR E Flop 1993 0.03 0.00    
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Venezuela FACTOR X Flop 2000 0.01 0.00    
Venezuela FAI Flop 1993 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.04  
Venezuela FD Flop 1993 0.05 0.08 0.00   
Venezuela FDP(2) Flop 1993 0.07 0.00    
Venezuela FE Flop 1973 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.00
Venezuela FEI Flop 1968 0.03 0.00    
Venezuela FEVO(1) Flop 1973 0.00 0.00 0.00   
Venezuela FEVO(2) Flop 1988 0.04 0.03 0.00   
Venezuela FID Flop 1988 0.01 0.00    
Venezuela FIN Flop 1983 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.07  
Venezuela FIR Flop 1968 0.06 0.00    
Venezuela FL Flop 2005 0.02     
Venezuela FNP Flop 1988 0.03 0.00    
Venezuela FP Flop 1998 0.11 0.02 0.20   
Venezuela FPI Flop 1993 0.27 0.00    
Venezuela FRD Flop 1998 0.01 0.00 0.06   
Venezuela FRENAMAC Flop 2000 0.01 0.00    
Venezuela FS Flop 1998 0.13 0.00    
Venezuela FUN Flop 1973 0.35 0.25 0.19 0.16 0.20
Venezuela FURE Flop 1978 0.00 0.00    
Venezuela FUTURO SEGURO Flop 1988 0.01 0.00    
Venezuela FVI Flop 2005 0.02     
Venezuela GAR Flop 1978 0.17 0.23 0.00   
Venezuela GE Flop 1993 0.27 0.20 0.11 0.38  
Venezuela GEIJM Flop 1993 0.00 0.00    
Venezuela GEM Flop 1998 0.03 0.00    
Venezuela GENTE-MIRANDA Flop 1998 0.01 0.01    
Venezuela GIRASOL Flop 1993 0.14 0.01 0.00   
Venezuela GOA Flop 1983 0.02 0.01 0.00   
Venezuela IA Flop 1988 0.00 0.01 0.00   
Venezuela ICC(1) Flop 1983 0.97 0.00    
Venezuela ICC(2) Flop 1988 0.05 0.00    
Venezuela ICC(3) Flop 1993 0.02 0.00    
Venezuela ICC(4) Flop 1998 0.09 0.00    
Venezuela IDEAL Flop 1988 0.00 0.02 0.00   
Venezuela INCVF Flop 1998 0.03 0.00 0.00   
Venezuela INICIATIVA Propia Flop 2000 0.05 0.00    
Venezuela IP Flop 1973 0.63 0.00    
Venezuela IPCN Flop 1998 0.16 0.17 0.92   
Venezuela IPDC Flop 1978 0.12 0.00    
Venezuela IPV Flop 1998 0.16 0.00 0.01   
Venezuela IR Flop 1958 0.75 0.00    
Venezuela IRE Flop 1983 0.45 0.27 0.03 0.00  
Venezuela IRENE Flop 1998 1.28 0.05 0.00   
Venezuela IZQUIERDA Flop 2000 0.84 0.05    
Venezuela JUAN BIMBA Flop 2005 0.10     
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Venezuela LA LLAVE Flop 1998 0.01 0.00    
Venezuela LIDER Flop 1988 0.08 0.01 0.00 0.00  
Venezuela LNR (OLVARRIA) Flop 1988 0.35 0.00    
Venezuela LS(1) Flop 1978 0.57 0.91 0.46 0.09 0.00
Venezuela LS(2) Flop 2005 0.35     
Venezuela M 2000 Flop 2000 0.01 0.00    
Venezuela MAI(1) Flop 1978 0.01 0.00    
Venezuela MAN Flop 1958 0.58 0.55 0.67 0.29 0.00
Venezuela MANO Flop 1988 0.00 0.00    
Venezuela MAP Flop 1993 0.00 0.00    
Venezuela MAR Flop 1993 0.02 0.03 0.00   
Venezuela MCGN Flop 2005 0.08     
Venezuela MCM Flop 2005 0.62     
Venezuela MDA Flop 2000 0.02 0.00    
Venezuela MDD Flop 2000 0.48 0.13    
Venezuela MDI Flop 1968 0.50 0.14 0.00   
Venezuela MDP Flop 1993 0.21 0.00    
Venezuela MDP-BR Flop 1998 0.31 0.00    
Venezuela MDT Flop 1978 0.43 0.00    
Venezuela MEM Flop 1988 0.01 0.00    
Venezuela MENI Flop 1963 0.65 0.38 0.00   
Venezuela MIAP Flop 1988 0.06 0.01 0.00   
Venezuela MID Flop 1993 0.04 0.00    
Venezuela MIL Flop 1993 0.01 0.03 0.01   
Venezuela MIN Flop 1978 1.58 0.81 0.47 0.62 0.37
Venezuela MIO Flop 1983 0.15 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01
Venezuela MIPV Flop 1998 0.00 0.00    
Venezuela MIR Flop 1973 1.00 2.35 1.58 0.00  
Venezuela MIRA Flop 1998 0.02 0.00 0.04   
Venezuela MIRU Flop 1988 0.00 0.00    
Venezuela ML(1) Flop 1968 0.01 0.00 0.00   
Venezuela ML(2) Flop 2005 0.05     
Venezuela MLPU Flop 2005 0.01     
Venezuela MNBD Flop 1998 0.02 0.00    
Venezuela MNV Flop 1988 0.07 0.00    
Venezuela MOBARE 200-4F Flop 2005 0.68     
Venezuela MOMO Flop 1988 0.04 0.00    
Venezuela MONCHO Flop 1993 0.02 0.05 0.00   
Venezuela MORENA Flop 1978 0.50 0.01 0.00 0.00  
Venezuela MPDIN Flop 1983 0.00 0.06 0.02 0.00  
Venezuela MPJ Flop 2005 0.47     
Venezuela MPJ(1) Flop 1973 0.19 0.00    
Venezuela MR Flop 1993 0.03 0.13 0.01 0.55  
Venezuela MRN Flop 1993 0.17 0.02 0.00   
Venezuela MSN Flop 2005 0.42     
Venezuela MT Flop 2005 0.03     
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Venezuela NA Flop 1983 1.05 0.16 0.00   
Venezuela NED Flop 2005 0.03     
Venezuela NGD Flop 1983 0.16 3.30 0.35 0.00 0.00
Venezuela NOR Flop 1978 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.00
Venezuela NOSOTROS (PSN) Flop 1988 0.07 0.00    
Venezuela NR Flop 1993 0.01 0.00    
Venezuela NRD Flop 1998 0.01 0.10 0.00   
Venezuela NT Flop 1988 0.03 0.00 0.00   
Venezuela OI Flop 1988 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.01  
Venezuela ONDA Flop 1993 0.10 0.04 0.23   
Venezuela ONI Flop 1988 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.01  
Venezuela OPINA Flop 1968 0.20 0.74 0.15 1.98 0.58
Venezuela OPIR Flop 1968 0.06 0.00    
Venezuela ORA Flop 1978 0.03 1.29 0.87 0.54 0.02
Venezuela OVNI Flop 1968 0.12 0.00    
Venezuela PAN(1) Flop 1963 0.51 0.00    
Venezuela PAN(2) Flop 1993 0.01 0.00 0.00   
Venezuela PARTICIPA Flop 1998 0.06 0.00 0.00   
Venezuela PCI Flop 1993 0.18 0.00    
Venezuela PD Flop 2005 0.06     
Venezuela PENETRACION 88 Flop 1988 0.01 0.00    
Venezuela PENSAMIENTO NAC Flop 1993 0.00 0.00    
Venezuela PEV Flop 1993 0.11 0.00    
Venezuela PG Flop 1998 0.02 0.00    
Venezuela PLV Flop 1988 0.04 0.05 0.00   
Venezuela PN(1) Flop 1988 0.21 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.00
Venezuela PND Flop 1993 0.02 0.00    
Venezuela PNI Flop 1973 0.70 0.00    
Venezuela PNV Flop 1983 0.03 0.00    
Venezuela PODER Flop 1993 0.04 0.00    
Venezuela PODER LABORAL Flop 2005 0.24     
Venezuela PPI Flop 1998 0.02 0.00    
Venezuela PQAC Flop 1993 0.04 0.17 0.04 0.11  
Venezuela PRIN Flop 1963 3.44 2.39 0.00   
Venezuela PRIVO Flop 1968 0.17 0.00    
Venezuela PRN Flop 1973 0.09 0.00    
Venezuela PROSOCIAL Flop 1993 0.04 0.00    
Venezuela PST(1) Flop 1958 0.60 0.00    
Venezuela PST(2) Flop 1993 0.01 0.00    
Venezuela PUEBLO Flop 1988 0.03 0.00    
Venezuela PVL Flop 2005 0.33     
Venezuela RC(1) Flop 1998 0.02 0.01 0.00   
Venezuela RC(2) Flop 2005 0.09     
Venezuela REINA Flop 1973 0.01 0.00    
Venezuela RENACE Flop 1998 0.28 0.09    
Venezuela RENOVACION Flop 1988 0.11 0.12 1.27 0.00  
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Venezuela RHONA Flop 1988 0.00 0.00    
Venezuela RN(1) Flop 1983 0.23 0.00    
Venezuela RND Flop 1998 0.02 0.00    
Venezuela SENCO Flop 1993 0.06 0.00    
Venezuela SI(1) Flop 1983 0.04 0.00    
Venezuela SI(2) Flop 1993 0.01 0.50 0.34 0.07  
Venezuela SIGLO XXI Flop 1988 0.01 0.00    
Venezuela SOLIDARIDAD Flop 2005 0.06     
Venezuela SOLUCION Flop 1998 0.10 0.01 0.10   
Venezuela TNSD Flop 1993 0.01 0.00    
Venezuela TUPAMARO Flop 2005 1.26     
Venezuela U Flop 1993 0.05 0.00    
Venezuela UDH Flop 1998 0.62 0.76 0.54   
Venezuela UO Flop 1993 0.04 0.00    
Venezuela UP Flop 1983 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.00  
Venezuela UP(2) Flop 2005 0.27     
Venezuela UPC Flop 1993 0.01 0.14    
Venezuela UPP Flop 1968 0.04 0.00    
Venezuela UPV(2) Flop 2005 1.36     
Venezuela USP Flop 2005 0.47     
Venezuela UTOPIA Flop 1983 0.00 0.00    
Venezuela UVI Flop 1993 0.10 0.01 0.00 0.00  
Venezuela VDP Flop 2005 0.06     
Venezuela VISION Flop 2005 0.02     
Venezuela VOI(1) Flop 1983 0.06 0.00    
Venezuela VTM Flop 2005 0.03     
Venezuela VU Flop 1998 0.05 0.00    
Venezuela VUC Flop 1978 0.89 0.00    
Venezuela ZVPV Flop 2005 0.05     
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APPENDIX 3. ALTERNATIVE SAMPLES IN TRAJECTORY MODEL ESTIMATION 
The coding decision about when a party is new is clear in most cases. However, 
interruptions in democratic competition introduce a potentially ambiguous decision point. 
This appendix includes SPMM estimations on two alternative samples: one for the 24 
“legacy” parties alone and one for all parties, legacy and new. The legacy parties, including 
the trajectory group membership which results from an estimation on the first sample, are 
listed below in Table x. The estimation results appear in Figure X and Table X below. 
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Table A3.1: Legacy Parties 
      Vote Share 
Country Party Trajectory Election 1 Election 2 Election 3 Election 4 Election 5 
Venezuela AD Player 49.45 32.70 25.57 44.45 39.68 
Bolivia MNR Player 30.11 25.65 35.59 18.20 22.46 
Chile PDC Player 25.99 27.12 22.98 18.92 20.76 
Venezuela COPEI Player 15.20 20.81 24.00 30.24 39.81 
Bolivia ADN88 Crash 32.78 25.09   22.26 3.40 
Ecuador CFP Crash 31.73 8.99 9.44 8.09 4.16 
Venezuela URD Crash 26.76 17.38 9.26 3.19 1.68 
Ecuador PSC Riser 6.37 11.45 12.61 12.42 24.46 
Ecuador PLRE Flop 9.66 5.97 8.46 2.73 3.31 
Ecuador 
UN-
UNO Flop 8.86 3.53 1.39 2.00 4.24 
Venezuela PCV Flop 6.23 2.82 1.20 1.04 1.75 
Ecuador PR Flop 5.99 1.36 0.56 0.55 0.00 
Chile PC Flop 4.99 6.88 5.22 5.14   
Ecuador PNR Flop 4.54 2.24 1.86 0.00   
Ecuador FADI Flop 4.48 5.13 6.06 2.39 2.11 
Chile PRSD Flop 3.94 2.98 3.13 4.05 3.54 
Ecuador APRE Flop 3.03 0.22 2.42 4.31 2.15 
Ecuador FNV Flop 2.99 0.89 0.00     
Ecuador PS-FA Flop 2.62 1.76 4.39 4.31 8.87 
Bolivia PS-1 Flop 2.57 2.82 0.65 0.00   
Bolivia FSB Flop 1.34 0.75 1.27 0.00   
Chile PN Flop 0.79 0.04 0.00     
Venezuela PSD Flop 0.43 0.86 0.81 0.28 0.00 
Chile MAPU Flop 0.10 0.00       
 
                                                          
88
 ADN’s classification as “Crash” is highly influenced by its performance in election 5 which took place in 
2002 immediately following the death of its founder, Banzer. If one drops the fifth observation, the party is 
classified as a “player” and conforms more closely to what country experts might expect. 
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Figure A3.1: 4-Group Model for Legacy Parties 
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Table A3.2: 4-Group Model of Legacy Party Electoral Performance 
(Latent Trajectory Model; parties N=24; panel N=108) 
Group Population Prevalence Share Parameters   
Players 16.70%** Intercept 28.5** 
Crash 12.50%* Intercept 26.7** 
      Slope -6.1** 
Contender 4.20% Intercept 6.0 
      Slope 3.7** 
Flops 66.60%** Intercept 3.3** 
      Slope -0.5  
* significant at .1 level; ** significant at .05 level. 
 
Intercepts are undefined at t=0 and have been adjusted to t=1 
 
The result of the estimation above (on only legacy parties) offers support of the 
decision to exclude them from an analysis of party performance because two of the groups 
are distinctive. Both the group I have called “players” and the group I have called “crash” are 
not found empirically in the estimates of models which include only new parties. 
Furthermore, as groups consisting of parties with a long history in and out of democratic and 
authoritarian regimes, we would not have a strong theoretical basis for expecting them to 
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exist in the population new parties. The predictors of their performance are likely to be 
distinct from predictors of new party trajectories.  
The four legacy parties classified as “players” all began the democratic episode with a 
great deal of electoral strength, and remained strong throughout their first five elections. In 
fact, this set of four parties had a slope estimate which was not significant at the .05 level, 
suggesting that the group can be sufficiently described with the intercept alone—28.5% of 
the vote at election 1—and no slope. Three of the four parties in this group enter the founding 
election with a share of the vote which is not remarkably different from the share of the vote 
with which they exit the analysis five elections later. The one exception to this pattern is 
COPEI in Venezuela, and one can see that the posterior probability that this party belongs to 
this groups is relatively low. In fact, its posterior probability of belonging to the “riser” group 
(not reported here) makes up most of the difference.  
The group classified as “crash” began the episode very strongly—even stronger on 
average than the “players”—but their support quickly deteriorates. Empirically, this group 
resembles the “flash” group of the new parties model in that it has a large negative slope, but 
it differs in that the intercept is much higher. If we take into consideration the fact that these 
parties were organizationally continuous and that they had consolidated bases of electoral 
support before competing in the first post-transition election—two attributes not 
characteristic of new parties—then this distinctively high intercept is not surprising, and 
suggests that the group is conceptually distinct from what we will find among new parties. 
Accounting for their electoral performance—and especially their very high intercept 33% of 
the vote at election 1—requires a different theoretically account than what one expects to use 
in accounting for the performance of “flash” parties.  
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The lone “riser” party, Ecuador’s PSC, shares the profile of the “high rise” group in 
the main model, and as I show below, is classified with that group in a model including all 
new and preexisting parties. In many respects, it emerged from the transition to democracy in 
1978 as a new organization, and there is some disagreement among scholars as to whether it 
should be considered new or not. By the transition, many of its leaders, including its founder, 
had faded away and it was revitalized beginning at that point under the leadership of León 
Febres-Cordero. Its classification as a new or preexisting party is ambiguous, but technically 
it does not qualify as a new party according to my definition, and so I exclude it from the 
analysis.  
The last set of parties, which I also call “flop” parties, is distinctive from the flop 
parties of the main model in that the former greatly outlast the latter. In fact, the slope 
estimate, though slightly negative, is not significant. The trajectory of these parties is best 
described with a zero order polynomial—that is, with an intercept and no slope. Many of 
them are parties of the socialist and communist left or lingering elements of the traditional 
party system—liberals and conservatives—and they entered the new episode with long-
standing and deep roots in a very narrow labor or traditional elite. It is no surprise that they 
manage to hang on much longer than upstart parties which enter and win few votes. Six of 
the 16 continue to compete today. As a group they may share many common features, but 
their inheritance from the prior democratic regime makes them a distinctive analytic class of 
parties.  
The fact that there is a different theoretical foundation for understanding the 
performance of these preexisting parties means that it dilutes and confuses the analysis when 
they are included with the new parties. The consequences are not severe—as I indicate 
 253 
above, some of the trajectory groups are distinctive in terms of the intercept, slop, or both, 
and will therefore yield new and distinctive groups in the model. But this is not always the 
case, and the model has difficulty detangling some of the more subtle distinctions. Let us 
consider how the inclusion legacy parties with new parties alters alter the results.  
Figure x below graphs the six trajectories of the best fitting model when all parties—
new parties and legacy parties—are included in the analysis. My argument here is that these 
trajectory groups conflate parties operating under distinctive logics; therefore, rather than 
adopting group names which imply meaning, I will identify the trajectories using numbers 
where 1 corresponds to the group with the highest intercept, 2 corresponds to the group with 
the second highest intercept, etc.  
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Figure A3.2: 6-Group Model for Sample of Legacy and New Parties 
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Trajectory 1 conflates the new parties I call explosive with one preexisting party from 
the “players” group, Venezuela’s AD, with one exception: the new Bolivian party 
PODEMOS is removed from the group and placed on trajectory 2. This adjustment is trivial, 
however, because PODEMOS’ trajectory is fully determined by only one data point, its first 
election in 2005, which at 28% more closely matches trajectory 2’s intercept than trajectory 
1’s intercept. As one would expect, with such a shallow basis for computing its trajectory 
group, it has a 61% chance of being on trajectory 2 and a 39% chance of being on trajectory 
1. When more data points become available its classification will take place with more 
certainty. In sum, trajectory 1, by including a member of the “player” set, takes on a less 
extreme shape than its “explosive” counterpart in the main model and thereby dilutes the 
truly dramatic rise of the new parties in that group. Figure X.A below compares the explosive 
trajectory of the new party sample with trajectory 1 of the combined sample. 
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Figure A3.3: Group by Group Comparison Across Samples 
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Trajectory 2 is composed entirely of preexisting parties, with the exception of 
PODEMOS in Bolivia. Therefore, it is an entirely new trajectory relative to the new party 
sample and conforms mostly to the shape of the “players” trajectory, though it is slightly 
declining rather than flat. See Figure X.B above. 
Trajectory 3 conflates three of the “flash” new parties—those which among that 
group had a high level of initial success and slightly more staying power—with two of the 
three “crash” parties. In other words, it conflates the death of two legacy parties (Venezuela’s 
URD and Ecuador’s CFP) and the initial “flash” performance of three Bolivian parties (NFR, 
Condepa, and UCS). See Figure X.C above. 
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Trajectory 4 corresponds very closely to the “contender” group of the new party 
sample. The only difference in the classification result is that it incorporates the Ecuadorian 
PSC, a party which, as I mention above and argue in other sections of this project, closely 
resembles this group not only in its electoral trajectory, but in other ways. See Figure X.D 
above. 
Trajectories 5 combines many members of the groups of new parties which I call 
“flat” and “flash” parties with many members of the “flop” parties in the legacy only sample 
to yield a group which on average enters with around 6% of the vote and slowly declines, but 
not to the point of death. See Figure X.E above. 
Trajectory 6 is largely the same as the “flop” group in the new party sample, and it 
incorporates a few of the poorest performing legacy parties from the “flop” group in that 
model. See Figure X.F above. 
While I argue that the wholesale inclusion of legacy parties alters the model in 
important and problematic ways, one may wonder if and how coding errors which incorrectly 
classify parties as new or preexisting will effect the analysis. The case of Ecuador’s PSC, 
which I code as a legacy party, suggests that the consequence can be trivial in that the 
parameter estimates are trivially changed. Chile’s Socialist Party is another ambiguous case 
which, for reasons outlined elsewhere, I classify as new. It is classified together with other 
“contender” parties in both the new party sample and the sample which includes all parties. 
When the analysis turns to the incorporation of predictors of trajectory classification, the 
PSCH may be different in important ways from other members of this group, but at this stage 
of the analysis where I focus on forming the dependent variable, it does not seem to matter. 
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In sum, these results confirm a) that most preexisting parties have electoral profiles 
following a democratic transition that are empirically distinctive from the profiles of new 
parties; and b) that the estimates used in the main body of this project are not sensitive to the 
coding decisions for parties that are ambiguously new or preexisting. 
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APPENDIX 4. PARTY BIRTHS, DEATHS, SPLITS AND MERGERS IN ECUADOR 
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